The descent of evolutionary debunking. by Davis, Oscar
Bond University
DOCTORAL THESIS






Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
















Submitted in total fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
August 2020 











In this thesis I explore and critique an emergent metaethical challenge against moral realism 
called the evolutionary debunking argument (EDA). The EDA surfaces from the attempt to 
integrate findings from evolutionary science with the philosophical project of understanding 
the metaphysical and epistemological nature of the ‘ultimate foundations’ of morality. After 
surveying current literature by identifying four distinct formulations of the argument and 
existing counter-arguments, I introduce and formulate a new challenge to aspiring debunkers, 
called the otiosity argument. This argument stipulates that the success of the debunking 
manoeuvre depends on a series of imported assumptions or pre-established arguments 
regarding the metaphysical and epistemological nature of morality. I demonstrate how in 
various instances in the debunking literature these assumptions or attempts to pre-establish 
certain anti-realist conclusions play out in the otiosity argument. I conclude that the EDA is 
only as successful as these imported metaethical assumptions and arguments and that the 
EDA is therefore otiose to the metaethical debate between realists and anti-realists. Upon 
reviewing the success of the integration of findings from evolutionary science, I propose a 
positive metaethical account grounded in a renewed perspective towards the evolution of 
morality and metaethical constructivism. I suggest that the future of this domain of enquiry 
takes on this renewed perspective and acknowledges the descent of the evolutionary 
debunking manoeuvre.  
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In discussions of evolution and morality, an important starting point seems to be that we 
Hominin have a capacity for normative guidance – an ability on the one hand to make 
judgements about how people ought to have acted and on the other to be motivated through 
this normative capacity to act in ways which seem to accord with our judgements. But, as has 
become a common phrasing of this central issue, whence morality?1 In moral judgement, it 
appears that we have a general consensus about the rightness or goodness of certain acts or 
traits of individuals and that some are better than others at articulating these judgements. In 
deciding how one should act, some are better than others at acting in accordance with what 
they feel or reason to be right or good. In both the formations of judgements and decisions, 
the properties of rightness or goodness might be employed. The metaphysical nature of these 
properties, our epistemic access to them, and the factuality of the properties themselves, 
frame important metaethical questions which have become intertwined with our evolutionary 
story.  
With the emergence of sociobiology, and the more recent emergence of evolutionary 
psychology, those who sought to answer this question have mostly agreed with E.O Wilson’s 
claim that “the time has come for ethics to be removed temporarily from the hands of the 
philosophers and biologized.”2 The ripples of Wilson’s claim have come to form great waves 
in metaethical debate. It can appear no longer as a temporary removal but an indefinite 
submersion, where henceforth morality espouses a myth, a useful fiction, or otherwise 
nothing at all. The properties of rightness or goodness are still employed in discussions of 
morality. But many, because of this biological integration, are now increasingly sceptical 
 
1 "Moral Thinking: Biology Invades a Field Philosophers Thought Was Safely Theirs," The Economist, 
http://www.economist.com/science/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10717915. 




about the actual existence of a true right and wrong. In modern metaethical debate, this shift 
can be traced back to the emergence of a particular argument called the evolutionary 
debunking argument (henceforth, EDA). The argument was first employed by Michael Ruse, 
though it has since been fine-tuned and had its crosshairs widened and narrowed in various 
ways throughout its development.3  
This is an opportune time to draw attention to the mechanisms of this argument, the 
underlying assumptions and its various formations, because its increasing prominence has a 
number of serious implications. In this thesis, I will argue that we should not have any 
confidence in this argument, and we should be sceptical about the debunking role of such 
evolutionary considerations in metaethical arguments. I conclude that old metaethical 
questions are at the heart of the debunking literature and, upon examination, carry the 
argumentative load of the anti-realist. I do not attempt to solve these metaethical questions, 
but I show how realists facing the EDA are not in as much trouble as they have been led to 
believe. Having untangled some of the ropes, I close by suggesting some avenues for the 
ongoing conversation. 
In the first chapter, I explore four different formulations of the evolutionary 
debunking argument. I describe each formulation and briefly explore their strengths and 
weaknesses. I conclude this chapter with an analysis of the deep structure of the argument 
and present a general structure which I will refer to throughout this dissertation. 
In the second chapter, I explore objections to the EDA. I open this chapter with what I 
believe to be the most considerable and yet mostly underappreciated challenge for aspiring 
debunkers, a challenge I label the otiosity argument. In brief, the otiosity argument shows 
that important metaethical assumptions are inherent in the general debunking strategy. These 
 
3 I credit Ruse with the first formal characterisation of the EDA. However, Darwin made important precursory 
claims which lie at the heart of the EDA when he applied his evolutionary theory to human evolution in, The 
Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex. I return to Darwin’s contribution in chapter one.  
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assumptions render evolutionary considerations otiose to the debate over the mind-
independence of value. I then survey prominent categories of responses to the argument 
throughout debunking literature. I close this chapter by returning to the significance of the 
otiosity argument.  
In the third chapter I begin to explore those assumptions which I argued were inherent 
in the general debunking strategy. It is only with a certain understanding of moral ontology, I 
argue, that evolutionary considerations fix an anti-realist conclusion. I explore a case 
whereby the EDA fails because moral ontology is construed in a way that is more 
sympathetic towards the varieties of moral realism. This demonstrates that the anti-realist 
conclusions of the EDA depend on the construal of ontology as opposed to the mere 
integration of evolutionary facts. This reinforces the significance of the otiosity argument.  
In the fourth chapter, I continue my analysis of the underlying methaethical 
assumptions of the EDA by accepting relevant evolutionary facts and demonstrating that 
realism can still follow. Evolutionary facts can be both vindicating and debunking, so I 
suggest that the fulcrum of the debate lies elsewhere in the characterisation of truth about 
normative reasons. This further reinforces the significance of the otiosity argument. 
In chapter five, I revisit the formulations of the EDA and after identifying further 
underlying assumptions, locate that fulcrum in constructivist literature – where reasons as 
opposed to truth-instantiating facts take centre stage. 
In chapter six, I focus on the characterisations of truth about normative reasons. I 
show that the debate about the mind-independence of value rests with how truth is 
characterised in particular versions of metaethical constructivism. I examine prominent 
versions and discuss how they accommodate evolutionary facts differently. It is the debate 
between constructivists, and the viability of each competing constructivist theory, which 
seem to inform the debate between realists and anti-realists, as opposed to the use of 
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evolutionary facts. Since the explanatory function of evolutionary facts seems dependent on 
the version of constructivism adopted, the significance of the otiosity argument is reinforced. 
But there is another important observation to be made. The construal of constructivism as a 
anti-realist position involves an array of imported metaethical assumptions. 
In conclusion, my claim is that metaethical debate does not crucially depend upon 
evolutionary considerations. The outcome of metaethical debates rests upon ‘good-old 
metaethical argumentation’, as opposed to any solitary evolutionary consideration. This 
should mark the descent of evolutionary debunking. Instead, I propose, we should look to 
how our moral discourse can be enhanced by a more open study of our evolved natures and 

















CHAPTER ONE: FORMULATIONS OF THE EDA 
In the twentieth century, metaethical debate shifted towards philosophical naturalism – the 
view that all properties are analysable in terms of the physical sciences.4 Evolutionary ethics 
represents one such integration. FitzPatrick proposes three approaches to evolutionary ethics 
in practice: 
Descriptive Evolutionary Ethics: evolutionary theory is integrated in the scientific 
explanations of how we inherited certain cognitive capacities, patterns of behaviour 
and thought, or attitudinal predispositions. An example of this kind of explanation 
would be how we inherited the capacity to efficiently detect cheaters. 
Prescriptive Evolutionary Ethics: evolutionary theory is integrated in the normative 
domain where it may justify or undermine a particular approach to prescriptive ethics. 
An example of this kind of explanation would be the classic Spencerian prescription, 
survival of the fittest, or attempts to link the human predilection for altruism to 
altruistic prescriptions.  
Evolutionary Metaethics: evolutionary theory is integrated to support or undermine 
metaethical theories.5 
 Although I will refer to descriptive evolutionary ethics at various points, evolutionary 
metaethics will be the focus of this dissertation. The evolutionary debunking argument 
(EDA) is an attempt to integrate evolutionary theory and metaethics. I will explore four 
different formulations of the evolutionary debunking argument: the Non-Foundational 
Formulation; the Superfluity Formulation; the Sensitivity Formulation; and the Implausibility 
Formulation. The formulations are differentiated by their epistemic premise – that is, whether 
the target is the truth of the claim that there are moral facts, our belief that there are moral 
 
4 This definition suffices for introductory purposes. I will elaborate on this interpretation in chapter three.  
5 William FitzPatrick, "Morality and Evolutionary Biology," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. 
Edward N. Zalta (2016). 
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facts that obtain ‘stance-independently’, or our justification for believing that there are moral 
facts that obtain stance-independently.  
The Non-Foundational Formulation seeks to debunk the claim of an objective 
foundation to morality by arguing that morality is the result of the non-truth tracking 
genealogy of natural selection. The Superfluity Formulation appeals to ontological parsimony 
and the empirical claim of a completed non-moral genealogy of morality. The Sensitivity 
Formulation argues through a truth conditional theory of knowledge that moral beliefs do not 
count as knowledge given their status conferred from their evolutionary origins. The 
Implausibility Formulation is a two-pronged attack on the justifications offered by realists in 
the face of the debunking argument.  
Before describing these arguments, I will make further distinction. Erik Wielenberg 
distinguishes between metaphysical and epistemological debunking arguments: 
“[metaphysical debunking arguments show] that no moral belief that can be given an 
evolutionary explanation is true” whereas epistemological debunking arguments show that 
“the existence of an evolutionary explanation for a given moral belief implies that even if the 
belief is true, it is not knowledge.”6  To debunk morality metaphysically is to say that our 
moral beliefs are in fact false, whereas to debunk morality epistemologically is to say that 
they are not known to be true – as they are unjustified or do not count as knowledge. I will 
refer to this distinction throughout my analysis of these arguments.  
 
1.1 The Non-Foundational Formulation 
Michael Ruse argues that there is no objective foundation to morality given that it is a 
biological adaptation. 7 Though humans still have an awareness of right and wrong and a 
 
6 Erik Wielenberg, "On the Evolutionary Debunking of Morality," Ethics 120, no. 1 (2010). 442 
7 Michael Ruse, The Darwinian Paradigm (London: Routledge, 1989). 
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sense of obligation, this awareness can be explained by its biological worth.8 The first 
premise of his debunking argument can be constructed from his claim that, “morality is a 
biological adaptation, no less than are hands and feet and teeth.”9  Ruse then argues that, “the 
recognition of morality as merely a biological adaptation shows that there can be no 
foundation of the kind traditionally sought.”10  Ruse argues that predominant belief in the 
objectivity of morality is a functional illusion. As a species, we needed to believe that 
morality was objectively true and that it is “a function of something outside of and higher 
than ourselves” otherwise we would be less inclined to cooperate.11 Given the irrelevance of 
truth in the fitness-tracking story of the evolution of propensities to form moral beliefs, Ruse 
forms the conclusion that if morality is biologically adapted, then morality cannot have an 
objective foundation. This form of the EDA can be stated succinctly: 
1. If x is a biological adaptation, then x cannot have an objective foundation 
2. x is a biological adaptation 
3. Therefore, x cannot have an objective foundation 
Ruse’s support for the first premise takes the form of a response to Nozick. Nozick says: 
If a speeding train is bearing down on me, I am inclined to jump out of its way. How 
is it that I am aware of this train? Obviously through my evolved capacities of sight 
and hearing and so forth. My awareness of the train comes to me through adaptations 
which selection has put in place. Yet, no one would want to claim that the train does 
not have a reality in its own right. Why, therefore, should one feel able to deny that 
ethics or morality has a reality in its own right? The fact that awareness comes 
 
8 Ibid. 261 
9 Ibid. 262 




through adaptations is quite irrelevant to matters of ontology. There is, therefore, a 
blatant fallacy, right in the middle of the evolutionary ethical position.12  
Ruse argues that the analogy fails as it assumes the existence of the train. Given that we have 
no reason to assume the existence of moral facts as the foundation of moral claims, he argues, 
the analogy collapses. Ruse writes: 
Start with the fact that the argument about the train goes through because and only 
because the existence of the train is assumed independently. Suppose, for instance, 
one had two worlds identical except that one has a speeding train and the other does 
not. There would be no reason to think the evolutionist is committed to a belief in 
speeding trains in both worlds. One is aware of the speeding train only because there 
is such a train. Now consider two worlds, one of which has an objective morality, 
whatever that might mean (God’s will? Non-natural properties?), and the other world 
has no such morality. If the evolutionist’s case is well taken, the people in both worlds 
are going to have identical beliefs-subject to normal laws of causation and so forth. 
The existence of the objective ethics is in no way necessary for a derivation of our 
belief in an objective ethics from an evolutionary perspective. So, at the very least, 
what we can say is that an objective ethics is redundant to the evolutionist’s case.13 
Ruse attempts to show that “morality is no more than a collective illusion fobbed off on us by 
our genes for reproductive ends”14 and that “[m]orality is just an aid to survival and 
reproduction, and has no being beyond this.”15 As a comparative argument, he suggests that 
following World War I, belief in the supernatural increased as the requirement for solace and 
comfort rose in the face of death and loss. People were better off believing the ‘collective 
 
12 Quoted in Michael Ruse, "The New Evolutionary Ethics," in Evolutionary Ethics, ed. Matthew Nitecki and 
Doris Nitecki (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993). 155-156 
13 Ibid. 156 
14 Ibid. 152 
15 Ruse, The Darwinian Paradigm. 268 
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illusion’ that they could, for example, communicate with their dead loved ones through 
supernatural devices such as Ouija boards.  
Of course, we see that there was no justified foundation for a claim such as this. 
Excluding obvious cases of fraud, and I suspect that these were a lot fewer than the 
cynics maintain, we know full well of the successes of the séance were due 
exclusively to the capacity of people under stress to deceive themselves. They wanted 
to hear (or if you like “hear”) the comforting messages – and so they did. Once the 
causal analysis is given, we see that there is no place for a rational justification. 
Likewise, in ethics once we see that moral claims are simply adaptations, there is 
neither a place for or need of rational justification.16  
In the same way that a ‘causal analysis’ debunks the supernatural beliefs of the subjects in his 
analogy, so too does a genealogical understanding of the origins of moral beliefs debunk the 
claims of the moral realist. To draw out this séance argument, take the following version of 
the debunking argument: 
1. If hearing voices of the dead is the product of self-deceptive wish fulfilment, 
then x cannot have an objective foundation. 
2. x is the product of a self-deceptive wish fulfilment 
3. Therefore, x cannot have an objective foundation 
We have a number of reasons for positing the causal premise (that the ‘hearing’ of the voices 
and the self-deception are linked), and support could be found in an empirical investigation of 
the causal claims made within the epistemic domain of séance.17 Ruse likely benefits from 
this multitude of reasons, as the reader is generally either immune to the causal premise (in 
 
16 "The New Evolutionary Ethics." 156 
17 The relevant ‘causal’ claim in EDAs is the claim that evolution did influence the belief, faculty or attitude in 
question. I will use this term frequently. I will more fully introduce this term when I consider the deep structure 
of the EDA.  
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the case of faith), or overly welcoming to it (in the case of already being in ontological 
agreement with Ruse). But the final and most important feature of Ruse’s claim, is how the 
possibility of defence is removed in the same swipe as the debunking argument in his claim 
that, “the successes of the séance were due exclusively to the capacity of people under stress 
to deceive themselves.”18 It is exclusive to the capacity of, not just the tendency for, or the 
possibility of, and this claim is crucial to the success of Ruse’s argument . It is necessary that 
every justification put forward by the subject be the product of this off-track belief formation 
system. So, the completed argument is as follows: 
1. If x is the product of a spiritual séance, and alternative justifications of x are 
false, then x cannot have an objective foundation 
2. x is the product of a spiritual séance 
3. Alternate justifications in defence of x were formed exclusively under these 
conditions of self-deception and thus are false 
4. Therefore, x cannot have an objective foundation 
So, in the moral case, the final argument would have to account for this inherited capacity for 
self-delusion: 
1. If x is the product of evolutionary inheritance, and alternative justifications of 
x are false, then x cannot have an objective foundation 
2. x is the product of evolutionary inheritance 
3. Alternate justifications in defence of x were formed exclusively under an 
inherited predisposition to deceive ourselves, bolstering our tendency to 
cooperate, and are thus false. 
4. Therefore, x cannot have an objective foundation 
 
18 Ibid.  
11 
 
The sociobiological explanation for our reluctance to accept that there is no objective 
foundation for morality targets our incredulity. Ruse believes that it is evolutionarily 
beneficial for us to think that morality has an objective foundation and thus we would be 
understandably hesitant to accept that his argument, the Non-Foundational EDA, is 
successful. If we didn’t consider judgement of right and wrong to be rationally justifiable, 
“we would be less inclined to obey it and obeying rules is generally adaptive for human 
beings.”19 Without the illusion of objectivity, we could not experience normativity, and thus 
Ruse argues that morality would not fulfil its evolutionary function.  
If I think I should help you when and only when I want to, I shall probably help you 
relatively infrequently. But because I think I ought to help you – because I have no 
choice about my obligation, it being imposed upon me – I am much more likely, in 
fact, to help you.20 
Having rid ourselves of this collective illusion, are we thereby more likely to be immoral? If 
the function of the inherited myth of morality was to bind us to moral behaviour which is 
beneficial to ourselves, our families or our society, then debunking the myth seems to leave 
us without a clear reason to be moral at all. On the one hand, Ruse may well concede that this 
is the upshot of his position – he does indeed think that we have no reasons to be good. On 
the other hand, he might argue that there exist reasons for cooperating which obtain 
independently of those inherited predispositions which are tainted by the collective illusion. 
The first possibility means that, for Ruse, morality doesn’t involve any categorical 
requirements to be good. The second possibility means that morality does involve such 
requirements. Ruse seems to favour the latter view: 
 
19 Lemos, 2000, p.214 John Lemos, "Evolution and Ethical Skepticism: Reflections on Ruse's Meta-Ethics," 
Journal of Social and Evolutionary Systems 21, no. 2 (2000). 214 
20 Ruse, The Darwinian Paradigm. 268 
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The whole point about morality is that it is binding, not open to individual choice. It is 
greater than and above any of us. In other words, it has all of the features that we 
associate with objectivity…. Note, however, that the illusion lies not in the morality 
itself, but in the sense of objectivity. I am certainly not saying that morality is unreal. 
Of course it is not! What is unreal is the apparent objective reference to morality.21 
If morality is not objective and is yet still binding, Ruse’s challenge is to demonstrate how 
this post-myth morality functions exactly like the inherited myth-morality, without the 
illusion – the very motivational bulwark which is apparently required to make us more likely 
to help each other. He must show how reasons to be good are obtained in post-myth morality 
independently of any set of illusory reasons and beliefs which were inherited. 
  
1.2 The Superfluity Formulation 
Proponents of this form of the argument believe that our understanding of evolutionary 
biology allows us to fully explain moral beliefs and thus to posit that these moral beliefs are 
objectively true is explanatorily superfluous. 
Gibbard touches on this form of argument in his claim that, “[i]f the [evolutionary] 
account is on the right track, then our normative capacities can be explained without 
supposing that there is a special kind of normative fact to which they typically respond.”22 
Unlike the manner in which our sense organs can allow us to form judgements based on facts 
of our surroundings, moral judgements are capacities which allow us to cooperate in mutually 
beneficial ways.23 In his evolutionary speculation, Gibbard believes there may be natural 
facts, but no ‘peculiarly normative’ facts. If it is the role of biology to discuss the ontological 
status of normative judgements, there is no requirement to posit the existence of normative 
 
21 Taking Darwin Seriously (New York: Blackwell, 1986). 252-253 
22 Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (London: Clarendon Press, 1998). 107 
23 I will address this comparison between senses and morality in chapter two.  
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facts as well. Gibbard concludes, “[o]ur making [judgements] is to be explained by the 
rewards of coordination. To suppose there are normative facts is gratuitous.”24 This is the 
essence of the Superfluity Formulation.  
Joyce’s version of this argument is formulated by assessing two hypotheses which 
aim to describe the phenomenon of moral judgements.25 He contrasts a completed non-moral 
genealogy of moral beliefs with the supposition of moral or normative facts. Since moral 
judgements, such as judgements grounded in fairness and guilt, have biologically explicable 
origins, one can explain them in biological and subsequently psychological and sociological 
terms.26 Moral facts “should be excised from the picture with a swift slash from Ockham’s 
Razor, since we have a complete explanation of moral judgement with no need to posit any 
extra ontology in the form of moral facts.”27 However, Joyce acknowledges that this 
argument might be too hasty. It would be irrational to dismiss the existence of cats because 
they can be explained in terms of physics as “there is a sense in which cat is an ontological 
category over and above those of physics and chemistry, but there is also a sense in which 
positing this category does not really amount to adding extra ontological richness of the 
world, since the zoological category fits into those of the underlying sciences.”28 What is left 
for Joyce is “a kind of moral scepticism – scepticism, that is, in the classic sense of the word, 
meaning that the evidence favours neither a proposition nor its negation, and thus one could 
choose (or is required) to reserve judgement on the matter, at least until new evidence turns 
up.”29 This results in Joyce arguing for a “cultivating agnosticism”, one that accepts the label 
 
24 Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. 108 
25 Richard Joyce, The Evolution of Morality (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2006). 189 
26 This premise is vital to the success of the EDA. I question its success in chapter two, section 2. 
27 Joyce, The Evolution of Morality. 188 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 223 
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of an error theoretic position.30 This means that Joyce doesn’t believe we have the grounds to 
endorse moral propositions and that such moral propositions are unjustified.  
This is not to say that Joyce doesn’t believe that, for example, murdering for pleasure 
is wrong and thus that he is indifferent to actions that are gratuitously cruel and actions that 
are not. In fact, Joyce would argue that gratuitous cruelty is not morally permissible or 
impermissible, for it is not “morally anything.”31  
Just as one can make an autonomous decision not to maximize one’s genetic 
reproductive potential – after all, not many men are queuing at the sperm bank every 
day eager to max out their donations – so too we can make an autonomous decision to 
support social cohesion. We can simply decide to be kind to each other, to refrain 
from harming each other, to repay our debts, and so on.32  
Though there are no absolute moral truths, there are certain fictions to which members of a 
society can subscribe. These fictions are useful in a pragmatic sense, given their function in 
the evolutionary framework. In Joyce’s view, this sceptical position coincides with 
epistemological decrees whilst not completely dismantling the possibility of moral discourse.  
Hence much of the time one speaks and acts and even thinks as if one really believes 
in morality. The idea is, then, that one can in this way gain some of the pragmatic 
benefits that come from sincere moral belief. And yet in doing so one violates no 
epistemological imperative since one doesn’t believe it; one’s ‘acceptance’ of 
morality falls short of belief since one remains disposed to concede, if pressed in an 
appropriately serious and critical way, that it’s all false.33 
 
30 Though it is not detrimental to his argument, he later admits that scepticism is more accurate here than error 
theory. See: Richard Joyce, "Irrealism and the Geneaology of Morals," Ratio 26 (2013). 354 





With a supposedly satisfactory and complete empirical picture of the phenomenon in 
question, we have no reason to believe in moral facts.34 However, the possibility remains that 
a realist account could be embedded in or reducible to this ‘empirical picture’, and Joyce 
acknowledges this. Such an account would be a form of moral naturalism. Joyce concludes 
that the burden of proof lies with the naturalist to provide a theory or, at least, provide good 
grounds for believing that such a theory is forthcoming.  
The pivotal claim here is a restatement of Gilbert Harman’s challenge. Essentially, 
Harman argues that a moral judgement can be explained without reference to the truth of the 
judgement.  
If there is no reductive account available explaining how moral facts relate to 
naturalistic facts, then moral claims cannot be tested, moral theories cannot be 
confirmed of disconfirmed, and we have no evidence for the existence of moral 
facts.35 
Importantly, Joyce argues, Harman never establishes the antecedent claim. Instead, Harman 
attempts to form reductive accounts so as to avoid the challenge. Joyce explores Harman’s 
argument to first question the plausibility of reductive and non-reductive accounts of 
naturalism, before expanding argument to include non-naturalism. Harman constructs a 
scenario whereby we observe a group of children pour gasoline on a cat before igniting it, he 
continues: 
… You make a moral judgement immediately and without conscious reasoning, say, 
that the children are wrong to set the cat on fire. … In order to explain your making 
[this judgement], it would be reasonable to assume, perhaps, that the children really 
are pouring gasoline on a cat and you are seeing them do it. But [there is no] obvious 
 
34 Joyce, The Evolution of Morality. 195 
35 Ibid. 184-185 
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reason to assume anything about “moral facts,” such as that it is really wrong to set 
the cat on fire. … Indeed, an assumption about moral facts would seem to be totally 
irrelevant to the explanation of your making the judgement you make. It would seem 
that all we need assume is that you have certain more or less well-articulated moral 
principles that are reflected in the judgements you make, based on your moral 
sensibility. It seems to be completely irrelevant to our explanation whether your 
intuitive immediate judgement is true of false.36  
If it is true that the judgement itself can be explained in terms of chemistry and 
physics for example, without recourse to concepts of “wrongness” or even of “cat”, then to 
attempt to explain why this particular judgement was either right or wrong is unnecessary. 
Joyce argues that if we have an explanation as to why we believe a particular act was wrong, 
a reductive and naturalistic explanation as to why a judgement is the way it is, then it is not 
clear “how wrongness [is] needed to explain anything in the situation, in which case we have 
no reason to believe that it is a part of this cat-burning episode at all.” 37 Because the moral 
judgement can be explained without appealing to the moral facts, we cannot justifiably assert 
that the act is morally wrong. This claim is then extended to us having no reason to believe 
that anything is actually wrong. Judiciously, Joyce critiques this argument on the grounds that 
naturalism could explain what is wrong and that it is worth considering the case of the 
naturalist to discover whether any putative justification is in fact a post-hoc justification, in 
contrast to a post-hoc rationalisation.  
Thus a conclusion about moral naturalism is presupposed by the superfluity 
formulation of the EDA. Joyce begins his consideration of moral naturalism by exploring 
Robert Richards’ attempt to vindicate morality. Richards first shows how an inference may 
 
36 Gilbert Harman, The Nature of Morality: An Introduction to Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977). 
7. Quoted in: Joyce, The Evolution of Morality. 185 
37 The Evolution of Morality. 186 
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be possible to move from “is” to “ought” by appealing to the “beliefs and practices” of 
“rational men.” Just as these rational men consider modus ponens a valid argument structure, 
so too would they agree on a similar kind of justification in ethics. At the core of his 
argument, Richards argues for a rational stopping point - one that would be fairly intuitive - 
so as to not lead the questioner in an infinite justificatory regress. Joyce makes the point that 
there is sense in this argument, but that, “it is not enough to observe that there must be a 
stopping point somewhere and then choose your favourite contender (one that, incidentally, 
supports your pet theory).”38 Joyce disagrees with Richards’ foundation, before taking issue 
with his central attempt to vindicate morality. 
… the evidence shows that evolution has, as a matter of fact, constructed human 
beings to act for the community good; but to act for the community good is what we 
mean by being moral. Since, therefore, human beings are moral beings – an 
unavoidable condition produced by evolution - each ought to act for the community 
good.39  
Rottschaefer incorporates this argument into a more succinct statement of Richards position: 
1. Evolution produces in human dispositions to act for the community good. 
2. Acting for the community good is what we mean by acting morally. 
3. Therefore, humans ought to act for the community good.40  
Richards’ argument may have merit, despite his asking us to take his empirical premises on 
faith. Joyce counters that the kind of ‘ought’ that Richards produces does not contain the 
‘practical oomph’ that a practical morality requires, as the ‘ought’ claims derived are merely 
 
38 Ibid. 158 
39 Robert Richards, "A Defense of Evolutionary Ethics," Biology and Philosophy 1 (1986). 289 
40 William Rottschaefer, "Evolutionary Naturalistic Justifications of Morality: A Matter of Faith and Works," 
ibid.6, no. 3 (1991). 342 
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predictive – no more instructive then the claim of a physicist that “a particle ought to leave a 
trail of ions in a cloud chamber.”41  
Next, Joyce explores the attempt to use evolutionary biology to vindicate morality by 
Richmond Campbell. Campbell claims that morality is justified because it is innate, a claim 
which he argues for empirically. The essential problem with Campbell’s argument is that it 
can only by justified instrumentally. Take the following passage:  
…the argument rests on the normative but non-moral principle that having some 
morality rather than none is justified for every member of the group if having some 
morality rather than none overwhelmingly improves the life prospects of everyone in 
the group. Since the biological explanation for the existence of morality implies that 
having some morality rather than none overwhelmingly improves the life prospects of 
everyone in the group, it follows (given the principle just cited) that having some 
morality rather than none is justified.42 
Campbell’s claim is that if the factors which explain the evolution of morality can be 
identified, then those very factors can at the same time justify the existence of morality. But 
Campbell’s claim offers no account of the nature of those properties or why we would be 
inclined to act in such a way that it improves the life prospects of the group. The claim 
justifies the existence of a morality, but not necessarily a realist one. The instrumentalist 
justification here lacks moral clout. 
Finally, Joyce turns to Daniel Dennett’s attempt to provide an account for moral 
naturalism, which might be reducible to or embedded in the causal evolutionary premise. 
Joyce argues that Dennett’s work on this particular issue is mostly incoherent and 
presumptuous, but he turns on a particular phrase:  
 
41 Joyce, The Evolution of Morality. 160 
42 Richmond Campbell, "Can Biology Make Ethics Objective?," Biology and Philosophy 11 (1996). 24 
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Ethics must be somehow based on an appreciation of human nature – on a sense of 
what a human being is or might be, and on what a human being might want to have or 
want to be. If that is naturalism, then naturalism is no fallacy.43 
Joyce is quick to reject this claim as it does not align with his definition of naturalism that, 
“moral properties and relations exist and can be comfortably integrated within a naturalistic 
view of the world – the kind of world that science can investigate.”44 Joyce argues that the 
attempt to establish the viability of naturalism fails to satisfy his moral clout requirement, and 
thus he believes the debunking attempt can proceed.45  
Joyce’s strategy is to show that an evolutionary consideration debunks rather than 
vindicates morality. He argues that there could be three hypotheses for explaining moral 
judgements. Hypothesis A, “promises to explain all our moral judgements, leaving us without 
need to posit any moral facts…unless the moral facts are somehow implicitly buried in 
hypothesis A.”46 He continues that, “[t]he only way that moral facts could be buried in a 
scientific genealogical hypothesis is if some kind of moral naturalism were true.”47 
Hypothesis B would be that non-natural moral facts can adequately explain moral 
judgements, and Hypothesis C that supernatural moral facts could. Since hypothesis B and C 
posit an extra ontology in the world, and hypothesis A exists as a fully formed non-moral 
genealogy, then hypothesis B and hypothesis C are explanatorily superfluous.48 Joyce’s main 
contention against naturalism is the inability for a naturalistic theory to demonstrate ‘moral 
 
43 Daniel Dennett, Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1995). 468 
44 Joyce, The Evolution of Morality. 145 
45 Ultimately, Joyce’s requirement for moral clout seems to be motivated by his discontent with the ‘practical 
oomph’ of naturalist accounts. If morality is acting in the best interests of the community then Joyce would 
argue that morality only seems to matter if the interests of the community matter first. I develop this critique and 
a response in Chapter Three. 
46 Joyce, The Evolution of Morality. 209 
47 Ibid. 
48 He reinforces that this is dependent on the availability of Hypothesis A: ibid. 187 
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clout’ but his objection to non-naturalism is not made explicit.49 Nonetheless, he then forms 
the following argument:   
…Once we have a complete non-moral genealogy of moral judgement, if naturalism 
succeeds non-naturalism and supernaturalism are sunk, if moral naturalism fails non-
naturalism and supernaturalism are sunk. Thus non-naturalism and supernaturalism 
suffer most in this argumentative fray, whereas the moral naturalist is defeated only 
through independent arguments…50 
Whether or not a completed non-moral genealogy currently exists is debatable, but what is 
assumed with Joyce’s position as a naturalist about reality (not about moral properties) is that 
such a genealogy could exist and that its existence renders moral realism explanatorily 
superfluous. Again, this all depends on the reasons counting against moral naturalism – a 
point I return to in chapter four. 
It could be said that Ruse uses this form of the EDA as well. He sets up his argument 
with the claim that, “[t]he theory of the co-evolution of genes and culture can be used to 
further understand the origin and meaning of the epigenetic rules, including those that effect 
moral reasoning.”51 Next, he argues that realists are committed to the notion that morality is 
both objective and eternal. If this is so, and evolution can potentially change ethical laws 
through genetic evolution, just as other species have vastly different moral laws to humans, 
then positing the objectivity and the eternal, fixed nature of moral truths is unjustified. The 
realists have no reason to posit the existence of extrasomatic truths when those moral 
principles could both be explained by evolutionary processes and at any point be changed by 
them.52 Elsewhere, he writes that: 
 
49 I return to this in chapter four. 
50 Joyce, The Evolution of Morality. 210 
51 Michael Ruse and Edward Wilson, "Moral Philosophy as Applied Science," Philosophy 61 (1986). 185 
52 By extrasomatic, Ruse and Wilson mean “divinely placed within the brain or else outside of the brain 
awaiting revelation.” Ibid. 186 
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…the existence of the objective ethics is in no way necessary for a derivation of our 
belief in an objective ethics from an evolutionary perspective. So, at the very least, 
what we can say is that an objective ethics is redundant to the evolutionist’s case.53 
As Joyce rightly identifies, even if evolutionary theory could account for everything which 
required explanation, in terms of morality, this does not guarantee that moral facts do not 
exist. If moral facts are among this evolutionary explanation, or implied by it, in terms of a 
naturalist realism, then the argument falls through. The debunker is first required to show that 
naturalism is sunk, and thus that non-naturalism and supernaturalism are as well.54 Once 
naturalism, non-naturalism and supernaturalism are shown to fail to meet the demands of a 
moral theory, the non-moral genealogy – the evolutionary account of morality – renders those 
realist positions superfluous.  
The core of the Superfluity Formulation could be written as follows: 
(1) If s’s belief that p is fully explained by φ, and φ neither entails nor presupposes α, 
then α is explanatorily superfluous. 
(2) s’s belief that p is fully explained by φ and φ neither entails nor presupposes α. 
(3) Therefore, α is explanatorily superfluous. 
The truth of the causal premise (2) is vital to the success of this argument. I explore the evidence 
for this claim in 2.3.  
 
1.3 The Sensitivity Formulation 
This argument is based on an epistemological theory proposed by Robert Nozick,55 though 
the idea resembles Fred Dretske’s account of knowledge.56 Faculties which produce reliable 
 
53 Ruse, "The New Evolutionary Ethics." 156 
54 Joyce, The Evolution of Morality. 209 
55 Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981). 
56 Fred Dretske, "Epistemic Operators," Journal of Philosophy 67, no. 24 (1970). 
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information are deemed sensitive to truth or falsity, such faculties would include optical or 
aural faculties. For early hominins to hear a rustle in the grass (indicative of a stalking 
predator), and for this observation to be generally true, would have been vital to the longevity 
of that species. General success of the faculty in question in producing true beliefs allowed 
the species to respond effectively to evolutionary pressure. The process which formed such a 
faculty was required to be sensitive to truth. Proponents of the sensitivity argument hold that 
the faculties that generate moral beliefs are insensitive to truth. What is meant by this is that 
moral faculties differ from optical or aural faculties in the sense that they need not track truth 
or falsity, but merely provide some kind of advantage.57 It seems that the most that one could 
claim is that it would have been evolutionarily beneficial to cooperate in some way and this 
statement does not imply that the processes which give rise to moral beliefs are sensitive to 
truth or falsity. 
Given this, Ruse argues “you would believe what you do about right and wrong, 
irrespective of whether or not a ‘true’ right or wrong existed.”58 From here we can construct 
the sensitivity argument: 
1. The best explanation of the origins of our moral beliefs implies that the faculties 
responsible for the beliefs are insensitive to truth or falsity. 
2. Thus, we would believe what we believe about right and wrong irrespective of the 
truth or falsity of our beliefs. 
3. A belief cannot qualify as knowledge if we would believe it to be true even if it were 
false. 
4. Therefore, our moral beliefs do not track truth well enough to count as knowledge 
 
57 Derek Parfit, On What Matters: Volume Two (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 511-12 
58 Ruse, Taking Darwin Seriously. 254 
23 
 
Though one may argue on epistemological grounds against (3),59 premise (1) will be the 
focus of my critique. If some of our moral beliefs were required to be true in order to provide 
an evolutionary advantage, then the sensitivity argument would collapse. This route of 
argument would be to accept the causal claim that moral beliefs are caused by evolved 
patterns of belief determination, but resist the implication of truth-insensitivity. Alternatively, 
one could deny that a sufficient explanation for the origins of our moral beliefs, or even a 
sufficient explanation for the faculty which produces moral beliefs, exists, thus denying the 
causal claim altogether.60   
Derek Parfit describes a sensitivity argument against moral objectivism. The 
argument has it that moral beliefs would have been advantageous regardless of truth. He 
begins with the claim that the justification of our moral beliefs resides in the function of the 
beliefs themselves.61 He distinguishes between beliefs about the world which are formed 
perceptually, which he calls worldly beliefs, and beliefs which are formed in unreliable ways, 
such as hypnosis. Certain beliefs or cognitive abilities, he writes, may have formed because 
such beliefs were “evolutionarily or reproductively advantageous, by helping early humans to 
survive and reproduce.”62 Worldly beliefs, such as the number of lions seen entering a cave, 
were advantageous if they were mostly true. Moral beliefs, on the other hand, were not 
advantageous because they were true, but because they caused us to have beliefs which were 
advantageous. With the advantage of possessing these moral beliefs, Parfit observes that 
natural selection makes us disposed to have them.63 The advantage of moral beliefs would 
therefore exist whether or not the moral belief itself was true. As moral beliefs would be 
 
59 For such a line of argument, see: Saul Kripke, Philosophical Troubles: Collected Papers, vol. 1 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011); Jonathan Vogel, "Reliabilism Leveled," Journal of Philosophy 97, no. 11 
(2000). 
60 This will be the focus of chapter 2, section 2.  
61 Parfit, On What Matters: Volume Two. 511 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 512 
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believed whether or not they were true, they are not sensitive to truth and thus do not count as 
knowledge. 
 Ruse writes, “[g]iven two worlds, identical except that one has an objective morality 
and the other does not, the humans therein would think and act in exactly the same ways.”64 
He considers the possibility of an alien intelligent species, who possess moral rules which 
might include or justify “cannibalism, incest or the love of darkness and decay” – things 
which us as human beings would not consider central to being moral. In addition to this, if we 
were “savanna-dwelling, carnivorous man-apes” we might have an entirely different notion 
of what is right. He concludes, “[y]ou would believe what you do about right and wrong, 
irrespective of whether or not a ‘true’ right and wrong existed!”65 Granting truth in the 
premises, the aforementioned conclusion is reached: moral beliefs do not count as knowledge 
or, more specifically in Ruse’s case, a belief in an objective, ultimate foundation for moral 
beliefs is not justified. In, The Myth of Morality Richard Joyce utilises this formulation also:  
Suppose that the actual world contains real categorical requirements – the kind that 
would be necessary to render moral discourse true. In such a world we would still be 
disposed to make these judgements (most generally, to believe that categorical 
requirements exist), just as they did in the first world, for natural selection will make 
it so. What this shows is that the process that generates moral judgements exhibits an 
independence relation between judgement and truth, and these judgements are thus 
unjustified.66 
 Another version of this argument is put forward by Karl Schafer (2010). He begins by 
asserting that the best explanation of the genealogy of our moral beliefs does not imply that, 
in their development, these beliefs were sensitive to truth. From here, he writes: 
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25 
 
1. We should believe that their development was unlikely to be sensitive to whether or 
not they were reliable. 
2. If we believe that the process by which some faculty developed was unlikely to be 
sensitive to whether or not this faculty was reliable, and we do not have any evidence 
independent of the faculty that it is reliable, then we should not trust the faculty. 
3. We do not have any evidence independent of our normative faculties that they are 
reliable. 
4. Therefore, we should not trust them.67 
Each sensitivity argument is appealing to Nozickian or Dretskesian knowledge conditions to 
arrive at the conclusion that moral beliefs which are the product of insensitive formative 
processes are not knowledge.  
 
1.4 The Implausibility Formulation 
Sharon Street, among many others, construes non-naturalist moral realism as the view that 
moral facts exist in a sort of mind-independent realm and that our access to these facts is 
achieved through the exercise of our intuitive evaluative judgements.68 Given that it is widely 
accepted that such intuitive judgements would be the product of a fitness-tracking 
evolutionary story, the question is raised as to how such judgements have come to coincide 
with a mind-independent realm of truth. The target of this argument, as Street would have it, 
are those moral facts or values which are constitutively independent of our attitudes.69  
 
67 Karl Schafer, "Evolution and Normative Scepticism," Australiasian Journal of Philosophy 88, no. 3 (2010). 
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The argument is sketched in an analogy by David Enoch (2010). There is a man 
named Josh who believes a series of things about a remote village in Nepal. Most of Josh’s 
beliefs about the village are in fact true. The analogy describes a “striking correlation” 
between Josh’s beliefs with regards to the village and the truths about the village. It is at this 
point that we would seek an explanation for the striking correlation - perhaps Josh had visited 
the village or read about it. It would seem miraculous to suppose that Josh had never visited 
Nepal or come to know any facts about this remote village through any credible source, and 
yet hold beliefs which were true. This is of course analogous to the unlikely possibility that 
evolution, a process which combines random mutations and unpredictable selective forces, 
brought us to the door of moral truth by a matter of luck. As Enoch puts it, “the meta-
normative realist is committed to an unexplained striking correlation, and this may be too 
much to believe.”70 The unexplained coincidental link between these beliefs and truth 
underlies the implausibility formation of the EDA. 
To provide a formal structure for the challenge, Street formulates the Darwinian 
Dilemma. Our shared incredulity in the face of Enoch’s scenario is the bedrock of Street’s 
argument against moral realism. The argument is posed as having two horns: 
First Horn: Moral realists can assert that there is a relation between the fitness 
tracking processes of evolution and mind-independent moral truth. 
Or 
Second Horn: Moral realists can assert that there is no such relation between the 
fitness tracking processes of evolution and mind-independent moral truth. 
Essentially, the scientific explanation for morality suggests that there is no special relation 
between the evolutionary forces which shaped our evaluative beliefs and the evaluative truths 
 
70 David Enoch, "The Epistemological Challange to Metanormative Realism: How to Best Understand It, and 
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posited in the realist account.71 To embrace the first horn, realists must reject the best 
explanation we seem to possess for where our moral beliefs came from. To embrace the 
second horn, realists are no longer required to reject the causal claim, but are now faced with 
the challenge of explaining the relationship between evaluative beliefs and evaluative truths. 
On this account, Street argues, even if such truths existed the off-track nature of those 
evolutionary forces which shaped our evaluative beliefs means that we are not justified in 
believing that our beliefs are coinciding with those truths. So, embracing the second horn 
seems to lead the realist to metaethical scepticism. Street argues, “[r]ealism about value, then, 
has no escape: it is forced to accept either the tracking account of the relation or else the view 
that there is no relation at all, and both of these options are unacceptable.”72  
David Copp embraces the first horn. He attempts to answer Street’s claim that, 
“insofar as realism asserts any relation between selective pressures on our evaluative 
judgements and evaluative truths, the position is forced to give a tracking account of this 
relation.”73 He argues that it might be plausible to suggest that distorting evolutionary forces 
could still track evaluative truths with reasonable accuracy. He gives an account called 
society-centred moral realism. The central idea is that “a basic moral proposition is true only 
if a corresponding moral standard or norm is relevantly justified or authoritative.”74 A moral 
standard is relevantly justified in that “its currency in the social code of the relevant society 
would best contribute to the society’s ability to meet its needs – including its needs for 
physical continuity, internal harmony and cooperative interaction, and peaceful and 
cooperative relations with its neighbours.”75 Concepts of justice or certain virtues then, might 
 
71 I have adopted Street’s use of ‘evaluative beliefs’ and ‘evaluative truths’ here. For now, these terms suffice in 
encapsulating what we mean when we say, ‘moral belief’ and ‘moral truth.’ I explore issues related to the 
ambiguity of these terms in chapter three.  
72 Sharon Street, "A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value," Philosophical Studies 127 (2006). 136 
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be understood as those concepts which a particular society forbids or endorses in the interest 
of its ends. Street responds to this strategy arguing that Copp relies on his intuitions about 
what the needs of that particular society might be and thus what would constitute its moral 
standards or norms.76 The first horn of the dilemma seems plausible as belief-forming 
dispositions yielding the most evolutionarily beneficial behaviours were selected for the 
reproductive advantages they bestowed upon hominins who possessed them. Hominins with 
the dispositions out-reproduce any hominins that would lack them. This process would occur 
irrespective of the ‘metanormative’ truth of any moral beliefs formed. So, if realists are to 
embrace this first horn, they must propose an account of the tracking relation without 
presupposing the moral norms or standards they already believe.77  
The Second Horn is built on the sheer, perhaps unfathomable, coincidence that our 
evolutionary history has shaped moral beliefs and that these beliefs align with moral truths. 
We seem to have no justification for holding a position that involves a coincidence on this 
scale. This conclusion, Street believes, leads to a sceptical position about moral truth itself. 
She writes,  
The key point to see about this option is that if one takes it, then the forces of natural 
selection must be viewed as a purely distorting influence on our evaluative judgments, 
having pushed us in evaluative directions that have nothing whatsoever to do with the 
evaluative truth. On this view, allowing our evaluative judgments to be shaped by 
evolutionary influences is analogous to setting out for Bermuda and letting the course 
of your boat be determined by the wind and tides: just as the push of the wind and 
tides on your boat has nothing to do with where you want to go, so the historical push 
 
76 Sharon Street, "Reply to Copp: Naturalism, Normativity, and the Varieties of Realism Worth Worrying 
About," Philosophical Issues 18 (2008). 
77 The attempt to continue this line of argument is founded on the premise that Street’s justificatory requirement 
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of natural selection on the content of our evaluative judgments has nothing to do with 
evaluative truth. Of course every now and then, the wind and tides might happen to 
deposit someone’s boat on the shores of Bermuda. Similarly, every now and then, 
Darwinian pressures might have happened to push us toward accepting an evaluative 
judgment that accords with one of the realist’s independent evaluative truths. But this 
would be purely a matter of chance, since by hypothesis there is no relation between 
the forces at work and the “destination” in question, namely evaluative truth.78 
There is room for improvement of this view, as it is not true that a coincidence implies that 
event couldn’t have happened naturally, or that we should question that the event happened at 
all in the face of the small probability of its happening. Roger White (2010) argues in this 
case that we should believe the coincidence occurred if we can find evidence that the results 
are instantiated.79 The burden is supposedly on the realist to provide these reasons.80 This 
epistemic claim is thus at the heart of Street’s Darwinian Dilemma: 
Epistemic Claim: If it would be an extraordinary coincidence if our beliefs about x 
turned out to be correct, then we shouldn’t believe that there are objects of type x. 
So, the first question that comes from this horn of the dilemma is whether an explanation for 
the coincidence is possible. If it is possible, we need to show how that explanation exists and 
how it is made true independently of the phenomena which is susceptible to debunking. That 
is, how we might justify objects of type x independently of our pre-existing beliefs about x. 
Another question that arises is whether the realist must be committed to accepting that the 
coincidence took place at all.81 
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Enoch (2010), believes this argument can be improved. Before examining this 
improvement, however, I must momentarily digress. Enoch’s improvement looks at 
expanding the argumentative reach of Street’s argument by including not just externalists 
about epistemic justification, but internalists also.  
The debate regarding epistemological internalism and externalism seeks to identify 
the manner in which a justified true belief is formed – either through internally accessible 
facts or some form of fact external to the believer. Poston writes that internal can refer to 
“one’s bodily states, one’s brain states, one’s mental states (if these are different than brain 
states), or one’s reflectively accessible states.”82 Externalism, on the other hand, can be 
reduced to a mere denial of the internalist position and that more than just mental states can 
operate as justifiers.83 This review of Street’s argument is an important one as,  her argument 
described above only attacked the reliability of moral beliefs formed through evolution. This 
notion of reliability, being an externalist method of justification is of too narrow a scope for 
her to then debunk moral beliefs entirely. Internalists remain unaffected by Street’s argument 
and, though it is not mentioned by Enoch, so do other externalists about justification who do 
not solely identify with reliabilism.84  
Enoch writes, “[p]erhaps, if internalists are right about epistemic justification, I can 
justifiably form a belief using an unreliable belief forming method. But even if this is so, I 
can’t justifiably form a belief using what I know is an unreliable method.” With this, he 
constructs his attack on internalist moral realists, “[k]nowing that there is no correlation 
between even his own normative beliefs and the normative truths, he can no longer hold these 
normative beliefs justifiably (and so, perhaps nor can he hold them as beliefs at all). The price 
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84 Enoch, "The Epistemological Challange to Metanormative Realism: How to Best Understand It, and How to 
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of denying the correlation is scepticism.” These arguments do not necessarily allude to a 
distinct moral nihilism (that there are no moral facts of any sort), but rather a kind of moral 
scepticism (that we should doubt our capacity to have moral knowledge).  
Though Street’s general challenge has been mapped, there is an important weakness 
which Street recognizes may bring down her entire argument. Building upon her analogy 
regarding the boat in Bermuda, influenced by the off-track influence of wind and tides, she 
writes, “just as a compass and a little steering can correct for the influence of the wind and 
tides on the course of one’s boat, so rational reflection can correct for the influence of 
selective pressures on our values.”85 But Street maintains that illegitimate influence existed 
since the very beginning in the formation of our evaluative capacity. Thus, rational reflection 
is just “a process of assessing evaluative judgements that are mostly off the mark in terms of 
others that are mostly off the mark.”86 She continues: 
In rational reflection, one does not stand completely apart from one’s starting fund of 
evaluative judgements: rather, one uses them, reasons in terms of them, holds some of 
them up for examination in light of others… Thus, if the fund of evaluative 
judgements with which human reflection began was thoroughly contaminated with 
illegitimate influence… then the tools of rational reflection were equally 
contaminated, for the latter are always just a subset of the former. … reflection of this 
kind isn’t going to get one any closer to evaluative truth, any more than sorting 
through contaminated materials with contaminated tools is going to get one closer to 
purity.87 
The only option remaining, Street suggests, is to adopt a theory which is mind-
dependent because this construal allows for the possibility of evaluative error resulting from 
 
85 Street, "A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value." 154 




the influence of evaluative attitudes.88 For Street, the search for reflective equilibrium 
operates within this realm where evaluative judgements are taken only from the poisoned 
well of evolutionary influence, where evaluative truth is a function of what emerges from this 
process and thus, is not ultimately true. This is damning for the realist because: 
The realist understands the evaluative truths to be prior, in the sense that evolutionary 
causes are understood to have selected us to track those independent truths. The 
antirealist, on the other hand, understands the evolutionary causes to be prior, in the 
sense that these causes (along with many others) gave us our starting fund of 
evaluative attitudes, and evaluative truth is understood to be a function of those 
attitudes.89  
This raises an interesting problem. Having noted the seriousness of this objection to 
her Darwinian dilemma, Street formulates a new challenge to the moral realist to make up for 
the weakness of her debunking argument. To effectively eliminate the possibility of 
correcting the off-track starting fund of beliefs through some process of rational reflection, 
Street must extend her causal claim to reasons which might count in favour of moral beliefs. 
This requires demonstrating that the tools of rational reflection are not distinct from the 
contaminated starting fund of beliefs. This is a significant task because rational reflection 
need only be partly autonomous from the content of those beliefs which were subject to 
evolutionary inheritance to dissolve the challenge. Street must provide reasons for believing 
that this level of influence has shaped not just the content of our moral beliefs, but our 
capacity for rational reflection. In addition to this, Street owes an etiological account of how 
reasons which count in favour of moral beliefs obtain purely within the domain of morality 
without the very universal acid of her debunking argument spreading to reasons which allow 
 
88 That is, stance-dependent or attitude-dependent as opposed to stance-independent or mind-independent. 
Metaethicists often use the terms, stance, mind, and attitude interchangeably in this sense.  
89 Street, "A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value." 154 
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one to construct scientific claims – such as the causal claim of the debunking argument 
itself.90  
At the risk of oversimplification, the following argument could be deemed the core 
structure of the Implausibility formulation: 
1. S’s belief that P is explained by φ 
2. φ is an off-track process 
3. Given (2), realists can assert that: 
a. there is a relation between the fitness tracking processes of evolution and 
mind-independent moral truth, or 
b. there is no such relation between the fitness tracking processes of evolution 
and mind-independent moral truth. 
4. (a) is implausible because it is not empirically supported. 
5. (b) is implausible because we are committed to asserting that our moral beliefs 
and mind-independent truth coincide by coincidences, and we are not justified in 
believing in the product of coincidental doxastic processes. 
6. Therefore, S’s belief is unjustified because both 3(a) and 3(b) are implausible. 
 
1.5 The Deep Structure 
I will now attempt to identify an overarching EDA by analysing the deep structure of the 
argument itself. A distinction between undermining and rebutting facts is vital to maintaining 
clarity when exploring the deep structure of the EDA. To use a rebutting argument is to 
provide counter evidence for a belief on the same explanatory level. To use an undermining 
argument is to say that a belief cannot be true because the mechanisms that produced it are 
 
90 I explore the wider issues pertaining to this challenge in Chapter two, Section 2 and 4 
34 
 
unreliable. If I were to argue that all apples were blue, you could rebut me by showing me a 
red apple. If you wished to debunk me, you would be required to show that the genealogy of 
my belief that apples are blue is, in some way, unreliable or incorrect, which led to my 
corresponding incorrect belief. If the causal origins of a belief are shown to be an 
undermining defeater, the belief is defeated.  
Joyce provided the often-cited example involving a belief pill, with the aim of 
capturing the general debunking strategy: 
Suppose that there were a pill that makes you believe that Napoleon won Waterloo, 
and another one that makes you believe that he lost [. . . ] Now imagine that you are 
proceeding through life happily believing that Napoleon lost Waterloo (as, indeed, 
you are), and then you discover that at some point in your past someone slipped you a 
“Napoleon lost Waterloo” belief pill. It is not a matter of your learning of the 
existence such pills and having no way of knowing whether you have ever taken one; 
rather, we are imagining that you somehow discover beyond any shred of doubt that 
your belief is the product of such a pill. Should this undermine your faith in your 
belief that Napoleon lost Waterloo? Of course it should.91  
The argument begins with a belief about a certain state of affairs. The conclusion of the 
argument calls for us to abandon that belief, following the discovery that the belief is the 
product of a process which does not accurately track states of affairs. This example uses an 
historical case which refers to a battle which took place in present day Belgium, a battle 
which Napoleon did in fact lose and which marked the end of the Napoleonic Wars. The 
factuality of this belief is available to us – we have a number of historical documents and 
artefacts of various kinds which give us good reasons to believe that Napoleon lost Waterloo. 
Through this analogy, the factuality of this belief is available to us only from a third-person 
 
91 Joyce, The Evolution of Morality. 179 
35 
 
perspective. From this perspective, we have full knowledge that Joyce has plucked this 
example from history for illustrative purposes and asked us to alter a feature of our pre-
existing beliefs about it. We must however take the first-person perspective for the argument 
to go through. On this view, we have the belief that Napoleon lost Waterloo but discover that 
someone slipped us this “Napoleon lost Waterloo” belief pill. Our discovery of the formative 
processes behind our belief that Napoleon lost Waterloo should give us cause for concern 
about the accuracy of that belief. But hold your horses, we need not abandon our Napoleonic 
beliefs on this information alone.  
 The aspiring debunker must take care to specify the target belief of this pill. It must be 
made clear just what beliefs are contained within the target belief, what beliefs might be 
inferred from the target belief, and what other beliefs might allow us to infer from their own 
truth that the target belief is justified. Facing these considerations allows us to understand the 
implications of the belief pill and how these analogous considerations arise in the debunking 
argument against moral realism.  
 The target of the pill seems to be relatively clear, but we rarely have beliefs which 
exist as standalone propositions which the success of this example seems to require. What 
does it mean to debunk the belief, Napoleon lost Waterloo? To fully appreciate that our belief 
that Napoleon lost Waterloo is unjustified because of this belief pill, we probably require a 
number of other beliefs which give this focal belief any meaning in the first place. For 
example, we believe that Napoleon was a French Emperor, that a battle took place in a region 
called Waterloo in 1815, and that the armies which Napoleon commanded lost that battle.92 
These beliefs, let’s call them the necessary beliefs (N-beliefs), must appear in the set of 
beliefs which are targeted by this pill. If the belief pill didn’t target the Battle of Waterloo 
which occurred in 1815 (as opposed to another battle of Waterloo in a different year) or the 
 
92 I will be relatively relaxed about the finer historical details of this event in the interest of clarity.  
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actual Napoleon Bonaparte, the debunking attempt fails. I will call this condition pertaining 
to the specific target of the debunking argument, its scope.93  
 Next, the aspiring debunker must make clear what beliefs might be inferred from the 
focal belief, Napoleon lost Waterloo, because those beliefs would be undermined as well. 
Let’s suppose that we had built upon our false belief: we came to believe that Napoleon lost 
Waterloo by a very small margin. A belief about the degree of the loss at Waterloo makes no 
sense without a loss at Waterloo to refer to. So, the discovery that our belief that Napoleon 
lost Waterloo was the product of a belief pill, means that our auxiliary belief that Napoleon 
lost Waterloo by a very small margin is built upon an insecure epistemic foundation. This 
consideration regards the debunking argument’s corrosiveness. A debunking argument with a 
narrow scope, so a very specific target belief or set of beliefs, will probably corrode fewer 
auxiliary beliefs and thus have less of an impact.94 A debunking argument with a wide scope 
will likely corrode more auxiliary beliefs and thus have a greater impact.95 
 Finally, the aspiring debunker must ensure that beliefs which are outside of the scope 
would not allow one to reason from them and consequently establish those targeted beliefs by 
some other means. For example, suppose we had the belief that Prussian forces won the battle 
of Waterloo against Napoleons’ armies. A pill which targeted the N-beliefs I mentioned 
earlier would be ineffective, as even upon discovery that our N-beliefs were tainted, we could 
 
93Vavova (2014) makes a similar distinction and argues that it follows an inverse rule, “the potential strength of 
a debunking argument is inversely proportional to its ambition.” See, Katia Vavova, "Debunking Evolutionary 
Debunking," in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 9, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2014). 20  
94 If the belief pill targeted my belief that Napoleon had an inferiority complex, it would impact only a very 
small portion (if any) of my pre-existing auxiliary beliefs about Napoleon. However, if the belief pill targeted 
my belief that Napoleon was shorter than usual and behaviourally overcompensated for this, it might corrode the 
auxiliary belief that Napoleon had an inferiority complex. The former is a narrow scope and the latter is a wider 
scope. 
95 Debunking arguments as having a corrosive effect comes from Dennett’s book, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, 
where Dennett likens Darwinian evolution to a “universal acid” which “eats through just about every traditional 
concept, and leaves in its wake a revolutionized worldview, with most of the old landmarks still recognisable, 




deduce from our untainted beliefs regarding the Prussian forces that Napoleon must have lost 
Waterloo. If I were to widen my scope so as to include this belief regarding the success of the 
Prussian forces, to safeguard against the failure I have just demonstrated, I must further 
account for those beliefs regarding the German forces, the allies of the German forces, then 
the War of the Seventh Coalition, then the French revolution, and so on.96 Joyce 
acknowledges this, but doesn’t seem to notice the gravity of this consideration in the moral 
case. He concludes his belief pill analogy with the claim that, “unless you can find some 
concrete evidence either in favour or against the belief you should cease to believe this 
thing…”97 For now, I will refer to this as the problem of available evidence. I will explore it 
further in a moment.  
 An airtight rendition of the belief pill story would have to include a condition to the 
effect that we could immediately counter the possibility of seeking concrete evidence external 
to influence of the pill. Suppose that, contained within the package belief “Napoleon lost 
Waterloo” were all our beliefs about Napoleon and Waterloo. There are two options available 
to the aspiring debunker in terms of formulating the causal premise. If the pill leads us to see 
properties which confer truth upon any belief relating to Napoleon and Waterloo, and we 
discover that the pill has had this effect, then our belief “Napoleon lost Waterloo” is 
debunked. This would require that our capacity to see those properties is provided only by a 
faculty or sense which is directly influenced by the effects of the pill.98 Alternatively, the 
aspiring debunker could argue that the package belief, “Napoleon lost Waterloo” serves as 
the starting fund for any belief pertaining to Napoleon and Waterloo, and thus any belief 
 
96 This makes clear a secondary issue pertaining to wide scope debunking arguments, see Chapter Two, Section 
Four. 
97 Joyce, The Evolution of Morality. 180 
98 To demonstrate that those properties do not obtain outside of this faculty or sense, we would have to face each 
reason we have for believing that Napoleon lost Waterloo and connect our confidence in those reasons back to 
this faculty.  
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which draws from that starting fund is drawn from the poisoned well.99 Either option means 
that there are no alternate justifications that can rescue those beliefs, because those 
justifications contain the concepts of Napoleon and Waterloo which I am unable to interpret 
objectively. 
 In a footnote, Joyce admits that his Napoleon example contains the possibility of 
incoherence, but that “even impossible thought experiments may serve a useful pedagogic or 
intuition-priming role.”100 Having extracted features of the general debunking strategy from 
this example, I agree that the case of Napoleon can be pedagogical. But in time I will show 
how the issues pertaining to the scope and corrosiveness of the Napoleon case carry over to 
the moral debunking strategy. Before I develop these issues, let’s return to the problem of 
available evidence.  
Kahane (2011) structures a general debunking argument as follows: 
1. S’s belief that P is explained by φ 
2. φ is an off-track process 
3. Therefore, S’s belief is unjustified 
It may be helpful to move away from the Napoleonic war example and devise one that more 
closely correlates to evolutionary debunking. Consider the new case of Jack who possesses a 
unicorn gene, a gene which is responsible for distorting the views of its possessors and 
making them likely to believe that unicorns exist. Here is an argument debunking Jack: 
1. Jack believes in unicorns. 
2. Jack’s belief that unicorns exist is caused by the expression of a unicorn gene. 
3. Expression of a unicorn gene is an off-track process. 
 
99 This would require that any ‘concrete evidence’ we find elsewhere can be traced back to the starting fund. I 
have just outlined Joyce and Street’s causal claims respectively. I return to these accounts in 2.2 
100 Joyce, The Evolution of Morality. 242 
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4. Therefore, Jack’s belief is unjustified. 
Here (2) is a causal premise and (3) is an epistemic one. (2) has it that the cause of Jack’s 
belief is the expression of his unicorn gene. (3) has it that belief produced in this way does 
not reliably track the truth. In addition to the causal and epistemic premises, Kahane stresses 
the importance of a further premise. He states, “our understanding of the causal premise… 
needs to rule out what we might call post-hoc justification.”101 Say that Jack seeks to 
reinforce his belief in unicorns by looking for evidence of them. Kahane’s further premise is 
vital to understanding whether or not any such evidence is a post-hoc justification (PHJ) or a 
post-hoc rationalisation (PHR). Consider this argument. 
1. Jack believes in Unicorns. 
2. Jack’s belief that Unicorns exist is explained by the expression of his unicorn gene. 
3. Expression of a unicorn gene is an off-track process 
4. Expression of the unicorn gene leads Jack to look for evidence of unicorns, and 
indeed he finds compelling evidence for their existence. 
5. Therefore, Jack’s belief is justified. (It is justified post-hoc.) 
Jack’s belief in unicorns is caused by an off-track process. But the evidence for his belief that 
he produces after the fact of it really does justify his belief.102 Jack is epistemically lucky that 
the off-track process hit the truth, in that it motivated him to find independent evidence for 
his belief. In this case premise (2) and (3) no longer provide an undermining defeater of 
Jack’s belief. However, the sophisticated debunker is aware of this possibility and thus would 
 
101 Guy Kahane, "Evolutionary Debunking Arguments," Nous 45, no. 1 (2011). 106 
102 This version of the argument invites the subsidiary that since Jack’s belief is insensitive it is not a candidate 
for knowledge. Jack would believe in unicorns regardless of what evidence he finds, so he cannot be said to 
truly know that there are unicorns. However, there are good reasons to resist such an argument. The idea that 
sensitivity is necessary for knowledge leads to counterintuitive results, including ‘abominable conjunctions’ 
such as, “George knows that he has hands, but he doesn’t know that he’s not the handless victim of a Cartesian 
demon”. Considerations such as these lead most contemporary epistemologists to reject sensitivity conditions on 
knowledge. See, Jonathan Ichikawa and Matthias Steup, "The Analysis of Knowledge," in The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (2017). §5.1 
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try to show that (3) necessitates (~4) in that the possible justification either isn’t possible, or 
through some degree of examination, is insufficient.  
Consider this argument. 
1. Jack believes in unicorns. 
2. Jack’s belief that unicorns exist is explained by expression of a unicorn gene. 
3. Expression of a unicorn gene is an off-track process. 
4. Expression of the unicorn gene leads Jack to study unicorns. He finds what he takes to 
be evidence of them in history books. In fact, however, what he sees in these books 
are just horses with hats on. However, he believes that he has found solid evidence for 
his belief in unicorns. 
5. Jack’s belief remains unjustified. (His putative justification is in fact a post-hoc 
rationalization). 
In this form Jack is not justified in his belief at all. Jack’s arguments for his beliefs are post-
hoc rationalizations due to the nature of the evidence he adduces. Perhaps Jack’s willingness 
to believe that the hatted horses were unicorns is increased by the fact that he possesses the 
unicorn gene, but what Kahane’s distinction stresses is that this willingness-to-believe is 
exclusively the reason for the belief. Kahane shows that the debunking argument cannot 
clearly decide the nature of Jack’s belief without a premise to the effect that all post-hoc 
reflection on the belief is a rationalization, not a justification. I will call this stipulation the 
post-hoc rationalization premise. It is a strong premise which introduces important 
vocabulary for understanding the problem of available evidence.103 
An important final distinction, as I mentioned earlier, is between epistemic and 
metaphysical debunking. Where epistemological debunking arguments seek to undermine the 
 
103 I return to this in 2.1 
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justification we have for our moral beliefs or to assert that moral beliefs do not in some way 
count as knowledge, metaphysical debunking arguments posit that moral beliefs aren’t true. 
Joyce calls the former justification-debunking and the latter truth-debunking.104 Other more 
specific distinctions include the claim that debunking occurs upon the discovery of the off-
track premise or that simply in the face of evolution, moral judgements cannot be 
independently justified.105 All of these distinctions are important and have allowed for a 
number of interesting sub-discussions, but for now I will be considering the debunking 
argument in its most general justificatory form.  
With this in mind, we could spell out a general version of an evolutionary debunking 
argument in this way. 
1. Moral beliefs are formed and supported only through unreliable doxastic processes. 
2. We are not justified in our beliefs formed only through unreliable processes. 
3. Moral beliefs are not justified. 
Conclusion 
Let us take stock of the considerations I have adduced so far.  
The evolutionary debunking argument comes from the attempt to integrate findings 
from evolutionary science into metaethical debate. It offers an undercutting defeater, as 
opposed to a rebutting defeater, of the moral realist’s claim that belief in objective moral 
truths is justified. The EDA draws on the discovery that only some beliefs are likely to have 
emerged from cognitive processes formed via on-track belief forming processes. The debate 
which emerges from this observation centres around the question of which beliefs are formed 
via on-track belief forming processes and which are not. The EDA against metaethical 
 
104 Richard Joyce, "The Evolutionary Debunking of Morality," in Reason and Responsiblity: Readings in Some 
Basic Problems in Philosophy, ed. J. Feinberg and R Shafer-Landau (Boston: Cengage Learning, 2014). 
105 Hallvard Lillehammer, "Debunking Morality: Evolutionary Naturalism and Moral Error Theory," Biology 
and Philosophy 18, no. 4 (2003). 
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realism carries the charge that moral beliefs were, at best, instrumental for our evolution, and 
that our moral beliefs are not necessarily made true by any feature of the world. Broadly, this 
is the evolutionary debunking manoeuvre. After surveying the literature, I argued that there 
seems to be at least four different ways of forming the argument. 
The Non-Foundational Formulation seeks to debunk the claim of an objective 
foundation to morality by arguing that morality is the result of the non-truth tracking 
genealogy of the natural selection of our moral sense. The Superfluity Formulation appeals to 
ontological parsimony and the empirical claim of a completed non-moral genealogy of 
morality. The Sensitivity Formulation argues through a truth conditional theory of knowledge 
that moral beliefs do not count as knowledge given their status conferred from their 
evolutionary origins. The Implausibility Formulation is a two-pronged attack on the 
justifications offered by realists in the face of the debunking argument. Each of these 
arguments have now been introduced and described. The important questions which have 
arisen in the face of these formulations are discussed in chapter two.  
A more rigorous portrayal of each formulation requires moving beyond the EDAs 
themselves and into the surrounding literature to which the debunkers refer. I began this 
analysis with a discussion of the deep structure of the evolutionary debunking argument. I 
followed Joyce in his example of Napoleon and the Battle of Waterloo, whereby we are to 
imagine (disregarding the actuality of its truth or falsity) that at some point we were slipped a 
pill which has led us to believe that Napoleon lost Waterloo. The discovery that our belief 
comes from the belief pill is supposedly analogous to our discovery that our moral beliefs 
have come from off-track formative processes of our moral faculties. Just as a pill alone 
provides no reasonable grounds for believing that Napoleon lost in the battle of Waterloo, so 
too does the etiology of our moral beliefs provide no reasonable grounds for believing that 
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moral facts are true mind-independently. I argued that there are three important clarifications 
to be made in such an argument. 
Firstly, I asked what it means to debunk the target belief, Napoleon lost Waterloo. To 
fully appreciate that our belief that Napoleon lost Waterloo is unjustified because of this 
belief pill, we probably require a number of other beliefs which give this focal belief any 
meaning in the first place. For example, we believe that Napoleon was a French Emperor, 
that a battle took place in a region called Waterloo in 1815, and that the armies which 
Napoleon commanded lost that battle. I named these other beliefs the necessary beliefs (N-
beliefs), since they must appear in the set of beliefs which are targeted by this pill for the 
debunking of them to make any sense. If the belief pill didn’t target the Battle of Waterloo 
which occurred in 1815 (as opposed to another battle of Waterloo in a different year) or the 
actual Napoleon Bonaparte, then the attempt to debunk my belief that Napoelon lost 
Waterloo fails. I called this first condition the scope of the EDA.  
Next, I argued that the aspiring debunker must be weary of how widely they set the 
scope of the EDA. Beliefs which are built upon the target belief are toppled by its 
undermining. I proposed the example that we came to believe that Napoleon lost Waterloo by 
a very small margin. A belief about the degree of the loss at Waterloo makes no sense 
without a loss at Waterloo to refer to. So, the discovery that our belief that Napoleon lost 
Waterloo was the product of a belief pill, means that our auxiliary belief that Napoleon lost 
Waterloo by a very small margin is built upon an insecure epistemic foundation and is thus, 
by extension, unjustified. I called this consideration the debunking argument’s corrosiveness.  
 Finally, I posed the question of how we are to understand those beliefs which are 
outside of a debunking argument’s scope yet might provide a means for understanding and 
synthesising those beliefs which are within the scope. I gave the example of our belief that 
Prussian forces won the battle of Waterloo against Napoleons’ armies. A pill which targeted 
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the N-beliefs I mentioned earlier would be ineffective, as even upon discovery that our N-
beliefs were tainted, we could deduce from our untainted beliefs regarding the Prussian forces 
that Napoleon must have lost Waterloo. If I were to widen my scope so as to include this 
belief regarding the success of the Prussian forces, to safeguard against the failure I have just 
demonstrated, I must further account for those beliefs regarding the German forces, the allies 
of the German forces, then the War of the Seventh Coalition, then the French revolution, and 
so on. We might even look to the arrangements of states today and deduce something further 
about the outcome of the war. Either the debunker continually expands the scope of their 
EDA until all this information is similarly contained within the scope, or their EDA is 
rendered ineffective. I called this the problem of available evidence. I showed that Joyce was 
seemingly aware of this condition when he wrote that, “unless you can find some concrete 
evidence either in favour or against the belief you should cease to believe this thing…”106 It is 
precisely this search for alternative evidence which makes up the ongoing debate between 
realists and anti-realists. The problem of available evidence reveals my central contention 
with the evolutionary debunking argument. I now turn to this issue and other significant 
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CHAPTER TWO: RESPONSES TO THE EDA 
In this chapter I consider a series of problems facing the debunking strategy. I recount 
prominent responses to the debunking argument and explore the literature surrounding each 
response. These arguments and the strategies which underly them inform the responses I 
develop later in this thesis. I begin by setting out the otiosity argument. In 2.2, putting the 
otiosity argument to one side, I face the ‘Darwinian Hypothesis’ (the claim that our moral 
beliefs were formed or emerged from some evolutionary process and that that process was 
not truth-tracking) head on. In 2.3, I explore the work of the realists who seek to respond to 
the debunking argument by accepting the Darwinian Hypothesis. In 2.4, I set out a challenge 
set by realists which calls into question the problem of scope in the debunking strategy. In 
this final section, with the roots of the self-undermining challenge exposed, I show that the 
problem runs deeper than previously thought. This sets the stage for Chapter Three.  
 
2.1 The Otiosity Argument 
In Chapter One, I set out Kahane’s post-hoc rationalisation (PHR) and post-hoc justification 
(PHJ) distinction through the following case: 
1. Jack believes in Unicorns. 
2. Jack’s belief that Unicorns exist is explained by the expression of his unicorn gene. 
3. Expression of a unicorn gene is an off-track process 
4. Expression of the unicorn gene leads Jack to look for evidence of unicorns, and 
indeed he finds compelling evidence for their existence. 
5. Therefore, Jack’s belief is justified. (It is justified post-hoc.) 
I showed that the post-hoc rationalisation model, which serves as the foundation of the 
debunking strategy is as follows: 
1. Jack believes in unicorns. 
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2. Jack’s belief that unicorns exist is explained by expression of a unicorn gene. 
3. Expression of a unicorn gene is an off-track process. 
4. Expression of the unicorn gene leads Jack to study unicorns. He finds what he takes to 
be evidence of them in history books. In fact, however, what he sees in these books 
are just horses with hats on. However, he believes that he has found solid evidence for 
his belief in unicorns. 
5. Jack’s belief remains unjustified. (His putative justification is in fact a post-hoc 
rationalization.) 
The central premise for the debunker is that the causal origins of our beliefs track 
fitness and not truth. The problem of otiosity arises out of the many possible alternative 
grounds we may have for our beliefs. The problem of available evidence which I discussed in 
the case of Napoleon plays out here through Kahane’s distinction. What is required of the 
debunker, without begging the question, is to show that the other grounds one has for a belief 
are insufficient for knowledge or justification. One must rule out that available evidence first, 
in order for it to not be a problem. Kahane highlights the importance of a hidden premise that 
all available grounds for a debunked belief are post-hoc rationalisations rather than 
justifications. As quoted earlier, he writes that “our understanding of the causal premise… 
needs to rule out what we might call post-hoc justification.”107 To establish that available 
grounds of belief are not justifications and are instead rationalisations, I will argue, is not to 
debunk at all. Simply put, this is to shift the argument from an undermining argument to a 
rebutting one.  
 The otiosity argument holds that the mere existence of a possible post-hoc 
justification means that the EDA cannot run. This is because debunkers cannot rule out the 
 
107 Kahane, "Evolutionary Debunking Arguments." 
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possibility of a PHJ without securing the very anti-realist conclusion they seek to establish 
with the EDA. Debunkers can’t rule out extant philosophical justifications of moral realism, 
except through rebutting arguments, which renders the undermining attempt otiose. 
To demonstrate through the running analogy, I could act as if I aspired to debunk Jack 
myself. The first step of my debunking process, following Kahane, would be to assess every 
ground Jack might have for his belief in Unicorns. This step is vital as if it shows that Jack is 
justified in his belief, then I cannot continue my debunking attempt (I must rule out the 
possibility of post-hoc justification). I find that Jack is grounding his belief in three history 
books - these are three separate books which all claim that Unicorns exist. After my study of 
the validity of these sources, I find strong justification that the information in these books was 
fabricated and that the photos were tampered with. This would be an exercise of rebutting 
facts. A simple admission from the authors stating the falsehoods would be enough to deem 
the entirety of Jack’s grounds for belief as rationalisations. I would have thus established that 
Jack has no reason to believe that unicorns exist. From this point, excited by my knowledge 
that I can now construct my debunking argument (knowing already that it will succeed), I 
argue that the expression of the Unicorn Gene is forming beliefs in Jack’s mind and that the 
expression of this gene is an off-track method of tracking truth. In this exercise of mine, what 
role did debunking play? It seems to be purely explanatory, as opposed to playing any 
argumentative role. If Jack continued to believe in unicorns even after being told that the 
history books were fabricated, the unicorn gene (the causal explanation) could explain that. 
However, the weight of the argument seems to lie with the rebutting facts, that is, with the 
work done in my analysis of his alternate grounds for belief (showing that his history books 
were fabricated), as opposed to the discovery of the unicorn gene. 
The debunking argument then, serves merely as the football field for which the real 
players, namely the justifiers, will play out. Kahane’s causal premise, that S’s belief that P is 
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explained by X, is only explanatory. The argument can only be carried out if all alternate 
grounds are deemed unjustified. It becomes clear that the debunker either assumes the 
putative alternative justifications are post-hoc rationalisations, or they pre-establish that such 
putative justifications are post-hoc rationalisation. If all putative justifications are rebutted, 
then the belief is unjustified. Period. The EDA is superfluous in metaethical argumentation - 
it is otiose.  
Applying this to morality, we could say that alternative reasons for believing that 
moral truths exist can be found in the work of Kant, in the words of naturalist reductionist 
realists like Brink, or even in theological ethicists like Aquinas (to barely scratch the surface). 
What would be required of the aspiring debunker, would be to show that all of these 
alternative attempts at justification are mere post-hoc rationalisations. That is, they would be 
required to show that every one of these attempts at justifications fail and thus that believing 
in moral truths is unjustified. After such an ordeal, if the aspiring debunker found no justified 
and alternative grounds in this history of philosophical ethics, they could reasonably assert 
that, for example, morality is a myth. However, having made his or her point with purely 
rebutting facts (by discrediting Kant and the like), the EDA is superfluous. EDAs are 
attempted shortcuts that fail. 
Take Joyce’s work in Evolution of Morality, for example. He meticulously explores 
the possibility of naturalism. He concludes among other things that cognitivism is an 
acceptable view, but that naturalism about moral properties is not. He is fully aware that if a 
viable naturalist explanation exists, his etiological claim is either at odds with it (in which 
case he must determine which is the best explanation) or otherwise his etiological claim 
supports it. Provided that his arguments against naturalism hold, his conclusion follows that 
naturalism is not the best explanation for our moral beliefs.108 If naturalism is not the best 
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explanation of our moral beliefs, then non-naturalism or supernaturalism cannot help 
either.109 At this point, we should be led to abandon our position as realists and accept moral 
scepticism. This is not in the end a debunking strategy. Metaethical argumentation is doing 
all the work here. In 2016 (ten years after his popular EDA), Joyce argues that his metaethical 
argumentation is not complete, leading him to the more modest conclusion that “our 
confidence in our moral judgements should be provisionally lowered.” Accepting that this 
reopens the causal premise, he concludes that, although it is an exciting idea that empirical 
findings can impact on metaethics, “…the arguments examined lead back to the need to do 
metaethics the old-fashioned way.” 110 
2.2 Denying the Darwinian Hypothesis 
Recall the general EDA I formulated in Chapter One: 
1. Moral beliefs are formed and supported only through unreliable doxastic processes. 
2. We are not justified in our beliefs formed only through unreliable processes. 
3. Moral beliefs are not justified. 
The Darwinian Hypothesis is the first premise of the EDA, the view that moral beliefs are the 
product of an epistemically off-track formative process, a process that is off-track because of 
the nature of the selection of our moral beliefs. There are two ways of expounding the 
Darwinian Hypothesis. One way is moral nativism, according to which moral beliefs are in 
effect hard-wired into the brain at birth. Another way of expounding the Darwinian 
Hypothesis is to say that whatever causes are at work in the production of moral beliefs are 
saturated with the off-track features due to our evolution. On this latter view, moral beliefs 
might be the product of emotional schemas, critical reflection, and cultural influences. 
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However, their basis in our emotional responses poisons the epistemic well, as it were, 
meaning that our beliefs never escape their off-track origins.  
 
2.2.1 Nativism and the Darwinian Hypothesis 
Let us consider the merits of the Darwinian Hypothesis in its nativist form. Contrary 
to simple versions of nativism, we have the tendency to act in certain ways, form moral 
judgements or make decisions about how we should act in accordance with our evolved 
natures. Call this a conservative expressive tendency (CET). On the other hand, we have a 
capacity to reflect on the ways in which we choose to act and the sort of people we thus 
become or aspire to be. We seem to be capable of a thoughtful exploration of moral concepts 
and moral language, with which we can challenge others and ourselves. Call this our critical 
reflective capacity (CRC).  
Neil Sinclair makes a similar distinction when he separates the tendency to form 
moral judgements and the capacity to think with and express moral thoughts. I find this 
distinction important though incomplete, as unlike CRC, Sinclair’s capacity hypothesis does 
not explicitly go beyond unreflective habits of moral thought and justification.  
According to some accounts, evolution explains why some human beings possess the 
capacity to deploy moral concepts in thought and language. Call this the ‘capacity 
hypothesis’. According to others, evolution explains why some human beings are 
disposed to make particular types of moral judgements, distinguished by their 
contents. Call this the ‘tendency hypothesis’. Whereas the former explains our 
possession of moral concepts, the latter explains our tendency to deploy those 
concepts in particular ways.111 
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Debunkers can target and explain our tendencies for particular decision and judgement 
formations. For example, Street writes that: 
…it is clear how beneficial (in terms of reproductive success) it would be to judge 
that the fact that something would promote one’s survival is a reason to do it.112 
Joyce’s practicality requirement says that: 
…the function that natural selection had in mind for moral judgment was [nothing] 
remotely like detecting a feature of the world, but rather something more like 
encouraging successful social behaviour.113 
We make a judgement about x in situation y because it would promote our survival (Street), 
and we justify acting on that judgement to ourselves and others and this allows us to 
consistently form judgement x (Joyce). The differentiation between the conservative 
expressive tendency and our critical self-reflective capacity allows an expansion of what is 
meant when we speak of moral thought. The debate surrounding where our moral beliefs 
come from seems to be principally composed of etiological explanations of our conservative 
expressive tendency and not our critical self-reflective capacity. This is detrimental to the 
debunking argument as our reasons for holding certain moral beliefs are not fully contained 
within the scope of the causal claim. Serious debunkers must find a way to connect the off-
track forces of evolutionary inheritance to our rational reflection to avoid simply overlooking 
our capacity to ‘correct’ our evolved natures through our critical reflective capacity. 
To form the rather serious conclusions which have come from this debate, for 
example, that morality is a myth or that morality is “a collective illusion foisted upon us by 
our genes”114, we require a level of confidence in the causal claim. But this claim seems to be 
without merit if we are not clear about what a belief that p entails. Levy and Levy note, 
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“[q]uite generally, what counts as data about 𝜑 inevitably depends on assumptions about the 
nature of 𝜑. Morality is no exception.”115 If this causal claim cannot be defended, or reasons 
cannot be provided for believing that such an explanation might be forthcoming, then the 
debunking argument collapses on empirical grounds. If support for the causal claim can be 
provided, the claim must be construed so as to include our reasons for belief which might 
obtain through our critical reflective capacity.116 
I will refer to this problem throughout my analysis of the causal claim. The basic 
argument strategy is to insist that, in order to avoid overgeneralising their target beliefs, 
debunker’s must narrow the scope of their debunking argument rendering their etiological 
claim ineffective against the broader position of metaethical realism.  
 
2.2.2 In search of a completed non-moral genealogy 
Opinions differ about the nature and importance of the causal premise. Kahane writes that, 
“[i]t is important to see that it does not matter here whether any particular explanation is true. 
What matters is that some such story is likely to be true.”117 This is echoed in Vavova, who 
admits to the controversy behind the causal premise but suggests that “both sides should 
acknowledge this and move on… While it is important that this argument is empirical, the 
particular empirical claim is not important. It is replaceable and, anyway, not philosophically 
interesting.”118 Though it may be worthwhile to consider what would happen if a genealogy 
could be provided, the literature in question has quickly moved from this being a hypothetical 
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conversation to an established one. Contrary to Vavova, it has become quite philosophically 
interesting. 
Street writes that it “does not seem much of a stretch” to argue that fitness enhancing 
dispositions were responding to some feature of the world “in some primitive, non-linguistic 
sort of fashion.”119 So, we could view our evaluative judgements as “conscious, reflective 
endorsements” of certain evaluative tendencies that we share with other animals and that 
were shaped by some form of off-track inheritance.120 However, Street is careful not to assert 
that “the acceptance of a full-fledged evaluative judgement with a given content … is a 
genetically heritable trait.121 Rather, our capacity to form judgements is indirectly tainted by 
the directly tainted evaluative tendencies we acquired via natural selection. Street argues that 
evaluative tendencies such as “[t]he fact that something would promote the interests of a 
family member is a reason to do it”122 and “[t]he fact that someone has treated one well is a 
reason to treat that person well in return”123 are supported by appeals to kin selection and 
reciprocal altruism respectively. Since our evaluative judgements are “conscious, reflective 
endorsements” of these evaluative tendencies, our reflective endorsements favour certain 
judgements over others as a result of this off-track influence.  
Most debunking arguments target our justification for moral belief. Our realisation 
that we might only believe that helping others is a good thing because evolution and our 
upbringing made this so, should give us cause for concern about asserting that our beliefs are 
actually true. Faced with an etiological and supposedly scientifically supported case for the 
‘thorough saturation’ of our evaluative tendencies, we see that our justifications for our moral 
beliefs - grounded in those evaluative tendencies - are influenced by forces of natural 
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selection and cultural inheritance. But the success of this argument rests on the support for 
Street’s empirical claim that there exists a relationship between kin selection, reciprocal 
altruism and our tendency to believe that acting in the interests of our family members or that 
acting altruistically in general is a morally good thing.  
Kin Selection is a term coined by Maynard Smith (1964) to describe the selection for 
behaviours of an individual organism which impacts upon the reproductive success or 
survival of other genetically similar organisms, even if it means bringing harm to the actor.124 
The theory is captured by a simple mathematical expression known as Hamilton’s Rule (𝑟𝑏 −
𝑐 > 0) outlining the relation between the fitness cost to the actor (c), the resultant fitness 
benefits to another organism (b), and the genetic relatedness of the organisms in question 
(r).125 Levy and Levy argue that kin selection theory does not account for “behaviour guided 
by a belief about the significance of the interests of family members” nor does moral belief 
“exhibit a significant genetic basis” which kinship theory would require.126 
Street’s use of reciprocal altruism seeks to link the proliferation of genes predisposing 
moral agents to altruism with the predisposition to return altruistic behaviours when they 
were received. Levy and Levy note that this relationship can be modelled in iterated prisoners 
dilemmas utilising reciprocal tit-for-tat strategies, but that “there are several concerns about 
the scope and character of these models…virtually all models in this area deal with pairwise 
interactions between a single altruist and a single beneficiary. But moral precepts often 
concern situations with more persons involved.”127 Additionally, especially in cases 
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pertaining to human morality, significant assumptions are made in terms of the character of 
the agents used in these models. Environmental factors influencing judgements formed in 
reality, such as social hierarchy, are not included in the idealised settings of the model 
environment and thus do not clearly inform our understanding of the evolution of this 
predisposition.128  
Elsewhere, evolutionary scientists’ express concerns about attempts to explain 
altruistic behaviours in general. Okasha (2013) distinguishes between biological and 
psychological altruism, whereby the latter explores altruistic behaviour stemming from 
motives outside of the biological predisposition. He writes that “[a]n action performed with 
the conscious intention of helping another human being may not affect their biological fitness 
at all, so would not count as altruistic in the biological sense.”129 Street’s causal claim focuses 
on the established connection between moral precepts we advance, such as “[t]he fact that 
someone has treated one well is a reason to treat that person well in return” and the 
evolutionary genealogy of such an altruistic tendency. Since the link has not been established 
and evolutionary scientists haven’t settled on where our motivations to be altruistic might 
come from, it remains possible that we can ratify our belief that acting in this way is a 
morally good thing with reasons which are not ‘thoroughly saturated’ by any inherited 
evaluative tendency.  
Joyce argues that there exists a requirement for practical clout, and thus that some 
kind of “motivational bulwark” must be a feature of the nativist thesis. He asks us to imagine 
that there was a community of social creatures with a set of imperatives which assist in the 
regulation and governance of interpersonal relations. Imperatives such as, “Don’t steal for 
self-gain” or “Keep your Promises” are examples cited, as a community without such 
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imperatives would have difficulty securing the cooperation required to flourish as a social 
animal. However, he writes, “[i]f someone fails to follow one of these prescriptions – say, 
one of them doesn’t keep a promise, out of selfishness – her fellows don’t subject her to 
criticism… Let’s say this community doesn’t have a concept of desert at all…”130 Joyce 
believes that if the members of the community don’t feel that wrong doers, when punished, 
are actually getting what he or she deserves, then they lack a sense of justice. Similarly, 
without guilt, the offender can’t recognise that what he or she has done is something morally 
denounceable, “for what is guilt, if not an emotion that involves the judgement that one 
deserves some kind of penalty for one’s actions”131 He thus suggests that we have an innate 
conception of justice and guilt, and without the corresponding desire to see that moral beliefs 
are consistently carried out among our peers, it’s difficult to conceptualise how we would 
have managed to cooperate at all. Without such an evolutionary spur, we wouldn’t tend to do 
that which was evolutionarily beneficial and thus the evolutionary benefit of morality is lost. 
For Joyce, humans required this bulwark lest we succumbed to the temptations of short-term 
reward and lose out on the long-term rewards of cooperation.  
Levy and Levy take issue with this notion, as there exists a variety of situations in 
which humans makes decisions between short- and long-term temptations without the need to 
posit any kind of mechanism resembling the motivational bulwark. Levy and Levy construct 
a comparative case involving the need to invest in food and shelter in the face of extreme 
weather conditions. They ask if there must also exist some ‘special motivational mechanism’ 
which acts as the motivational bulwark for our non-moral normative beliefs such as the belief 
that “the impending inclement weather is reason to start storing food…[or] the dropping 
temperatures are reason to believe that inclement weather is impending…”132 If we require 
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this special motivational mechanism for non-moral prudential and epistemic beliefs, then it 
would seem that the debunking argument has implications beyond the moral domain.  
Joyce argues that error theorists are not deprived of motivational support for acting 
with generosity or integrity. He writes: 
The moral error theorist may have as much compassion, love, and generosity as 
anyone else; she will just not believe these characteristics, or their attendant actions, 
to be morally desirable…The atheist is still inclined to enthusiastically assert “I ought 
not kill”—and perhaps takes himself to have grounds for holding that this is true 
always and for everyone—but he will remain clear in his own mind that he is not 
employing the “ought…according to God” locution. And this, clearly, doesn’t 
undermine his atheism in the least.133 
Joyce is here describing a form of moral fictionalism. On this view, moral discourse 
continues to function as it did before we realised that morality was a myth – at least to the 
effect that we are more likely to be moral than if we were eliminativists.134 With clear 
knowledge that our moral beliefs don’t have an ontological backing – the very backing which 
supposedly bolsters our cooperation – we can still call morality a useful fiction provided this 
benefit is incurred. Since it is on prudential grounds that we choose to engage in this fiction, 
Joyce needs a means of distinguishing between moral fictionalism and prudential or 
epistemic fictionalism. Unless he can provide argument for why we can be trusted to make 
good decisions about food choices in the face of extreme weather but can’t be trusted to make 
good moral judgements without the help of some innate mechanism, his argument collapses 
into wholesale normative scepticism. This is because his causal claim extends to prudential 
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and epistemic normativity as the very considerations which undermine factual moral 
discourse are required in the mechanisms of motivation under his account of moral 
fictionalism.135  
A more powerful argument for Joyce’s view would be empirical support for a moral 
sense which produces moral beliefs. If this mechanism exists, we could expect there to be a 
dedicated cognitive partition which facilitated its functioning, or at least a group of related 
mechanisms which would serve this purpose. Since “the discovery of dedicated mechanism is 
a tell-tale sign of a specialised function…the presence of such a mechanism in the case of 
human morality should make us more confident in Joyce’s hypothesis – and conversely, its 
absence should decrease our confidence.”136 Most studies in this area rely on fMRI studies to 
examine the activation of brain regions during moral deliberation.137 Levy and Levy follow 
Sinnott-Armstrong and Wheatley in concluding that nearly all of these studies show that 
multiple areas are involved, however that none of the areas which showed increased activity 
were activated “in all and only” moral judgements.138 This suggests that Joyce’s moral sense 
faces a dilemma: either it doesn’t produce all moral beliefs, or it doesn’t just produce moral 
belief.139 The first option means that the causal claim cannot threaten the realist position and 
is merely operational against some of our moral judgements - our moral judgements 
stemming from disgust, for example. Additionally, to avoid post-hoc justification, those 
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judgements stemming from disgust would have to be unreflective and thus be solely the 
product of that evaluative tendency. The second option means that either the debunker 
abandons the rhetoric of sense and faculty, or otherwise demonstrates how this faculty 
unreliably produces beliefs which are not just moral, and yet none of these non-moral and 
unreliable beliefs fall into a domain which might undermine the debunking argument itself. 
Joshua Greene’s work shows that conflict in moral deliberation can be reduced to 
tension between competing partitions of the brain. Greene’s study of consequentialist and 
deontological judgements is unlike the others in that its target is not particular evaluative 
tendencies, but kinds of moral judgments which are typically seen to be the product of our 
critical reflective capacity. His argument is that these two moral outlooks seem to rely on 
distinct cognitive systems. Deontological processing is more emotional whereas 
consequential processing is more reasoning-like.140 The significance of Greene’s findings in 
his study of deontological intuitions have been contested.141 Nonetheless, even if his 
empirical claim goes through, his study represents only deontological intuitions and thus is 
only useful for debunking those intuitions. Otherwise, as Levy and Levy point out, 
demonstrating that some moral judgements are emergent from processes which are not 
grounded in evaluative tendencies, weakens Joyce’s motivational argument which requires 
that a link holds between our evaluative tendencies and moral judgements. On this view, 
since we didn’t need a motivational bulwark for some of our moral judgements, the question 
arises again as to why we needed this evolutionary spur at all.  
The evidence for Joyce’s moral sense is not promising. Another route for Joyce is to 
explore the viability of alternative theories of motivation. He provides an alternative to the 
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externalisation of sanction with a possible internalisation of sanction: “[o]ne who practices 
vice thereby damages his soul.”142 He claims that such an internalisation of punishment, what 
he calls the self-harm model of normativity, just doesn’t seem sufficient. He provides little 
argument for this, apart from a reductio ad absurdum involving a man named Jack, who 
commits a series of violent crimes and yet receives no denunciation from his peers. Jack only 
feels an internal sense of wrongdoing. Joyce finds this conclusion unpalatable, echoing his 
earlier statement that “without details and supporting evidence [Jacks internal sense of 
wrongdoing] amounts to nothing.”143  
Joyce briefly considers Kant but concludes that “no culture thinks that the wrongness 
of all such acts depends upon a primary harm that the perpetrator does by frustrating his own 
ends.”144 This is derivative of his earlier claim about Jack that “surely [the wrongness of 
torture] derives chiefly from the harm being inflicted on others!”145 This seems to be a 
misunderstanding of Kant. Kant’s account of the good will is not a proposal for how social 
cooperation is possible. It is an account of how a rational being with autonomy as a self-
legislating agent would be inherently motivated to act by their nature. To disregard the 
categorical imperative is not to frustrate one’s ends, but to act against one’s nature as a 
rational and self-legislating agent. Being a moral person then is to do the right thing for the 
right reasons. This is overlooked by Joyce.  
Recall that Joyce’s main contention with moral naturalism is that an adequate account 
of why we should be moral seems to be lacking from those theories. With so much resting on 
this issue of motivation, and with the empirical nature of the motivational bulwark under a 
shadow of doubt, it is worth considering what, in terms of metaethical argumentation, is 
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doing the heavy lifting. As I mentioned earlier, Joyce’s own realisation of the significance of 
considering the nativism debate leads to him calling for a return to “do[ing] metaethics the 
old-fashioned way.” He realises that it might not be settled that nativism supports scepticism 
until the metaethical argumentation against naturalism is done. Although he doesn’t seem to 
realise that such argumentation would render the debunking attempt otiose, it is at least step 
towards acknowledging the debate of rebutting facts (as opposed to undermining facts) at the 
heart of his anti-realist position.  
To summarise, we are still in search for a completed non-moral genealogy and thus 
the causal premise is not complete. A convincing and adequate non-moral genealogy is not 
available and even as a hypothetical consideration faces challenges pertaining to the 
containment of the acid of the debunking claim and the broader issue of the theoretical 
constraint. But exploring this issue has also uncovered a pattern in evolutionary explanations 
which is worth consideration. 
 
2.2.3 Cherry picking evaluative tendencies 
In nativist literature, what is most common is to explore the selection of fitness-enhancing 
evaluative tendencies which correspond to widely held beliefs. An example would be 
selecting reciprocal altruism over more denounceable and yet equally fitness enhancing 
tendencies like philandering or murdering one’s stepchildren.146 If we did inherit such 
tendencies, how do we explain the scarcity of those beliefs?  
What the critical reflective capacity provides is a “concept [with which] we can turn 
back against evolution. From the mindless and mindlessly selfish rose beings capable of 
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rationality and morality…”147 We have been led to believe that our conservative expressive 
tendency in evolutionary history couldn’t have adequately functioned as normative guidance 
without some kind of externalised sense of punishment, grounded in, at best, attitudes and 
desires, such as the desire to have our hunger for just deserts satisfied. Given that this is a 
desire, and that, surely, the alternative Kantian, Aristotelian or non-naturalist picture is 
inadequate, we are more accepting of the view that a causal explanation that fully explains 
morality is in prospect.  
When we depart from the view of motivational internalism and when we readily 
dismiss the potential of our critical reflective capacity, we risk ignoring a feature of human 
morality which makes us unique. Levy writes, “[o]ur evolutionary past constrains what we 
can think and believe and hope for; equally, it opens us up to unexpected, and ever-changing 
vistas of transformation and (we can hope) progress.”148 
The moral thought that dominates nativist literature is the conservative expressive 
tendency. With this tendency, come those evaluative beliefs acquired via natural selection 
which serve to bolster our confidence in moral assertions and compel us to generally act in 
ways which would be, or once were, evolutionarily beneficial. Beliefs about cooperation, 
tribalism and fairness for example, may be innate beliefs, or may stem from innate beliefs, 
which exist solely due to the evolutionary benefit their innateness emulates.149 Cooperation, 
to take a single case, requires a set of beliefs which we would employ in the event that our 
evaluative beliefs are challenged. These seem to be the beliefs elicited in time-sensitive 
situations, or in situations where we are otherwise unable to communicate our reasons for 
acting a certain way. To borrow from moral psychology, these might be those beliefs 
 
147 Neil Levy, What Makes Us Moral?: Crossing the Boundaries of Biology (London: Oneworld Publications, 
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employed in System 1 cognitive processes.150 This conservative expressive tendency consists 
of actions and conservative intuitive beliefs, which tend to produce and support cooperative 
behaviour. But morality is more than this.  
Simon Blackburn is among many who argue that in many important moral dilemmas, 
we require the use of a slow and deliberative thought process in contrast to a purely automatic 
and emotional one.151 Sterelny makes a similar observation in his survey of nativist literature: 
The syntactic model of moral cognition has no natural model of the relationship 
between reflexive and reflective moral cognition. Suppose [nativists] are right to think 
that an abstract set of normative general principles develops in every normal 
individual, principles whose character is invariant but whose specific form depends on 
individual learning history, principles that automatically, rapidly, productively, and 
unconsciously generate moral appraisals… We endorse moral generalisations; we do 
not just make bullet-fast judgements about specific cases. 152 
Moral problems involving inheritance laws, organ donation and immigration law for 
example, might elicit intuitive responses, and these responses may be the reflection of a 
social, cultural or evolutionary predilection, but given that fair-minded disagreement can 
exist on such issues for extended periods of time, intuitive responses are more likely to back-
fire.153 In addition to this, we seem to be capable of changing our actions based on periods of 
slow deliberation, such as in the case of our eating habits.154 We might become a vegetarian 
or come to place emphasis on the sourcing and conditions in which our food is grown 
 
150 Popularised in Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011). 
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following a consideration of the longevity of the planet or the cruelty of certain farming 
methods.  
This critical and reflective feature of our moral thought is also capable of modifying 
our intuitive responses over our lifetime and even across generations. Sterelny cites many 
examples such as recent shifts in attitudes towards “animal cruelty, the appropriate discipline 
of children, the role of women in the world… Not so long ago, public execution was an 
immensely popular public entertainment in England.”155 With rational reflection as a feature 
of our moral theories, not only can we better explain these changes in intuitive response, we 
can give credence to our capacity to formulate sophisticated and universal claims about 
human behaviours.  
This forgetting of the role of our critical reflective capacity, this overlooking of the 
hypothetical nature of the causal premise, and this mistaken belief of the premise’s empirical 
completeness, are all the features of a wider pattern. We could call this the Nativist 
Assumption.  
Take the Nativist assumption in Rex and Abrantes: 
Morality exists in all human societies we know of and almost every individual 
develops a sense of it without formal instruction and without intentional effort.156 
The term, ‘morality’, is used here in a way which does not clearly involve or acknowledge 
the role of rational reflection. Additionally, though ‘a sense’ of morality may exist in all 
human societies, the fact that some societies may be more reflectively sophisticated than 
others is a point which is similarly unacknowledged. The harm of this narrow construal is in 
its illusion of completeness – the idea that there exists an adequate explanation for the origin 
of morality. Taking nativism for granted means that debunking discourse develops upon an 
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inaccurate and incomplete foundation which threatens the stability of the causal premise as 
that premise requires that morality be fully explained by a particular off-track genealogy. 
Interestingly, there seem to be two strands of this nativist assumption, each attempting 
in opposing ways to explain human nature. The first, seemingly Hobbesian in its view, 
echoes the ancient sentiments of Plato’s Glaucon in the Republic. The second perhaps 
Romantic construal of human nature, echoing the work of Mencius in that human goodness is 
the foremost expression of our conservative expressive tendency.157 A paramount example of 
the former is in Ghiselin’s claim that: 
The evolution of society fits the Darwinian paradigm in its most individualistic form. 
Nothing in it cries out to be otherwise explained. The economy of nature is 
competitive from beginning to end. … What passes for cooperation turns out to be a 
mixture of opportunism and exploitation. … Scratch an ‘altruist’, and watch a 
‘hypocrite’ bleed.158 
And of the latter Romantic view: 
Where once science painted humans as self-seeking and warlike … today scientists of 
many disciplines are uncovering the deep roots of human goodness. … Empathy, 
gratitude, compassion, altruism, fairness, trust, and cooperation, once thought to be 
aberrations from the tooth and claw order of things, are now revealed as core features 
of primate evolution…More and more, it seems that rather than being irrational and 
superfluous, behaviours like compassion and kindness are actually conducive to 
human survival – and essential to human flourishing.159 
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First of all, the existence of two contradictory accounts of human nature gives us good reason 
to review the question of human nature itself, and exactly what evidence is being used to 
represent that nature. Emerging predominantly in literature from evolutionary psychology, 
such as in Tooby and Cosmides, is the view that there exists a complete and optimally 
functioning faculty which produces those moral beliefs which were likely to secure our 
tendency to partake in behaviours which safeguard our survival as a species. 
Because natural selection is a hill-climbing process that tends to choose the best of the 
variant designs that actually appear, and because of the immense numbers of variant 
designs that actually appear over the vast expanse of evolutionary time, natural 
selection tends to cause the accumulation of superlatively well engineered functional 
designs.160 
However, it does not follow from a faculty’s having-been-selected that it is in any way 
‘superlatively well engineered’. It may be the case that it was ‘better’ than competing features 
of an organism, given a specific pressure or set of pressures, but this is not necessarily 
conducive to superlative functionality or design. The incremental optimisation of 
evolutionary adaptation is potentially overlooked in the construal of natural selection as a 
selection between “an immense number of variant designs.” It is relatively small variations 
facing specific challenges which contribute to the hill climbing process. Thus, the products of 
evolution are well engineered in the sense that they might have met a particular selective 
pressure. Nevertheless, this assumption, emerging in evolutionary psychology, creates the 
foundation of inaccuracy on which others build, especially those in other disciplines. Take 
the following claim from Steven Pinker: 
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The parts of the mind that allow us to see are indeed well engineered, and there is no 
reason to think that the quality of engineering progressively deteriorates as the 
information flows upstream to the faculties that interpret and act on what we see.161 
The success of this comparison rests on the assumption that whatever is the product of 
evolution has reached a point of ‘superlativity’. Why is there no reason to think otherwise? 
Our eyes are indeed spectacularly functional, superlatively well engineered for creatures like 
us. But our eyes have a maximum resolution of about two megapixels (a cheap phone is 
better) and this lack of resolution requires extraordinary – and extraordinarily vulnerable – 
upstream processing to create an illusion of sharp and full vision. We cannot see cells 
unaided, we cannot see outside of the visible light spectrum, a considerable percentage of the 
human population requires glasses, and a smaller percentage will experience some kind of 
physiological malady which could render them blind. The hill-climbing process gave us a 
multitude of circumstances in which a particular adaptation would be selected, and to pick a 
single adapted feature and call it well engineered is to overlook the series of trials in which 
that feature would fail.  
As an extension of this, evolved traits could also be the product of a developmental 
‘quirk’ or ‘kluge’ where maladapted features can be repurposed at later points in the hill 
climb.162 In terms of morality, if we evolved a specific faculty at all, it might well be a kluge, 
it might even emerge from one or a series of other faculties with completely different 
purposes. The point is that superlativity itself is not a necessary feature of products of 
evolution. The implication of this consideration is firstly a reduction of tension between the 
contradictory explanations of our conservative expressive tendencies. It is not required that 
we are superlatively functional as beings in either this Hobbesian or Romantic sense. In terms 
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of measuring tendencies then, we should expect mistakes and we should expect every level of 
maladaptive possibility that comes with the eye. But what does this mean for the nativist? 
The nativist ought to consider an agent’s reasons for acting a certain way or holding a 
particular belief. That we might act in accordance with the Hobbesian or Romantic tradition 
or have beliefs which these traditions might expect of us, is not a smoking gun. It’s not even 
ammunition. When we talk about reasons for action, we leave the realm of explaining our 
conservative expressive tendency and we face our critical reflective capacity and the reasons 
which count either in favour of or against a particular belief.  
As I indicated in my introduction to this section, there exists another possibility. If 
causes which are at work in the production of moral beliefs are saturated with off-track forces 
due to our evolution, then moral beliefs, even with critical reflection, might be the product of 
emotional schemas and cultural influences. This means that their basis in our emotional 
responses renders our beliefs drawn from the poisoned well, whereby our beliefs never 
escape their off-track origins. Anti-realists (in particular, those who argue that value is mind-
dependent) argued well before the prominence of the debunking argument that our moral 
beliefs were ultimately grounded in off-track beliefs (such as in emotional responses). If we 
must first value cooperation to take it to be an end worth pursuing, then the anti-realists who 
argue for this kind of stance-dependence are right. However, this is not a distinctly Darwinian 
argument, nor is it empirically established. This other possibility is identical in argumentative 
structure to classic metaethical arguments which need not invoke the Darwinian Hypothesis. I 
return to this issue in chapter five. 
 
2.3 Accepting the Darwinian Hypothesis 
Although I have just provided a number of reasons which complicate this ambition, 
there exists substantial literature which plays out the assumption that a satisfactory defence of 
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the Darwinian Hypothesis might be provided, either along nativist or non-nativist lines. These 
theorists argue that the Darwinian Hypothesis might not complicate but might instead enrich 
the realist’s story. 
If it is true that evolution or some off-track process influences our normative beliefs, 
then we must on one hand consider whether this influence is complete and thus whether it 
undermines the justification or truth of those influenced beliefs. On the other hand, and what 
will be the focus of this section, is the consideration of the nature of this influence. Recall the 
deep structure of the EDA: 
1. Moral beliefs are formed and supported only through unreliable doxastic processes. 
2. We are not justified in our beliefs formed only through unreliable processes. 
3. Moral beliefs are not justified. 
In the previous section, I explored challenges to the claim that moral beliefs were strictly 
formed and supported through an off-track genealogy. Here, I grant that moral beliefs could 
have been formed and supported by a process but challenge the claim that this process was 
off-track. David Enoch (2010, 2011), Knut Skarsaune (2011) and Jeff Behrends (2013) are 
prominent voices in this debate, each attempting to show that normative belief and normative 
truth are on the same track.163 On this view, we consider the hypothetical availability of an 
etiological account and how realism might be compatible with an evolved morality. 
The first part of this argument challenges the assumptions made in Street’s 
epistemological formulation of the evolutionary debunking argument, in particular, the first 
horn of her Darwinian dilemma for moral realists. This is the claim that moral realists may 
embrace the fact that there is no relation between the fitness tracking processes of evolution 
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and mind-independent moral truth. Having grasped this horn, moral realists, if they are to 
persist in their beliefs, must explain the striking coincidence that an evaluative judgment 
came to accord with one of an independent evaluative truth. This likelihood, she analogises, 
is like setting out on a boat to Bermuda and hoping to arrive by the sheer chance that the 
wind and tides will take you there. Enoch sums up the thought in his exploration of Street’s 
argument: 
[I]sn’t it an amazing fluke that whatever evolution ‘aims’ at happens also to be good? 
And isn’t this itself something that calls for an explanation, an explanation that the 
realist is not in a position to offer?...So doesn’t it follow that the story just told, far 
from showing how the realist can avoid commitment to miraculous correlations, relies 
on a miracle?164 
Enoch argues that such a coincidence isn’t miraculous at all, “[f]or what would have to be the 
case for this miracle not to occur?”165 Whatever evolution aims towards would have to be of 
no value to us. This view seems untenable because even fundamental normative truths seem 
“necessary in a fairly strong sense.”166 Enoch doesn’t intend to refute challenges such as 
Street’s, but simply to accrue plausibility points for the moral realist. He writes, “once it is 
kept in mind that the game is an explanatory one and that the winner is going to be 
determined on plausibility grounds, the challenge to the realist – though still serious – seems 
at least manageable.”167 He concedes that the correlation between the evolutionarily selected 
normative judgements and supposed normative truths is not that strong, but that “the 
correlation the realist must acknowledge – and the one it seems independently plausible to 
believe in – can be fairly weak, so long as it is strong enough to block the inference of 
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scepticism.”168 Referring to his earlier analogy, he writes, “if the correlation between Josh’s 
beliefs about the distant Nepalese village and the truths about it is rather weak, so that he’s 
right more often than you would expect a random guesser to be, but not by much, then a very 
weak explanans would suffice to dispel the mystery – perhaps he just read a story in a 
magazine about the village. If the correlation is much stronger, though, a more impressive 
explanans would be needed.”169 If the realist accepts that, in the face of this weak correlation, 
she gets things right more than she gets things wrong in regards to normative issues, then she 
can quite reasonably hold on to the normative beliefs in question.  
There is still a questionable amount of luck involved in the possibility that we 
happened to evolve in an environment where being right more often than we are wrong is 
conducive to our evolutionary success. But this brute luck, he argues, is apparent everywhere 
else.170 This level of scepticism seems to call into question our existence entirely, and it 
becomes apparent that we are by and large content, everywhere else, with this kind of brute 
luck. Nevertheless, he provides an account of how we may have to acquire an adequately 
functioning reasoning mechanism which may give rise to normative beliefs and thus come to 
‘track truth.’  
Normative beliefs and some reasoning mechanisms could quite possibly come closer 
to tracking truth by “eliminating inconsistencies, increasing overall coherence, eliminating 
arbitrary distinctions, drawing analogies…etc.”171 There is a rationality, he argues, in 
accepting that a reasoning mechanism deemed fallible could become more accurate or refined 
in the judgements or beliefs it produces over time. Imagining that there is certain starting 
point for the level of truth in a certain set of normative beliefs, this evolutionary story can 
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explain a gradual movement from less-true to more-true. Enoch’s caveat is that these 
normative beliefs aren’t ‘far off’ from the start, that is, the strength of the correlation between 
the starting points – the normative beliefs and the normative truths themselves. After this 
supposed evolution, where for example inconsistencies are eliminated, we are left with our 
not-too-far-off beliefs and their correlation to truth. Though richly speculative, this point 
could be said to be lowering the bar to the sort of scepticism welcome in the realist position, 
a bar previously set to unreasonable or unfair standards by debunkers such as Street.  
Enoch’s broader argument, and perhaps the most significant aspect of his defence of 
moral realism, seeks to provide an explanation for the supposedly unfathomable coincidence 
that our normative beliefs coincide with mind-independent truths. In providing his 
explanation, Enoch writes that it is not his aim to completely explain the coincidence, but 
merely to show that the coincidence “should not be a cause for too much distress,”172 and that 
even if realism is implausible, “it may still be globally better than all competing 
metanormative theories.”173 His explanation of the correlation between the normative beliefs 
and mind-independent truth is called the third factor explanation. It serves as an alternative to 
two factor explanations which are the focus of Street’s critique. As Street would have it, the 
correlation would be explained if normative beliefs were (causally, constitutively, or both) 
responsible for the mind independent truths or if the truths were similarly responsible for the 
beliefs. Street’s argument seemingly succeeds, he argues, because these two factor 
explanations are “unavailable to the robust realist.”174  Enoch believes that by including a 
third factor into the explanation of the correlation, the realist position remains defensible. 
This means that this third factor is somehow (causally, constitutively, or both) responsible for 
 





the normative beliefs we have and the mind independent truth. This is the godless pre-
established harmony explanation. 
He begins, “assume that survival or reproductive success (or whatever else evolution 
“aims” at) is at least somewhat good.”175 Enoch admits that this is a weak assumption, though 
he is satisfied with the assertion that survival and reproduction are usually better than death 
and infertility. Since survival and reproduction can be argued to be key selective pressures in 
our evolutionary story, we can assume that the prevalence of corresponding beliefs and 
desires would be unsurprising. Though Street argued that considering our evolutionary past 
formed the foundation of her argument against moral realism, it is Enoch’s consideration of 
our evolutionary past which seeks to rescue the realist. Enoch shows that what is morally 
good has a pre-established harmony with what is evolutionarily beneficial. From here, he 
argues that what is evolutionarily beneficial has a (causal, constitutive, or both) relationship 
with cognitive faculties and thus the correlation is explained. He writes, it is not “because the 
normative truths are a function of our normative beliefs, nor because our normative beliefs 
causally track the normative truths, but because our normative beliefs have been shaped by 
selective pressures towards ends that are in fact – and quite independently of – value… The 
fact that (roughly speaking) survival is good pre-establishes the harmony between the 
normative truths and our normative beliefs.”176 This connection then, between evolutionary 
forces and the fact that survival is good, can explain our normative beliefs and their 
correlation to mind-independent truth. Though there is an ensuing discussion, Enoch 
concludes that his only aim is to increase the plausibility – and so to null the level of 
scepticism – in embracing Street’s first horn, that there is a relation between the fitness 
tracking processes of evolution and mind-independent moral truth. 
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At the point of the argument where Enoch argued that survival could serve as a moral 
good, Skarsaune (2011) offers another account where pain and pleasure are argued to have 
evolutionary utility. For clarity’s sake, I will restate Street’s Darwinian Dilemma:  
First Horn: Moral realists can assert that there is no relation between the fitness 
tracking processes of evolution and mind-independent moral truth. 
Or 
Second Horn: Moral realists can assert that there is a relation between the fitness 
tracking processes of evolution and mind-independent moral truth. 
Also, recall that this dilemma arose for the realist when responding to the EDA. It is 
Skarsaune’s position that the realist can accept the second horn of the dilemma. As with 
Enoch, Skarsaune believes that the supposed scepticism in the embracing of the second horn 
is no burden. He happily embraces this horn and argues that realists can provide an account 
of the relation between the fitness tracking processes of evolution and mind-independent 
moral truth, despite Street’s charge of the implausibility of such an account.  
The foundation for Skarsaune’s claim rests on the following argument: 
If pleasure is usually good and pain is usually bad, there does indeed exist a relation 
between evolutionary pressures and the evaluative facts, a relation which is truth-
conducive in the sense that it would tend to bias our evaluative beliefs toward truth.177 
His first premise, that pleasure is usually good for an agent, he argues is a plain psychological 
fact.178  
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Individuals that took pleasure in nutrient foods, sex, the welfare of the children, social 
status within their group, and so on, would tend to pursue these things with greater 
vigour than individuals that did not.179 
It could be argued that S’s pleasure in p would generally cause S to engage in p. Given this, 
there are two inferences to be made: either the statement is true, and so the truth-
conduciveness of the influence in the evolutionary account of our evaluative beliefs has been 
supported. Or, the statement is false, and we don’t seem to understand “plain psychological 
facts,” and most of our evaluative beliefs are wrong. He continues, “[f]or if pleasure is 
usually good, then the activities and states of affairs evolution has caused us to value 
through this mechanism tend to be good—because they are pleasurable. Hence, if P 
is true, there is a relation between reproductive enhancement and goodness after all.”180 If it 
can be accepted that it is even generally true that pleasure is good for an agent, then the 
valuing done by that agent due to the pleasure response is thereby, in some way, similarly 
imbued with value. This is not to say that evolution is selecting what is valuable, merely that 
the role of evolution was in “simply making these states of affairs pleasurable. But once 
evolution has done that, the independent evaluative fact “kicks in”, as it were, the end result 
being that these states of affairs are good.”181 
If the statement that S’s pleasure in p would generally cause S to engage in p is false, 
then much of what we understand about evolutionary tendencies, psychological responses 
and a host of other beliefs is wrong. He argues, “if given a case of pleasure is not good for the 
person who enjoys it, then it is hard to see how it could be good in the absolute sense…if the 
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hard to see how this fact could be a reason for other people to bring the event about.”182 In 
other words, the realist has nothing to fear by embracing the first horn of Street’s dilemma.  
 
2.4 The Self-Undermining Response 
Consider this general evolutionary debunking argument:  
Causal Premise: We believe that p, an evaluative proposition, because we were 
predisposed to believe that p, and there is an evolutionary explanation of that 
predisposition to believe that p. 
Epistemic Premise: Evolution is not a truth-tracking process with respect to 
evaluative truth.  
Therefore, we are not justified in believing that p.183 
The issue of self-undermining arises in the analysis of which beliefs are affected by this 
argument. Beliefs can be directly tainted, as in (1) holding the belief that p was necessary to 
bolster our tendency to do x, and x was evolutionarily beneficial. Otherwise they can be 
indirectly tainted, whereby (2) our belief that p2 is grounded in our belief that p, and (1). 
When I introduced this problem through the case of Napoleon beliefs, recall that the central 
issue was how to determine the scope of the debunking argument so that it would allow a 
clean and contained target for the belief pill. I raised the question of how we could go about 
debunking our belief that “Napoleon lost Waterloo” without neglecting information which 
might ratify the belief external to the debunking attempt (our knowledge of who won 
Waterloo), and without our debunking carrying over onto fundamental beliefs about France, 
Europe, history and so on. 
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 In terms of morality, the stakes are much higher. The risk is that the debunking 
argument in metaethics might extend to beliefs outside of the moral domain. If we take all of 
our belief-forming capacities to be the product of evolution, and we accept the general 
epistemic claim that evolution selected for fitness and not truth, then we undermine the very 
faculties responsible for producing our beliefs about evolution and thus the evolutionary 
debunking argument itself is self-undermining. No debunker forms such a crude debunking 
argument against moral realism. Instead, the debunker must show a clear way of 
distinguishing between domains which can be epistemically justified by natural selection and 
domains which cannot.184 Call this the demarcation challenge.185 Debunkers present a 
common argument to face this challenge: 
1. Domains which are epistemically justified are those which pertain to cognitive 
faculties which would have reliably facilitated survival and reproduction. 
2. Faculties which were responsible for producing beliefs about states of affairs 
needed to be reliable. 
3. Scientific beliefs are produced by faculties which are responsible for producing 
beliefs about states of affairs. 
4. Therefore, scientific beliefs are reliable.186 
I consider the metaphysical and epistemological assumptions behind (1) and (2) in the next 
chapter, as I believe these premises clearly assume a causal theory of knowledge, or related 
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epistemic theories such as reliabilism.187  The focus of my present discussion is (3). The 
question can be posed as, what other fundamental beliefs might be involved in constructing 
the evolutionary debunking argument outside of scientific beliefs which must also be 
protected from the universal acid to allow for the argument to go through? 
Griffith and Wilkins (2015) face the demarcation challenge by proposing The Milvian 
Bridge principle – named after the battle between Constantinus and Maxentius who fought 
for the Roman Empire over the Tiber in Rome in 312.188 As a result of Constantinus’ belief in 
divine intervention, he won the battle. One could posit that either he won because God 
supported him and thus made the victory occur, or that he won because he thought that God 
was supporting him and so he (and his army) fought harder and longer. The historical 
reference can be reduced to the thesis that one cannot argue from the successful outcome of 
believing in x that x is therefore true. The analogy drawn then is that the success of moral 
values in our society means only that members who hold certain moral beliefs will tend to 
flourish in conditions which favour those behaviours. Moral beliefs which are deemed fitness 
tracking are by no means truth tracking. Though cognitive processes which allowed our 
ancestors to adapt and reproduce are generally reliable and truth tracking, if evolutionary 
theory cannot justify the existence of corresponding truth-making facts, such as moral or 
religious facts, then the evolved process cannot be deemed reliable.  
Kyriacou writes, “we can distinguish between processes that are reliable and truth-
tracking and processes that are not on the basis of what truth-making facts the naturalist 
framework of evolutionary theory could countenance.”189 Those evaluative processes, of the 
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unreliable kind, and the beliefs output by those processes are susceptible to debunking. This 
is because faculties which were responsible for producing beliefs about states of affairs 
needed to, more often than not, reliably track states of affairs – the truth of which was 
essential to our knowing them. The distinction drawn then, allows sensory faculties and the 
corresponding empirical beliefs to survive the debunking argument.  
Griffith and Wilkins (2015) word the argument as follows: 
Milvian Bridge: The X facts are related to the evolutionary success of X beliefs in 
such a way that it is reasonable to accept and act on X beliefs produced by our 
evolved cognitive faculties.190 
The essential distinction is one between commonsense grounded scientific beliefs and beliefs 
which do not relate directly relate to evolutionary success. These commonsense beliefs, such 
as perceptual or memorial beliefs, are reasonable to accept because they correspond to 
evolutionary success. These beliefs include, they write, “those everyday beliefs which guide 
mundane action…the existence of his body, and of other human bodies and inanimate bodies, 
all arranged in space and time, as well as the fact that those other human bodies knew similar 
things.”191 To clarify, these ‘commonsense facts’ are facts which must be true, as if they were 
false we would have been misled about essential features of the universe and would not have 
evolved much further. To clarify how they save commonsense beliefs from being 
undermined, take the following argument. 
1. In a universe where commonsense facts are necessary, commonsense beliefs were 
likely formed through reliable, truth-tracking mechanisms. 
 
190 Paul Griffiths, Wilkins, John, "Crossing the Milvian Bridge: When Do Evolutionary Explanations Debunk 
Belief?," in Darwin in the 21st Century: Nature, Humanity and God (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University 
Press, 2015). 
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2. If a belief is formed through reliable, truth-tracking mechanisms, it is a justified 
belief. 
3. Therefore, commonsense beliefs are justified. 
It seems quite commonsense to argue this, as one could posit that from an evolutionary 
perspective, navigating the complexities of Pleistocene life required doxastic processes 
grounded in observations which were generally true. Griffiths and Wilkins extend 
commonsense beliefs to form the foundation to scientific beliefs by arguing that “the world of 
the commonsense must be seen as…the world described using the perceptual and conceptual 
categories available.”192 It is argued that scientific beliefs are separate to commonsense 
beliefs but serve as a kind of extension from the commonsense realm to the scientific realm. 
In a way, these commonsense facts serve as the shoulders on which the scientific beliefs 
stand and so those beliefs can be similarly justified.  
 It would seem then, that our cognitive faculties were not selected for their ability to do 
calculus, statistics or even to take a series of known premises, say about an historical event, 
and deduce from those premises new information about a time in the distant past. But 
Griffiths and Wilkins argue that such cognitive processes are justified, as “…if evolution 
does not undermine our trust in our cognitive faculties, neither should it undermine our trust 
in our ability to use those faculties to debug themselves – to identify their own limitations, as 
in perceptual illusions or common errors in intuitive reasoning.”193 They argue that new 
concepts and methods which have not been directly shaped by the forces of natural selection, 
might still be introduced and justified through the use of those faculties which evolved. On 
these grounds, Griffiths and Wilkins believe they meet the demarcation challenge.  
 
192 Ibid. 212 
193 Ibid. 214 
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 These commonsense and perceptual beliefs come together to form what Griffiths and 
Wilkins characterise as the human Umwelt, a term introduced by Estonian biologist Jacob 
von Uexkull. What is available to a species, in terms of available perceptual and conceptual 
categories, constitute the Umwelt of that species. For a social bird like the Jackdaw, though 
they may view other Jackdaws purely in terms of their social function (as companions for 
flocking, mating, and parenting) and not as simply other Jackdaws (which we humans 
perceive), they are not mistaken about their world any more than we are mistaken about 
colours and objects.194 Griffiths and Wilkins write, “[w]hatever ontological authority may 
attach to the concepts and categories of science, the commonsense way in which we see the 
world has no more or less ontological authority than the way in which birds see the world.”195 
So, adopting this language, we could say that what is justified by natural selection is what is 
emergent (either directly or indirectly) from cognitive faculties which were selected because 
they tracked truth in the human Umwelt. 
We can question the success of this attempt at meeting the demarcation challenge. 
First of all, it is not made clear why moral beliefs are not similarly derivative of the 
commonsense world or why a set of commonsense moral beliefs couldn’t have formed 
independently of commonsense empirical beliefs. This is because it is not established that the 
faculty responsible for producing (at least some) commonsense facts necessarily involved a 
selection for as opposed to a selection of truth. Sober distinguishes between ‘Selection of’ 
and ‘Selection for’ to better understand the causal processes behind certain adaptations that 
would lead to an organism’s survival and certain adaptations that increased in representation 
as a byproduct of a causal process.196 To illustrate the difference between the two kinds of 
selection, Sober refers to a child’s toy which acts like a selection machine. The toy is a large 
 
194 Ibid. 210-211 
195 Ibid. 210 
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cylinder which has four tiers, each containing different sized balls. The top tier contains 
larger balls and each successive tier contains balls of gradually smaller sizes. Each tier also 
has holes of the same size. If all of the balls are at the top, shaking the toy distributes the balls 
to their respective tiers. Balls of the smallest size make it all the way to bottom. It could be 
said then that the toy selects for smallness – because the success of descending the tiers 
depends on the ball’s smallness. However, he adds, balls of the same size are also the same 
colour and the smallest balls happen to be green. There are now two kinds of selection at play 
in the selection machine, selection of objects (balls) and selection for properties (colour). 
There is selection for smallness, but not selection for green. The colour of the balls at the 
bottom of the toy is still a fact about the toy, but it was a byproduct as opposed to a 
mechanism of the selection process. This raises a challenge for attempts to locate the origin 
of our commonsense beliefs because they need not be directly related to our capacity for 
survival or reproduction, and upon these beliefs might be formed other beliefs which have 
come to play indispensable roles in our deliberation. To meet the demarcation challenge, 
debunkers must show why (on independent grounds) commonsense beliefs might be formed 
indirectly but truly, but moral beliefs are not. 
Kyriacou argues that the Milvian Bridge principle does not satisfactorily meet the 
demarcation challenge. He writes that “the [Milvian Bridge] principle itself does not satisfy 
the epistemic rationality standard for ontological commitment that it purports to set.”197 Our 
Pleistocene ancestors were unlikely to have benefited by the Milvian bridge itself. Recall that 
the belief produced by our evolved cognitive faculties required a sort of practicality, it is hard 
to see how such practicality can be attributed to the Milvian bridge. Our ancestors, Kyriacou 
concludes, “would not have had the leisure time we have to develop an interest to such highly 
 
197 Kyriacou, "Are Evolutionary Debunking Arguments Self-Debunking?."1357 
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theoretical issues. Practical, survival needs would have been pressing.”198 The truth makers 
of the Milvian bridge principle wouldn’t be any less mysterious than the running construal of 
truth makers in moral principles.199 
When utilised as a debunking argument against normative facts, Kyriacou argues that, 
“it entails an evaluative-epistemic assertion which itself claims that evolution is not a reliable 
and truth tracking process with respect to normative-evaluative truth.”200 By specifying the 
target of the epistemic premise to include evaluative truths, the debunking argument is still 
self-defeating if evolutionary theory itself is an evaluative-epistemic truth. As a result, he 
writes, “debunking evaluative truths implies debunking debunking evolutionary arguments 
because they rely on evaluative truths.”201  
With this very logic, the Milvian Bridge principle similarly debunks a range of 
evaluative facts that seem counter-intuitive to debunk, these could include the beliefs that 
“we ought to pursue the truth and avoid falsity, be logically and probabilistically consistent, 
sensitive to counterevidence, proportionate belief on evidence, be intellectually honest, open-
minded, love truth’ etc.”202 Such norms could be indispensable for rational reasoning, and 
such rational reasoning seems to be indispensable for formulating complex arguments such as 
the Milvian Bridge principle itself. 
 It would seem that without a clear understanding of what is entailed by their use of 
commonsense facts, the Milvian Bridge cannot adequately show a clear way of distinguishing 
between domains which can be epistemically justified by natural selection and domains 
which cannot. Commonsense facts that pertain to “the existence of his body, and of other 
 
198 Ibid. 1358 
199 But the question could be raised as to why the principle would need to be an accessible truth to our ancestors. 
Griffiths and Wilkins would probably respond that the principle could be arrived at long after the fact, based on 
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human bodies and inanimate bodies, all arranged in space and time, as well as the fact that 
those other human bodies knew similar things” seems to either commit the debunker to 
“debunk[ing] virtually everything (even ordinary natural facts and objects) or in an ad hoc 
and question begging way [to applying] double standards [in order] to debunk only some of 
the facts that could be debunked by its own lights.”203 
Griffiths and Wilkins also extend their principle to scientific facts, which might be 
just as troubling. Having shown that the Milvian Bridge principle extends to perceptual and 
memorial beliefs, Griffiths and Wilkins appeal to the history of science to argue that “we 
have reasons to believe that we can derive reliable knowledge in the more adequate 
conceptual schemes of science.”204 Just as “[n]o human being had the concepts of 
differentiation and integration before Leibniz and Newton’s introduction of the calculus” 
humans seem to be capable of implementing “radical changes” through “individual cognitive 
innovations.”205 The Milvian Bridge applies to scientific beliefs indirectly, in their view, 
opposed to the direct bridge connecting commonsense beliefs to pragmatic success. These 
commonsense beliefs play the role of justifying the methods by which we arrive at scientific 
beliefs – methods which Kyriacou suggests first require a capacity to ground an external 
reality using metaphysical and epistemological theory. Griffiths and Wilkins develop this 
account of the indirect Milvian Bridge: 
The reasons we have to think that our scientific conclusions are correct and that the 
methods we use to reach them are reliable are simply the data and arguments which 
scientists give for their conclusions, and for their methodological innovations. 
Ultimately, these have to be able to stand up to the same kind of commonsense 
scrutiny as any other addition to our beliefs. 
 
203 Ibid. 8 




Although there is care taken to connect purely pragmatic beliefs to the highly conceptual 
beliefs which lend support to the scientific methodology, in the face of the demarcation 
challenge, it seems that this explanation is still inadequate. Debunkers require a clear method 
of showing which domains are epistemically justified by natural selection and those which 
are not. In attempting to salvage the complexity of science out of purely pragmatic beliefs, 
Griffiths and Wilkins only complicate this distinction. Broadly, both science and philosophy 
“build theories that postulate posits and entities to abductively explain bodies of data in the 
best possible way, as they seem to be….”206 This seems to include, at least, our best 
philosophical beliefs, in much the same way as we would salvage complex scientific beliefs 
in order for the epistemic foundations of the evolutionary debunking argument to hold itself.  
Kyriacou argues that the number of unsalvageable commonsense beliefs is large 
enough to topple the structure which Griffiths and Wilkins sought to build, namely that of 
grounding scientific beliefs in commonsense beliefs. Kyriacou concludes that debunkers are 
required to clarify their meta-epistemological commitments, as their argument faces many 
challenges in its operation.207  
Elsewhere, more localised debunking attempts present analogous concerns. Vavova 
argues that an appropriate narrowing of the scope to purely moral beliefs, leaves us knowing 
nothing about morality. It is not clear how we would go about knowing what we are mistaken 
about, without some concrete notions of what morality is.208 In the same vein, even further 
narrowing of the scope to particular kinds of moral theorising, such as in Greene’s debunking 
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argument against deontological intuitions, the argument spills over into our consequentialist 
intuitions.209 
Overall, what is found is that Griffiths and Wilkins need to establish the validity of 
their use of epistemic norms, without presupposing the factuality of those norms. Kyriacou 
grants that, as a possible solution to the self-undermining problem, “the debunker could 
propose that antirealists can ‘construct’ epistemic facts (via social construction or via the 
Kantian categorical imperative) in virtue of which debunking arguments operate.”210 This 
leads to the consideration that this exact move is open for the realist.211 Griffith and Wilkins 
also owe an account of why moral properties are not a part of, or even possibly a part of, the 
natural world. In the same way that, according to Jack’s history books, unicorns either exist 
or do not, a viable form of naturalism would show that the Darwinian Hypothesis is 
vindicating rather than debunking – a possibility which is at odds with their argument, yet left 
untouched by their conclusions. At this point, however, I will conclude that without further 
specification, perhaps to the debunkers peril, at just what can be debunked without forming a 
self-undermining argument, further doubt can be cast upon the effectiveness of the EDA. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I surveyed prominent responses to the EDA and introduced the otiosity 
argument. The otiosity argument shows that it is underlying metaethical argument and 
rebuttal that carries forward the realist and anti-realist debate, as opposed to this progress 
coming from any undermining facts emerging from the evolutionary debunking literature. To 
summarise the argument, suppose I make the claim that blue is the best colour. If you showed 
me that I only think blue is the best colour because it is my favourite colour, then my claim 
 
209 Vavova argues that this claim either “accomplishes nothing new philosophically… [or] the argument 
collapses into the more ambitious and less promising one.” Ibid. 17-18 
210 Kyriacou, "Are Evolutionary Debunking Arguments Self-Debunking?." 1358 
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that it is the best colour is not justified – clearly I am biased and unable to advance a stance-
independent reason to hold that blue is the best colour. But, if you went on to say that I was 
predisposed to favour such a colour purely because of my upbringing, you would not be 
developing any new argument against my original claim that blue is the best colour. You 
would, perhaps, only be cladding your claim that my favouritism skews my judgement of 
colours (you would be adding descriptive weight to the charge of bias). However, assuming 
that I was sensitive to reasons, I would have already retracted my claim that blue is the best 
colour once I realised the poverty of my reasons for thinking it so, and perhaps I am now in 
the process of trying to separate my quest for the best colour from the distorting influence of 
my favouritism. Your causal claim about my upbringing may be true, but it is no longer 
pertinent. Now, you and I should both return to the question of bias: I can still be biased and 
make a judgement which is true, so we must determine what colour is really the best, as 
objectively as we can, taking care to distance ourselves from causal influences which might 
be directing our choices. In this example, the undermining facts would be the discovery that 
my upbringing led me to favour blue. I am arguing that debunkers must first establish that 
this is the only available reason for me to believe blue is the best colour in order for the 
argument to have any force. If the debunker must establish this prior to constructing their 
debunking attempt, then they must effectively rule out any reason I might have had to believe 
that blue is the best colour. This would establish the post-hoc rationalisation premise. Since 
establishing this premise would achieve the very conclusion which the debunking attempt 
aims at, the debunking argument itself is otiose. In metaethics, the argumentation which 
debunkers provide in order to establish their versions of the post-hoc rationalisation premise 
plays out this very problem. In each proceeding chapter I seek to demonstrate this. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I turned to prominent arguments against evolutionary 
debunking arguments. The first argument I explored challenges the claim most central to the 
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evolutionary debunking of morality – the claim that there is any appropriately complete 
evolutionary story to be told of the origins of our moral beliefs in the first place. I called the 
view that moral beliefs are the product of an evolutionary and epistemically off-track 
formative process, the Darwinian Hypothesis. Recall the stipulation of the Darwinian 
Hypothesis from Chapter One, which is the first premise of the general version of the EDA 
set out in that chapter: 
1. Moral beliefs are formed and supported only through unreliable doxastic processes. 
2. We are not justified in our beliefs formed only through unreliable processes. 
3. Moral beliefs are not justified. 
If moral beliefs are not formed only through unreliable doxastic processes, then the debunker 
must concede the more modest conclusion that only some moral beliefs are unjustified. Such 
an argument does not threaten the broader position of metaethical realism. The literature on 
denying the Darwinian Hypothesis weakens this first premise on several fronts. I first began 
by emphasising what it would mean to debunk ‘morality.’ I argued that a significant portion 
of debunking literature draws on the empirical evidence underlying our conservative 
expressive tendency (CET) as opposed to our critical reflective capacity (CRC). 
We have the tendency to act in certain ways, form moral judgements or make decisions about 
how we should act or certain characteristics we should express, in accordance with our 
evolved natures and, on the other hand, we have a capacity to reflect on the ways in which we 
choose to act and the sort of people we thus become or aspire to be. The existence of this 
latter capacity problematises the attempt to empirically investigate morality since it exceeds 
the kind of disposition to believe targeted by EDAs. Next, I argued that there does not yet 
exist a satisfactory and completed non-moral genealogy for our moral beliefs. So, the 
conclusions drawn through EDAs are hypothetical considerations until more work is done to 
demonstrate that the Darwinian Hypothesis is true. Then I explored the problem of cherry-
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picking in nativist literature. Often theorists draw upon ‘evidence’ from our evolutionary past 
in order to defend a certain image of our evolved natures. I argued that this evidence is often 
contradictory and that this reinforces the incompleteness of this research. We have good 
reasons to doubt that the Darwinian Hypothesis is true. 
 The second argument I explored drew from the literature which accepts, at least for 
the sake of argument, that the Darwinian Hypothesis is true. Realists in this debate sometimes 
call themselves the pre-established harmony theorists, since they claim that there is a pre-
established harmony between certain moral facts and the evolved cognitive processes which 
evolved to track them. These theorists seek to ‘lower the epistemic bar’ of scepticism towards 
the belief that we might have evolved to have certain moral beliefs because those beliefs are 
true. I return to this discussion in Chapter Five. 
The third and final argument I explored was the self-undermining argument. The self-
undermining argument builds upon the problem of defining a debunking argument’s scope. 
Debunkers must have a clear target for their EDA in order to avoid unleashing a universal 
epistemic acid and a debunking argument which generalises to its own epistemic foundation. 
It is in this move, in meeting the demarcation challenge, that is, the challenge to distinguish 
between beliefs debunked and those that are not, that the debunkers must assume or 
preestablish arguments about epistemic norms which are not distinctly evolutionary, 
undermining facts. This reinforces the significance of the otiosity argument against the 
debunking manoeuvre. To be in a position to begin a debunking argument, the conclusion of 
that argument must already be settled on other grounds. In Chapter Three I explore how this 





CHAPTER THREE: ONTOLOGISING MORALITY 
3.1 Meeting the Demarcation Challenge 
In Chapter Two I argued that the debunker must show a clear way of distinguishing 
between domains which are epistemically justified within natural selection and domains 
which are not. Kahane’s formulation of the EDA is that if S’s belief that p can be explained 
by X, and X is an off-track process, then p is unjustified.212 But as we have seen, in 
explanations for p evolutionary debunkers share the position that our cognitive faculties are 
the product of natural selection. The demarcation challenge is the task of demonstrating 
which beliefs are the product of cognitive faculties formed via off-track (non-truth-tracking) 
doxastic processes and which are formed via on-track doxastic processes. In the final section 
of the previous chapter, I argued that this challenge is significant because the epistemic 
norms which operate behind the EDA might themselves be susceptible to an EDA. The 
response from the debunker is the attempt to locate a meta-epistemic norm which meets the 
demarcation challenge for our perceptual and commonsense beliefs. The example I explored 
was the Milvian Bridge principle proposed by Griffiths and Wilkins: 
The X facts are related to the evolutionary success of X beliefs in such a way that it is 
reasonable to accept and act on X beliefs produced by our evolved cognitive 
faculties.213 
Here, I show that this attempt to meet the demarcation challenge assumes that moral truth, if 
it exists, must be appropriately responsive to fitness-enhancing tendencies. This 
presupposition begs the question against moral realism because moral knowledge need not be 
causal in nature and fitness-enhancing tendencies are likely to be causal in nature. A related 
presupposition of the debunking strategy is that natural properties are the only candidates for 
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evaluative truth and thus that the available options for the realist are limited to moral 
naturalism or moral nihilism.214 I will argue that this leads to a dilemma for the aspiring 
debunker. 
 
3.1.1 What Does it Mean to Track Truth? 
Goldman (1967, 1976) proposed that “S knows that p if and only if the fact that p is 
causally connected in an “appropriate” way with S’s believing p.”215 Here, “appropriate” 
denotes the knowledge-producing causal processes of perception, memory, and a causal chain 
of correctly constructed inference from perception or memory. A simplified version of this 
causality could be expressed in that S’s belief that P is appropriately caused by the fact that 
P.216 For perception, take the case where a vase situated in front of S is blocked by a 
photograph of a vase which, when illuminated in a certain way, looks to S as if it were the 
real vase. S does not really see the vase in front of him, as Goldman argues there is no causal 
connection between the vase (the fact that p) and S’s belief. In terms of memory, “the causal 
connection between an earlier belief (or knowledge) of p and a later belief (knowledge) of p 
is certainly a necessary ingredient…”217 So the case of remembering is much like perceiving, 
but the process of recollection at time t1, is justified in the instance that at t0 S’s belief that p 
was causally connected to the fact that p.  
The theory becomes more complex as an account is developed which attempts to 
consider cases of interrupted memories and interfering background propositions. What is 
important for my purposes, however, is that Goldman’s theory concerns empirical 
propositions only, as, according to Goldman, the “traditional analysis is adequate for 
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knowledge of nonempirical truths.”218 His theory is dependent on the existence of truth-
conferring properties, the objects of our perception themselves. This is troubling because a 
number of epistemological cases, such as the Barn County case described below, show that 
the causal theory of knowledge is questionable. If the debunking strategy rests on a 
relationship with truth such as that in Goldman’s causal theory of knowledge, then the EDA 
may inherently beg the question against the realist whose moral beliefs are not necessarily 
dependent on a causal relationship with moral facts.  
Epistemic reliabilism was proposed by Goldman a decade after he proposed the causal 
theory. Following the Barn County case, Goldman abandoned the causal theory which, he 
argued, failed to meet the challenge of Gettier cases. The Barn County case involves a town 
full of barn facades and one true barn. S (who is travelling through the county) observes and 
believes in the barns of Barn County.219 In the instance that S unknowingly observes a false 
barn and believes it to be an actual barn, he is clearly mistaken. But in the instance that he 
unknowingly observes the one true barn in the county, it would seem that his belief is both 
true and appropriately caused by the barn itself, yet the truth of S’s belief in this instance is a 
matter of luck. As a result, it is plausible to think that S’s belief does not count as knowledge. 
His belief that p is causally connected to the truth that p, but S doesn’t know that p. However, 
the epistemological debate concerning the causal theory is not the foremost concern here. The 
link between this causal theory and Goldman’s later reliabilism, is that in both cases objects 
in existence play a causal role in our knowledge of them.  
In terms of meeting the demarcation challenge, under reliabilism we are led to 
conclude that justified domains were those which were fitness-enhancing because they were 
truth-tracking. Beliefs which were fitness-enhancing irrespective of whether they were truth-
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tracking are rendered unjustified. The problem for debunkers is that in order to characterise 
moral beliefs as the latter, they must assume or demonstrate that moral belief forming 
processes are purely instrumental and thus that moral truths do not exist mind-independently. 
This suggests that the success of the EDA relies on a metaphysical assumption about the 
nature of moral facts. 
This presupposition of the debunking strategy is that truth-tracking belief forming 
processes evolved when objects in existence caused the belief of our ancestors, so that 
inherited beliefs of this kind are justified in spite of the fact that they are as much the product 
of our evolved cognitive processes as anything else. If moral realists are to meet this 
presupposed standard of knowledge, they must commit to the existence of moral facts whose 
mind-independent existence reliably cause beliefs in them. Few realists are actually 
committed to such a view. These facts would be something like Dworkin’s morons – 
mysterious free-floating values, acting as truth-conferring properties for our moral beliefs.220 
I will attempt to show how it is that debunkers construe realism in this way, and why it is that 
debunking strategies depend on this characterisation.   
 
3.1.1 The Objectivist Assumption 
As previously discussed in Chapter One, Nozick disputes this aspect of debunking 
strategies in the following passage: 
If a speeding train is bearing down on me, I am inclined to jump out of its way. How 
is it that I am aware of this train? Obviously through my evolved capacities of sight 
and hearing and so forth. My awareness of the train comes to me through adaptations 
which selection has put in place. Yet, no one would want to claim that the train does 
not have a reality in its own right. Why, therefore, should one feel able to deny that 
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ethics or morality has a reality in its own right? The fact that awareness comes 
through adaptations is quite irrelevant to matters of ontology.221  
Ruse argues in response that we have no reason to assume the existence of moral facts, 
although we have a reason to assume the existence of Nozick’s train provided, crucially, that 
it is actually there. He writes: 
Start with the fact that the argument about the train goes through because and only 
because the existence of the train is assumed independently. Suppose, for instance, 
one had two worlds identical except that one has a speeding train and the other does 
not. There would be no reason to think the evolutionist is committed to a belief in 
speeding trains in both worlds. One is aware of the speeding train only because there 
is such a train. 222 
Since it would make sense that we would not perceive speeding trains if they were not 
actually there, the assumption is that what is reliably tracked by our capacity to perceive are 
features of the world, as these features “impinge upon our sensory surfaces.”223 On these 
grounds, Ruse argues that the metaethical posit of the ‘ultimate foundation’ of morality is 
redundant: 
Now consider two worlds, one of which has an objective morality, whatever that 
might mean (God’s will? Non-natural properties?), and the other world has no such 
morality. If the evolutionist’s case is well taken, the people in both worlds are going 
to have identical beliefs subject to normal laws of causation and so forth.224 
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If the instrumental beliefs are identical in both worlds, then the appeal to an ultimate 
foundation seems to be unjustified. However, the most immediate concern with this case is 
that a world without an objective morality, which we are asked to imagine, wouldn’t contain 
moral beliefs by its very design. The success of the argument, on one hand, seems largely 
dependent on the construal of moral truths as truth-conferring properties. On the other hand, 
the argument seems to be a restatement of a counterfactual challenge that, “the people in both 
worlds are going to have identical beliefs subject to normal laws of causation and so forth”225 
and thus that, “you would believe what you do about right and wrong, irrespective of whether 
or not a ‘true’ right or wrong existed.”226  
The core claim here is that truth is ontologically superfluous in the formation of our 
moral beliefs, and thus that we seem to be capable of holding and communicating our moral 
convictions without invoking the properties which instantiate their truth. This assumes rather 
than argues for the fact that moral beliefs are purely fitness enhancing, as opposed to truth-
tracking. Yet, he rests his case for the superfluity of moral truth on this premise when he 
writes elsewhere that: 
We are not prisoners in the cave because we can make sense of things by making all 
of our beliefs hand together. Metaphysical reality is nothing to us. We cannot use 
it…We can live without the hypothesis, so dismiss it.227 
The first response to the train case is that the construal of objectivity inherent in this EDA 
does not hold for many realist accounts of truth. For example, Raz formulates a version of 
objectivity which is centred on the reality of domains as opposed to objects.228 Pettit 
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following Raz, develops an account of domain objectivity for morality, which is adapted by 
Richardson into three main conditions: 
1. Truth-aptness: Ethical judgements are robustly truth-apt, rather than simply 
serving to express feelings or attitudes. 
2. Some success in attaining truth: Some ethical judgements are true.  
3. The availability of nonrelative justification: The justifying reasons conveyed by 
an ethical truth do not vary with the values, evaluative perspective or 
Weltanschauung of the persons entertaining it.229 
I will not follow this line of argument now, but this contemporary account of our relationship 
with moral facts presents a problem for Ruse’s counterfactual. I only mean to demonstrate 
that we must assume that objectivity functions as Ruse construes it for his argument to go 
through. We must take the conditions for truth to be such that the truth of S’s belief that p is 
appropriately caused by the truth conferring property that p, because trains (as features of the 
world) cause our beliefs of them. Since moral facts do not impinge on our sensory surfaces, 
we do seem to face a special problem as to how we might come to know them. But arguing 
that, “[o]ne is aware of the speeding train only because there is such a train,” construes the 
awareness of the train as dependent on its existence, whereby the factuality of the train is 
conferring truth upon the claim that there is such a train. In the world without morality, we 
are led to believe that the content of our moral beliefs is no longer made true by virtue of the 
existence of moral properties and yet the people in both worlds have identical beliefs. So, 
Ruse argues, “what we can say is that an objective ethics is redundant to the evolutionist’s 
case.”230 But Ruse’s conclusion only goes through if we take moral properties (as truth-
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conferring properties) to be ‘out there’ in the world – a claim which I will show realist’s are 
not committed to.  
 Street meets the demarcation challenge by evoking an argument similar to Ruse’s 
case: 
Take first the irreducibly normative truths posited by non-naturalist realists such as 
Nagel, Dworkin, Scanlon, or Shafer-Landau. A creature obviously can’t run into such 
truths or fall over them or be eaten by them. In what way then would it have promoted 
the reproductive success of our ancestors to grasp them?231 
Returning to the Milvian Bridge principle, which I argued presupposes a causal theory of 
knowledge, take the following reformulation:  
MB: Moral facts are not related to the evolutionary success of moral beliefs in such a 
way that it is reasonable to accept and act on moral beliefs produced by our evolved 
cognitive faculties.232 
Given MB, Street argues that the realist must provide an answer as to why it might promote 
the reproductive success for an individual to have a moral belief or judgement that is true in 
the way that the truth of a nearby cliff or a burning fire is justified by recourse to our reliance 
on perception.233 As in Ruse, this move presupposes a casual relation between moral belief 
and the truth-maker of that belief. Take the following explanation of evaluative truth as 
construed by Street: 
To say that these truths could kill you or maim you, like a predator or fire, would be 
one kind of answer, since it makes it clear how recognizing them could be 
advantageous. But such an answer is clearly not available in the case of the 
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independent irreducibly normative truths posited by the non-naturalist realists. In the 
absence of further clarification, then, the non-naturalist’s version of the tracking 
account is not only less parsimonious but also quite obscure.234 
The realist is positioned to believe that failing to provide a reason for how the causal 
connection might be accounted for (in terms of the Milvian Bridge principle), leads them to 
the Darwinian dilemma: denying the tracking account or accepting it. But the relationship 
with truth invoked here guards against other realist responses. 
It makes sense to propose that the accurate belief formation of the presence of fires, 
predators and cliffs would have been instrumental to our evolutionary success. But for the 
argument to succeed, Street acknowledges that one will need to posit “in one’s best 
explanation that there were indeed fires, predators, and cliffs, which it proved quite useful to 
be aware of, given that one could be burned by them, eaten by them, or could plummet over 
them.”235 But she does not grant moral realists this choice. She identifies that it is these 
features of our manifest surroundings that have causal powers, “in particular being the kinds 
of things that can kill us, injure us…and so on.”236 Because of this, she argues, “they are the 
kinds of things that it would have promoted the survival and reproduction of our ancestors to 
track with reasonable accuracy.”237 The existence of the objects is primary in this 
explanation, which is not damning in itself for realism because naturalist accounts might 
accept this causal relationship with moral belief.238 But Street’s argument is targeting non-
naturalism, where normative truth is “independent and yet lacking in causal powers” thus 
“there is no reason to think that natural selection, or for that matter any other causal process, 
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would shape us in such a way that we would be able to track such truths.”239 The only 
response Street believes is available for the realist, is to posit that some concept like 
friendship or family is valuable, and that causes X, Y and Z led us to believe this fact. But 
these explanations, she argues, don’t provide reasons to think that causal forces might have 
shaped our evaluative judgements in the same way as they shaped our judgements about our 
manifest surroundings, “it merely confidently reasserts that they did.”240 Street is arguing that 
the realist response must demonstrate the very causal relationship which is implicit in the 
case of our relationship with our manifest surroundings, lest the realist simply presuppose 
that truth-conferring moral properties (morons) exist.  
Street’s argument is unlike Ruse’s in that, at its heart, it is not just leaning on the 
argument that truth is superfluous to our best explanation of morality, because she also seems 
to defend a claim about mind-dependence. As a constructivist, Street is demonstrating that 
our “moral reality is constituted by the attitudes, actions, responses, or outlooks of persons, 
possibly under idealised conditions.”241 So, stripped of its evolutionary premise, Street’s 
argument challenges our stance-independence.242  
Scanlon writes of moral facts that, “[n]othing in the content of normative or 
mathematical judgements suggests that they are about objects with any particular spatio-
temporal location at all, hence in particular not one “outside of us.”…No causal link can 
bridge the gap, so some mysterious form of intuition seems to be required.”243 If moral facts 
aren’t of the kind which might confer truth in the causal manner which Street supposes, then 
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it is not clear why the realist must present a case for instrumental truth which might justify 
the existence of moral truth-conferring properties. Scanlon’s quote above outlines the general 
anti-realist reductio, which could be interpreted in two different ways. The first works in 
favour of the anti-realist and the second in favour of the realist. Either we take this to mean 
that moral facts are of a kind which are of no importance to us, since they do not exist in the 
way which other facts, such as scientific facts, exist.244 Or, we could say that this is precisely 
the advantage of moral facts (at least in the face of the EDA). Realists are not answerable to 
why, from an evolutionary perspective, recognizing moral truths would be advantageous 
because realists are not committed to the causal relationship between S’s belief that p and the 
factuality of p – which, further still, is just one way of modelling our epistemic access to 
features of the world. 
Scanlon’s claim gives us cause to review one of Street’s earlier claims. If moral 
realists can’t present their ontological commitment to moral facts in the same way as we can 
present facts about our manifest surroundings then, Street writes, “the non-naturalist’s 
version of the tracking account is not only less parsimonious but also quite obscure.”245 
Absent of a completed non-moral genealogy, it would seem that the charge of non-parsimony 
falls through. But this argument needs to be considered on independent grounds. The second 
metaethical claim is that charge of obscurity, which again requires independent 
consideration.246 A number of viable options exist for the realist which might fall under this 
category of obscure, and this presents a problem for ensuring a clean scope in the EDA.247 
But more broadly, this reveals an assumption which is allowing the EDA to go through, at 
least against some versions of moral realism: either (1) the moral realist must provide a 
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naturalistic account as to how moral properties might have conferred truth upon the beliefs of 
our ancestors, and explain why this would have been beneficial, or (2) the moral realist must 
accept that naturalism fails and that we are led to moral scepticism. I am arguing that (1) 
presupposes a causal theory of knowledge and only seriously considers moral naturalism, and 
that the argumentation undergirding (2) relies heavily on this charge of parsimony and 
obscurity. 
 To reiterate, Street and Ruse’s argument begs the question against moral realism 
because our relationship with our reasons for holding certain moral beliefs need not be 
characterised in terms of a causal relationship with truth-conferring properties – properties 
which are justified in virtue of our best explanations of their existence. I gestured towards 
two metaethical arguments (parsimony and obscurity) that require independent consideration 
which, absent a coherent genealogy, seem to carry the debunking argument. Before I respond 
to these independent challenges, I will discuss Joyce’s approach to meeting the demarcation 
challenge. 
 Joyce’s argument is directed at salvaging mathematical beliefs in addition to beliefs 
about our manifest surroundings. In a sense, Street holds a contradictory position on this: 
It is important to me that the challenge I am raising does not go through with regard to 
objects in our manifest surroundings, or with regard to many of the things that are the 
object of study in the natural sciences. I don’t, however, mean to deny that a parallel 
challenge might go through in other important domains, for example the domain of 
mathematics.248 
There has been much speculation on whether or not one could reasonably do away with an 
ontology for mathematics whilst maintaining an ontology for science. Perhaps in the face of 
those speculations, Joyce takes mathematical beliefs much more seriously; arguing that 
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natural selection would have selected for the capacity to facilitate simple arithmetic. He 
seems to suggest that our reasons for salvaging mathematical beliefs are because the 
environment would necessitate generally accurate beliefs regarding basic arithmetic. He 
writes: 
This … is an eternal and necessary truth, and thus by “hard wiring” such a belief into 
our brains natural selection takes no risks – it is not as if the environment could 
suddenly change that 1 + 1 would equal 3… Suppose you are being chased by three 
lions, you observe two quit the chase, and you conclude that it is now safe to slow 
down. The truth of “1 + 1 = 2” is a background assumption to any reasonable 
hypothesis of how this belief might have come to be innate.249 
This follows for commonsense concepts as well, such as the concept, child. He writes, “the 
genealogical story will surely involve the presence of children…” as “[d]eveloping a 
preparation to form beliefs about children will be useful only in an environment where 
children exist….”250 We might understand these beliefs as useful in the sense that they are 
about features of the world which seem indispensable to our proper functioning.251 Joyce then 
argues that we would require an environmental ‘trigger’, transforming this tendency to form 
beliefs about concepts which are useful from those preparations, a process which he argues 
would “presumably involve an exposure to children.”252 Here, the factuality of p – the fact 
that our best explanation about p holds that p exists – confers truth upon our belief that p. It 
seems here that Joyce falls back on the existence of (exposure to) children.  
In the case of arithmetic beliefs, the appeal to pragmatic success seems to fall back on 
this very argument. However, the justification is inferential in that it is sensible to assume 
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that basic arithmetic beliefs are justified only because they afford beliefs about objects which 
confer truth upon our belief that p.253 That is, because our capacity for perception and 
memory in the case of the three lions involves a basic arithmetic calculation, without which 
perception and memory would have less utility, arithmetic calculation can be instrumentally 
justified. 
Applying this to moral beliefs, Joyce cites Kitcher’s claim that: 
…proto-morality is introduced as a system of primitive rules for transcending the 
fraught sociality of early hominids: there’s no issue here of perceiving moral truths. 
Nor at any further stage is there a need to suppose that moral truths play a role in 
constraining the normative systems adopted. The criterion of success isn’t accurate 
representation, but the improvement of social cohesion in ways that promote the 
transmission of the system itself.254 
Joyce wants to show that the genealogy of morality differs from arithmetical and scientific 
beliefs because, in the case of morality, the truth of the moral beliefs does is not dependent on 
the factuality of moral beliefs. Drawing on Kitcher, we can infer that Joyce’s argument is that 
the “criterion of success” is the accurate representation of an object whose existence triggers 
belief formation about that object. In the case of the domain of arithmetic beliefs, what is 
signified by the manoeuvre which led to the salvation of arithmetic beliefs is that certain facts 
function as background assumptions to reasonable hypotheses about how certain beliefs 
might have become innate.255 
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What I hope to have made clear is that a common argument is employed in each of 
these cases; if moral beliefs can be explained without invoking their truth, then the truth of 
those beliefs is superfluous and thus we are in error about a host of our moral beliefs (Ruse 
and Joyce) or our moral beliefs are not justified (Street). In their attempt to explain the 
evolution of the belief forming processes which give rise to our moral beliefs, debunkers 
have assumed that a causal connection must hold between our moral beliefs and their truth-
conferring properties. Our epistemological relationship with moral facts may not be of this 
kind and construing it in this way makes important metaphysical assumptions about the 
nature of moral facts. If the debunking strategy inherently relies on these metaphysical 
assumptions in order to meet the demarcation challenge and salvage perceptual and 
commonsense beliefs, then it either fails – and our perceptual and commonsense beliefs are 
similarly unjustified – or EDAs do not succeed in debunking moral realism.256 Instead, I will 
argue, they derive their force from implicit, non-evolutionary metaethical arguments.  
These attempts to meet the demarcation challenge present a shared challenge. If moral 
realists can’t present their ontological commitment to moral facts in the same way as we can 
present facts about our manifest surroundings, then realists must face the charge of parsimony 
or obscurity. But there is another response. What if the case for the existence of our manifest 
surroundings was not as obviously true as debunkers thought? If this were the case, the 
objectivist assumption fails for perceptual and commonsense beliefs as well. Based on 
Bayesian and Game theoretic modelling, Hoffman argues that it is not necessarily true that 
we can assume that fires, cliffs and predators exist in our explanations for which faculties 
would have evolved to track truth.257 In modelling, it is found that “fitness beats truth” in the 
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evolution of our perceptual faculties. It was found that the formative doxastic processes 
underwriting our perceptual faculties evolved to track a perceptual space, but that it is 
possible that “the perceptual space… is not the objective world, nor is it homomorphic to it. It 
is simply a representational format that has been crafted by natural selection in order to 
support more effective interactions with the environment…”258 This means that evolution can 
generate perceptual belief forming systems that are not necessarily tracking an ‘objective 
reality’ but rather the very reality which would permit beings like us to operate and flourish 
within it. The authors conclude that “evolutionary pressures do not push perception in the 
direction of being increasingly reflective of objective reality…”259 contrary to the debunkers’ 
strategy of citing our ‘optimised’ perceptual systems in their attempt to meet the demarcation 
challenge. This presents a considerable problem for the aspiring debunker, but I will not 
follow this particular response any further here. Instead, I will focus on the argument that the 
EDA does not succeed in debunking moral realism as it rests on important metaethical 
assumptions about the nature of moral facts.  
I now turn to the wider issue of understanding metaethical realism as relying upon the 
existence of truth-conferring properties. 
 
3.2 Moral Ontology 
Moral fabric has become a blanket term.260 Inherent in this phrase is the notion of 
materiality - that moral beliefs are made true in virtue of features of the world. With morality 
deemed part of the ‘fabric of the cosmos’, it becomes subject to the very physical laws which 
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govern it. But moral facts aren’t visible. Furthermore, moral facts aren’t necessarily reducible 
to natural properties. I showed in the previous section that in their construal of reliable 
faculties, debunkers assume causal relationship between a belief and its truth-maker. They 
assume that realists posit the existence of truth conferring properties which entail the truth of 
moral claims, in much the same way that the existence of a train or a lion entails the truth of 
our belief that there is a train or a lion impinging upon our sensory surfaces. Here, I focus on 
the assumption that there exist truth conferring properties for moral beliefs. 
 
3.2.1 On What There Is Not 
In meeting the demarcation challenge, debunkers are taking the Archimedean view 
which, Dworkin writes, is “to stand outside of a whole body of belief, and to judge it as a 
whole from premises or attitudes that owe nothing to it.”261 In their attempt to meet the 
demarcation challenge, the debunkers adopt a selective version of the Archimedean view; 
that descriptive propositions can be objectively true, but that evaluative propositions – such 
as moral and aesthetic claims – cannot be. Their position is only selectively Archimedean 
because, to form their debunking argument, they require a firm ground to stand on and 
materials with which they can construct their debunking argument which are not tainted by 
the off-track evolutionary influence they attribute to our moral and aesthetic beliefs. They 
require a concept of the thing they are trying to debunk, and thus they must at least partially 
acknowledge its reality. The kind of scepticism inherent in the debunking strategy is external 
(Archimedean) about moral and aesthetic values, yet debunkers often claim themselves to be 
mounting an internal challenge, and this is how they can maintain their selective 
Archimedean position (meeting the demarcation challenge).262 By internal, it is meant that the 
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belief under examination is a posit within a given domain which it challenges. For example, a 
science-based argument rejecting a religious cosmology is internal in that the cosmology is 
subject to causal scrutiny – an evaluative feature of the domain of science. However, a 
religious-based belief, say some claim about what constitutes piety, is formed and supported 
internal to the domain of religion. The religious cosmological claim is scientifically scrutable 
because it is reducible to the scientific domain. The opposing cosmological explanations 
conflict and we are required to analyse the reasons counting in favour of each view in terms 
of the domain which the belief is about. In the piety case, since the belief is about religion in 
that it is formed and supported with reasons internal to the religious domain, there is no 
conflict and, furthermore, it wouldn’t make sense to settle a conflict between belief p and q 
about piety in terms of reasons pertaining to the domain of science. This equips us with the 
vocabulary to posit that the debunking strategy may be a case of attempting to make an 
Archimedean argument about the moral domain – because the EDA applies the standards of 
the scientific domain to a dispute potentially internal to the moral domain.  
Dworkin argues that “[a]ny successful – really, any intelligible – argument that 
evaluative propositions are neither true nor false must be internal to the evaluative domain 
rather than Archimedean about it.”263 Internal scepticism must be austere and neutral. It is 
austere “in the sense that it does not rely even on very general or counterfactual or theoretical 
positive moral judgements.”264 It is neutral “in the sense that it takes no sides in substantive 
moral controversies.”265 This means that this form of scepticism is directed towards second-
order views on moral convictions, as opposed to views to the moral convictions themselves. 
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The Archimidean (anti-realist) and the realist both believe that genocide and slavery are 
instances of moral wrongs, but the anti-realist questions whether the wrongness is really “out 
there” in reality.266 The anti-realist believes that the wrongness is not really true, or as 
Dworkin prefers, true at “face value”, and instead that “wrongness is “in here,” in our own 
breasts, that we have “projected” moral quality onto reality, that events are not, after all, true 
or false, or part of what we do or do not know, but are only, in complex ways, products of our 
invention or manufacture.”267  
Most of us would believe that the torturing of innocents for pleasure would be a cruel 
and wicked act. We would probably also believe that this claim was true – that torturing 
innocents for pleasure being a cruel and wicket act is true at face value – and that those who 
opposed this notion would be in error. Furthermore, we might also deny that our belief is 
merely a subjective reaction to the idea of torture, and instead is a factual report of an 
objective matter. Dworkin distinguishes between the first statement – the positive moral 
judgement – and the final two statements which express philosophical opinions regarding the 
nature of the positive moral judgement. The positive moral judgement is an internal (I) 
proposition, and the latter two are external (E) propositions.  
1. Cruelty (I) 
2. Truth (E) 
3. Objectivity (E) 
Dworkin argues that the external propositions are supposedly metaphysical positions – and he 
attributes this belief to the Archimedeans. From here, if the Archimedeans were to examine 
the above claim, they would commit to (1), but not (2) and (3). However, Dworkin argues 
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this is incoherent. To form the argument that this belief is mistaken, Dworkin cites Rorty’s 
language game: 
Given that it pays to talk about mountains, as it certainly does, one of the obvious 
truths about mountains is that they were here before we talked about them. If you do 
not believe that, you probably do not know how to play the usual language-games 
which employ the word "mountain." But the utility of those language-games has 
nothing to do with the question of whether Reality as It Is In Itself, apart from the way 
it is handy for human beings to describe it, has mountains in it.268  
Regarding mountains, Rorty offers two levels of discourse. The first is at an ordinary level. 
Mountains exist now, before we existed, and will likely exist long after we die. Even if there 
were never humans to observe those mountains, they would have existed. The second level 
considers whether Reality as It Is In Itself contains mountains. On this level, Rorty argues 
that the debate consists of those who believe that mountains do exist and those who believe 
that they do not (but exist in so far as they provide utility in the “language game” of the first 
level of discourse). The response to Rorty, and the response that Dworkin believes is 
analogous to a defence of his domain realism, is that his position doesn’t actually contradict 
what someone believes and is therefore not “interesting.” Dworkin applies this criticism to 
Rorty in that: 
If [Rorty] gives the sentence “Mountains are part of Reality as It Is In Itself” the 
meaning it would have within our “language game” if any of us actually said it, then it 
means nothing different from “Mountains exist, and would exist even if there were no 
people,” and the contrast he needs disappears. If, on the other hand, he assigns some 
novel or special sense to that sentence – if he says, for example, that it means that 
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mountains are a logically necessary feature of the universe – then his argument loses 
any critical force or philosophical bite.269  
Dworkin questions whether anti-realists who would endorse this critique of Rorty would 
accept that the parallel holds for their selective Archimedean scepticism.  
They would insist that E-propositions like the proposition that morality is a matter of 
objective fact or that there can be right answers to moral questions really are different 
from I-propositions…and that it does make sense, in virtue of that difference, to deny 
the first pair of [propositions]…while affirming…the second.270 
Returning to the torture case, say I was to add a number of E-propositions. It is true that it is 
wrong, and this is an objective fact. Can I read these as I-propositions rather than 
metaphysical existence questions? Dworkin believes we can, and thus the anti-realist is 
committed to rejecting not just the objectivity claim, but the internal proposition as well – the 
neutrality requirement cannot be maintained if we view claims about objectivity and truth as 
external propositions (as questions of ontology). 
 If I-propositions are not philosophically distinct from E-propositions, then 
“anyone…persuaded to give up the face value view of morality…must surrender morality 
along with it.”271 My claim that it is objectively wrong to torture innocents for pleasure is 
equivalent in “ordinary discourse” to the claim that it is wrong to torture innocents for 
pleasure even if no one ever thought it was. Thus, if debunkers attempt to separate the I-
propositions from the E-propositions, they must either abandon their belief in the I-
propositions or take the Archimedean view.  
Dworkin believes that facts being the floating values which instantiate the truth of our 
moral propositions, are not the kind of objectivity we refer to. Instead, these characterisations 
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are “inflated, metaphysical ways of repeating what some of the earlier further claims say 
more directly…”272 That, for example, the wrongness of torturing innocents for pleasure does 
not depend on anyone’s thinking it wrong.  
 To further illustrate, consider the following conversation: 
A: Abortion is morally wicked: we always in all circumstances have a categorical 
reason – a reason that does not depend on what anyone wants or thinks – to prevent 
and condemn it. 
B: On the contrary. In some circumstances abortion is morally required. Single 
teenage mothers with no resources have a categorical reason to abort. 
C: You are both wrong. Abortion is never either morally required or forbidden. No 
one has a categorical reason either way. It is always permissible and never mandatory, 
like cutting your fingernails. 
D: You are all three wrong. Abortion is never either morally forbidden or morally 
required or morally permissible. 
The Archimedean claim is supposedly D, but Dworkin argues it is incoherent and ultimately 
an I-proposition. If D is arguing that “[a]ny proposition that assumes the existence of 
something that does not exist is false”, then D assumes that morons exist.273 The intelligibility 
of A, B and C requires that moral duties exist, but their intelligibility does not depend on 
morons. However, the moron assumption means that, if we suppose morons have colours, 
then A argues abortion is red, B that abortion is yellow and C that abortion is green. Dworkin 
argues that D is declaring that there are no colours, and thus that abortion cannot be red, 
yellow or green. D is also insisting that his declaration, that there are no colours, is not itself a 
moral claim. But the claims of A, B and C offer categorical reasons that people either have or 
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do not have for abortion, whereas D’s argument (that no colours – duties – exist), means that 
no one has a reason of the categorical kind. It becomes unclear then how D can truly disagree 
with C without contradiction. D, Dworkin concludes, must be expressing a moral position. 
 In our attempts to justify our beliefs, we provide internal reasons for why we might 
hold such a position. This means that any statement about the reasons we have for or against 
abortion for example, is a declaration about a stance towards abortion. In the same way, any 
statement about what responsibilities people have is a declaration of “how things stand – 
morally speaking. There is no way out of or around the independence of value.”274 
 We can understand these morons as, “special particles…whose energy and 
momentum establish fields that at once constitute morality or immorality, or virtue or vice, of 
particular human acts and institutions and also interact in some way with human nervous 
systems so as to make people aware of the morality or immorality or of virtue or vice.”275 
This “moral field” thesis articulates the ontological presupposition set in the debunker’s 
challenge.  
Inherent in the assumption that a causal story could undermine our moral beliefs – and 
any justification which might alternatively explain those moral beliefs – is the notion that a 
property (truth-maker, moron etc.) instantiates the truth of moral propositions. Instead, by 
accepting that the moral domain need not make any scientific claim and is itself an 
independent domain (unlike in the religious cosmology example), the debate between 
antirealists and realists need not be constricted by the ontological presupposition at work in 
the debunking debate. 
The kind of support a judgement can and therefore should have depends…on what it 
is about, and since empirical judgements…are about phenomena that supposedly can 
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causally affect our own experience, directly or indirectly, it is sensible to count 
evidence of some such impact on those judgements…[but] judgements of 
morality…have a very different content, and must therefore seek support in different 
ways. 
This support, I will argue, takes the form of reasons which either count in favour of or against 
what we believe. These reasons face each other head-on, on rebutting grounds, and are not 
susceptible to undermining unless certain ontological presuppositions are in play. Thus, the 
antirealist’s construal of moral ontology begs the question against the moral realist. It calls 
for a satisfaction of a criterion of existence which the moral realist is not necessarily 
committed to. So now we will return to the problem I outlined earlier. In their attempt to meet 
the demarcation challenge, debunkers back the realist into a corner and assert that either (1) 
the moral realist must provide a naturalistic account as to how moral properties might have 
conferred truth upon the beliefs of our ancestors, and explain why this would have been 
beneficial, or (2) they must accept that naturalism fails and that we are led to moral 
scepticism. 
 
3.2.2 The Criterion of Existence 
Objections to moral realism also stem from the following, related, concern: to posit 
that there exist irreducibly normative truths would be at odds with our most fundamental 
views on what there is. Mackie writes, “if there were objective values, then they would be 
entities or qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in 
the universe.”276 By “anything else in the universe”, we can infer that “our ontological 
commitments must be understood as claims about what exists in the physical world of space 
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and time.”277 Though this is a view compatible with naturalism, it is by no means an accurate 
representation of the variety of metaethical realisms.  
Quine’s most succinct statement of this concern comes in the form of a criterion: 
A theory is committed to those and only those entities to which the bound variables of 
the theory must be capable of referring in order that the affirmations made in the 
theory be true.278  
Quine would say is that we should formulate our best scientific theory of the world in 
its logically purest form and see what entities we are quantifying over in that formulation of 
the theory. If only objects in space and time are the values of bound variables, then our 
scientific theory only commits us to objects in space and time. We have no ontological 
commitments – and should make no ontological assertions about – any other objects. If we 
take a scientific view of the natural world, in Quine’s sense we become ontologically 
committed to only the natural things of which that world is composed. Mackie’s argument 
builds upon this sentiment. The world which impinges on our sensory surfaces, Scanlon 
argues, “immediately excludes the normative…[as] exclusive emphasis on the physical world 
is built in from the start.”279 Scanlon, like Dworkin, argues that domain-centred realism 
“makes the most sense”, whereby over the range of domains – including mathematics, 
aesthetics, morality and science – no particular domain is ontologically superior. Scanlon 
writes, “…statements within all of these domains are capable of truth and falsity, and that the 
truth values of statements of one domain, insofar as they do not conflict with statements of 
some other domain, are properly settled by the standards of the domain that they are 
about.”280 Scanlon’s non-naturalism is not susceptible to Mackie’s critique, as Mackie is 
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writing about objects in space and time (morons) and Scanlon is writing about truth. The 
assumption at work in Mackie is that all truths are made true by objects; this is the truth-
maker correlative of the causal theory of knowledge.  
Schafer calls for a similar shift in our view towards ontology – a what grounds what 
relationship as opposed to a question of what there is. The former he calls the Aristotelian 
task, and the latter the Quinean task.281 The return to traditional (Aristotelian) metaphysics 
means departing from the orthodox view of our ontological commitments.282 The orthodox 
view has “focused on existence questions such as whether properties, meanings, and numbers 
exist, as well as whether possible worlds exists, whether and when mereological composites 
exist, etc.”283 Schafer argues that metaphysics is better understood as the discipline that 
“studies substances and their modes and kinds, by studying the fundamental entities and what 
depends on them.”284 This grounding approach may support the ambitions of domain-centred 
realism.285 
A construal of realism as dependent on morons means that the anti-realist challenge 
(set by debunkers when they attempt to meet the demarcation challenge) can be rephrased to 
read something like the following: 
Moral propositions internal to the moral domain presuppose or entail the truth of 
certain scientifically verifiable facts, and thus the moral domain can be tested against 
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the standards of scientific inquiry which involve claims about causal interaction 
between our beliefs and truth-conferring properties in existence.  
We might interpret Mackie’s argument from queerness as an allusion to this idea – 
only properties or kinds of type x are justified, and moral properties are not of property or 
kind x and are thus not justified.286 From my discussion of the debunker’s attempt to meet the 
demarcation challenge it seems that reliance on Mackie’s argument is implicit in them. But 
the rephrasing of the anti-realist challenge allows a better articulation of the charge of 
ontological superfluity. If it is true that the moral domain can be tested against the standards 
of scientific inquiry, which involves claims about causal interaction between our beliefs and 
states of affairs that obtain in space and time, then the existence of a complete non-moral 
explanation of human behaviour would render the postulation of moral truth superfluous. In 
the same way, a religious cosmology would be superfluous given a complete physicalist 
account of the universe, since the universe is better explained in terms of science, where 
parsimony is preserved and obscurity avoided.  
So, to return to the argument that the debunkers are offering: 
(1) the moral realist must provide a naturalistic account as to how moral properties 
might have conferred truth upon the beliefs of our ancestors, and explain why this 
would have been beneficial, or  
(2) they must accept that naturalism fails and that they are led to moral scepticism. 
I am arguing that (1) presupposes something like the moral field thesis and thus only 
seriously considers moral naturalism. To establish (2), debunkers depart from any distinctly 
debunking manoeuvre and instead rely on the outcome of (1). The debunking manoeuvre is 
absent here. If it is not a distinctly evolutionary debunking argument, then what is at the core 
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of this anti-realist challenge? I now turn to this question.  
 
3.3 Revisiting the Otiosity argument 
Recall Joyce’s formulation of the debunking challenge. Three explanations are on 
offer for morality: Hypothesis A, which “promises to explain all our moral judgements, 
leaving us without need to posit any moral facts…unless the moral facts are somehow 
implicitly buried in hypothesis A…” and “[t]he only way that moral facts could be buried in a 
scientific genealogical hypothesis is if some kind of moral naturalism were true.”287 
Hypothesis B and Hypothesis C consist of non-natural and supernatural facts respectively. 
Crucially, he reconsiders the possibility of post-hoc justification. If any reasons can be found 
in the debunking attempt which might count in favour of the debunked belief, the debunking 
argument would carry no challenge. The debunker must ensure that S’s belief cannot be 
ratified external to explanation X to properly debunk S’s belief. 
In chapter one, I explained this condition in terms of our N-beliefs about Waterloo – 
beliefs which needed to be within the scope of the debunking challenge set by the belief pill 
for the debunking argument to go through. Recall that, if one was interested in debunking our 
belief that ‘Napoleon lost Waterloo’, a set of beliefs would actually be the target. The bare 
minimum of these beliefs (N-beliefs) would have to include our belief that Napoleon was a 
French emperor, that a battle took place in a region called Waterloo in 1815, and that the 
armies which Napoleon commanded lost that battle. But suppose we aspired to debunk these 
N-beliefs, and the belief pill targeted these exact beliefs. I raised the issue that if there were a 
fourth, residual belief - perhaps that the Prussian forces won the battle of Waterloo against 
Napoleon’s armies – then the fourth belief could give us grounds to deduce (after the fact) 
that Napoleon must have lost the battle of Waterloo. Since the Prussian forces won, and they 
 
287 Joyce, The Evolution of Morality. 209 
118 
 
were among the opposing forces in the war with Napoleon’s armies. I presented this problem 
as the problem of available evidence. We now know that this is a sketch of how the otiosity 
argument plays out. 
Joyce acknowledges the possibility of this problem when he writes, “…unless you can 
find some concrete evidence either in favour or against the belief you should cease to believe 
this thing.”288  Kahane echoes this concern as well, he writes that “…our understanding of the 
causal premise… needs to rule out what we might call post-hoc justification.”289 Joyce and 
Kahane, who both offer a formulation of the EDA, underestimate the significance of this 
condition. This surfaces in the argument with which I closed the previous section. Recall that 
the debunkers, through their attempt to meet the demarcation challenge, are ultimately 
offering the following argument:  
(1) the moral realist must provide a naturalistic account as to how moral properties 
might have conferred truth upon the beliefs of our ancestors, and explain why this 
would have been beneficial, or  
(2) they must accept that naturalism fails and that they are led to moral scepticism. 
Joyce offers this argument in the chapter before he offers his debunking argument. He writes 
that: 
…Once we have a complete non-moral genealogy of moral judgement, if naturalism 
succeeds non-naturalism and supernaturalism are sunk, if moral naturalism fails non-
naturalism and supernaturalism are sunk. Thus non-naturalism and supernaturalism 
suffer most in this argumentative fray, whereas the moral naturalist is defeated only 
through independent arguments…290 
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In this excerpt, we are offered two options. Either we face head-on the independent reasons 
which count in favour of moral naturalism and they stand, or we accept that naturalism fails 
and thus that non-naturalism and supernaturalism are sunk (and therefore that realists have no 
leg to stand on). Joyce’s attempt to satisfy the debunking condition is conditional: 
…if moral naturalism fails [then] non-naturalism and supernaturalism are sunk. 
But if naturalism does indeed fail, and by extension non-naturalism and supernaturalism are 
sunk, then the metaethical argument is complete as the anti-realist conclusion is established. 
The EDA is otiose. But it is interesting to consider what is carrying this argument. Joyce 
states openly that he is relying on Harman’s challenge – an appeal to explanatory parsimony 
in the explanations for our moral judgements. In his effort to satisfy the debunking condition 
(to rule out post-hoc justification), that S’s belief cannot be ratified external to explanation X, 
Joyce secures the very conclusion the debunking argument is meant to achieve – that 
naturalism, non-naturalism and supernaturalism are not viable positions and thus that realism 
is unjustified. 
The success of Joyce’s debunking argument depends on the affirmation of the 
antecedent claim that naturalism fails. This means that the debunking argument depends on 
the ‘independent arguments’ Joyce believes count against moral naturalism.291 One of Joyce’s 
independent arguments is that a moral naturalist “who wants to account for inescapable 
practical authority must locate it in the natural world.”292 That is, the moral naturalist must 
provide reasons for action which contain the practical authority (the motivational bulwark) 
that a satisfactory account of morality seems to demand. Since he doesn’t believe the 
naturalist can provide these reasons, he argues that moral naturalism fails. There are two 
arguments to unpack here. Firstly, Joyce’s dismissal of non-naturalism and supernaturalism 
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via Harman’s challenge. Secondly, Joyce’s claim that naturalism cannot satisfactorily account 
for the motivational bulwark he believes an evolved morality requires. I will explore the first 
challenge here. I will explore the second challenge in Chapter Four. 
 
3.3.1 Meeting the first underlying challenge 
Joyce argues against non-naturalism and supernaturalism via the application of 
Harman’s challenge. To formulate Harman’s challenge, we must begin with the belief that we 
are ontologically committed to that which plays an explanatory role in the happenings of the 
natural world. In scientific and moral observations, one factor seems to set the two kinds 
apart. Harman argues that an “observation has occurred whenever an opinion is a direct result 
of perception”293 and that “an immediate judgment [is] made in response to the situation 
without any conscious reasoning having taken place.”294 The difference is that in scientific 
observations, scientists rely on the truth of background beliefs to make accurate observations, 
whereas the same does not hold for moral observations. Compare the following cases, taken 
directly from Harman:  
1. If you round a corner and see a group of young hoodlums pour gasoline on a cat 
and ignite it, you do not need to conclude that what they are doing is wrong; you 
do not need to figure anything out; you can see that it is wrong. But is your 
reaction due to the actual wrongness of what you see or is it simply a reflection of 
your moral "sense," a "sense" that you have acquired perhaps as a result of your 
moral upbringing?295 
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2. Consider a physicist making an observation to test a scientific theory. Seeing a 
vapor trail in a cloud chamber, he thinks, "There goes a proton."… His making the 
observation supports the theory only because, in order to explain his making the 
observation, it is reasonable to assume something about the world over and above 
the assumptions made about the observer's psychology. In particular, it is 
reasonable to assume that there was a proton going through the cloud chamber, 
causing the vapor trail.296  
In the moral case, “there does not seem to be any way in which the actual rightness or 
wrongness of a given situation can have any effect on your perceptual apparatus.”297 So, the 
belief regarding the truth of the proposition that x is morally wrong, seems to be explanatorily 
superfluous to our understanding the wrongness of the act. The above argument goes through 
because the explanatory requirement calls for a physical explanation – our experience of 
phenomena and our reaction to it – an explanation which the psychology of our dispositions 
can potentially supply. But this applies the methods of enquiry specific to the scientific 
domain to the moral domain. In other words, it assumes that morons exist and that the realist 
response must invoke such truth-conferring properties.  
 One the one hand, such an argument seems to call for an intuitive response, and thus 
we might say that it only targets proponents of moral intuitionism. An intuitionistic 
epistemology would suppose that there exists a truth-conducive faculty of the mind capable 
of detecting (sometimes autonomously) moral facts. These facts are comprehended in a way 
comparable to perceptual seeming in that they are self-evident.298 Stratton-Lake writes, “[j]ust 
as certain things can seem perceptually to be a certain way, e.g., coloured, or straight, so 
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certain propositions can seem to be true, or present themselves to the mind as true.”299 In 
Harman’s example, moral facts are intuited through a kind of sensation that leads to an 
understanding and it is from this understanding that one can form the moral belief that the act 
is wrong. Such a construal of morality is reminiscent of Moore, who argues that good exists 
but does not have being, a claim which he coupled with the “supersensible reality” of 
numbers.300 Our access to this supersensible reality is supposedly made possible by a faculty 
of intuition – a faculty we could say has the capacity to perceive morons. As I have shown, 
not all realists are committed to the view that we possess a ‘moral sense’ (an intuition which 
responds to a supersensible reality) and thus that a supersensible counterpart of the moral 
field thesis is true (that supersensible morons exist). In the face of this challenge, the 
intuitionist response remains open for realists in the face of the EDA, but these realists 
unnecessarily commit themselves to accounts that make mixed as opposed to pure statements 
about morality – whereby the reasons invoked in the moral domain are scientifically 
scrutable.301  
On the other hand, Harman’s case seems to target a rapid response, emotional kind of 
morality, which is potentially exploring our conservative expressive tendency, but is 
nonetheless ignoring or not fully appreciating our critical reflective capacity. As I argued in 
2.2, we possess the capacity to change our intuitive responses based on periods of slow 
deliberation, and to reflect, develop, and in some cases, deny these affectations. For now, I 
will call a theory grounded in our critical reflective capacity a form of constructivism. 
Joyce’s treatment of realism overlooks the possibility of a mind-independent account of 
constructivism.302 Additionally, an account of moral naturalism can be shown to be 
 
299 Philip Stratton-Lake, "Intuitionism in Ethics," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. 
Zalta (2016). 
300 G. E. Moore, "Principia Ethica," ed. T. Baldwin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 161–63, 
174–76 
301 See, for example, Huemer, Ethical Intuitionism. 
302 I explore this account in Chapter Six. 
123 
 
embedded in Hypothesis A, and this is problematic for the aspiring debunker who must first 
consider such cases head-on. I return to this in the next chapter. 
Scanlon argues that the original assumption of Harman’s, that our best explanations 
play an explanatory role in explaining features of the world, does not apply to the moral 
domain or, he adds, the mathematical domain. We have reason in the domain of mathematics, 
“to quantify over numbers if quantifying over numbers is a good way to formulate this 
theory.”303 Just as we have good reason to introduce concepts such as imaginary or complex 
numbers, if such concepts provide a “more coherent and satisfactory account for the relevant 
parts of mathematics”304, reasons which count in favour of certain moral beliefs, internal to 
the domain of morality, are capable of ratifying our beliefs without evoking mixed 
explanations which would warrant an analysis in terms of the scientific domain. Wright calls 
this analysis the width of an entities “cosmological role.” Whereby cosmological extends to 
entities not only satisfiable by causal relations between truth and belief, but by the uses these 
additional kinds have in discourse.305 Wright states that an entity’s cosmological role is “the 
extent to which citing the kinds of states of affairs with which it deals is potentially 
contributive to the explanation of things other than, or other than via, our being in attitudinal 
states which take such states of affairs as object.”306 So, we have reasons to introduce moral 
concepts and cause to believe that, at least some of these concepts, are independent and pure 
statements internal to that domain.  
Scanlon’s claim is that “the basic element of the normative domain is a relation, being 
a reason for, can be seen as a claim about the metaphysics of the normative.”307 The world 
impinges on our sensory surfaces, but this does not set the ontological precedent for all forms 
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of understanding. Taking domain centred realism seriously opens up conceptual space for 
reasons fundamentalism, whereby in order to “earn the right to think that some moral 
judgement is true…I have to provide moral arguments for that very strong opinion.”308 These 
moral arguments consist of reasons which either count in favour of a particular belief or do 
not.  
Harman’s challenge, which is at the heart of Joyce’s debunking argument, can be 
resisted on non-naturalist grounds. Joyce’s EDA, in order to go through, relies on the 
assumption that accounts such as Scanlon’s are not viable. The first underlying challenge can 
be met and possibly settled on independent grounds. This renders the EDA otiose. 
Conclusion 
The demarcation challenge sets the task of distinguishing which beliefs are formed via 
reliable doxastic processes and which beliefs are not. Debunkers must provide reasons for the 
claim that moral beliefs are formed and supported only through unreliable doxastic processes 
whilst beliefs which underly the scientific and epistemic claims inherent in their own 
argumentation were formed and supported reliably – lest their debunking arguments collapse 
upon themselves.  
The debunker's attempt to meet the demarcation challenge reveals that truths about 
our manifest surroundings must first be posited 'in one's best explanation' in order to explain 
how our ancestors adapted to overcome the challenges of fires, cliffs, and predators. 
Debunkers do not offer this option to the realists. Instead, debunkers suppose that realists are 
committed to the mysterious position of proposing that moral truth also features in our 
manifest surroundings. I argued that there is a strong history for this kind of ontologising 
assumption is metaethics. As Dworkin argues through his moral field thesis, realists are not 
committed to such a view. I showed that reducing realism to this view leads to a dichotomy 
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which is elucidated by Joyce's analysis. I argued that the dichotomy offered by the debunkers 
seems to be that: 
(1) the moral realist must provide a naturalistic account as to how moral properties 
might have conferred truth upon the beliefs of our ancestors, and explain why this 
would have been beneficial, or  
(2) the moral realist must accept that naturalism fails and that they are led to moral 
scepticism. 
This surfaces in Joyce’s analysis when he argues that Hypothesis A can supposedly 
explain the history of our moral judgements. If Hypothesis A is true, he argues, then 
Hypothesis B and C (representing non-natural and supernatural facts) are rendered 
superfluous to explaining our moral judgements. Debunkers such as Joyce must first show 
that a naturalist account is not embedded within Hypothesis A. This requires argumentation 
which is independent of undermining facts emerging from debunking literature. Joyce runs an 
independent argument when he attempts to dismiss the claim that naturalism is embedded 
within Hypothesis A on the grounds of his moral clout requirement. This means, he argues, 
that Hypothesis B and C must also be sunk. Firstly, his argument against Hypothesis A relies 
on the outcome of the debate between motivational externalists and internalists as opposed to 
any distinctly evolutionary consideration utilising undermining facts. Secondly, his dismissal 
of Hypothesis B and C seems to rely heavily on this ontologising assumption. 
Meeting the demarcation challenge ultimately requires that debunkers construe the 
debate between realists and anti-realists as a naturalistic one, whereby moral facts can be 
situated within our manifest surroundings. Scanlon and Dworkin’s domain-centred realism 
offers a different perspective whereby “the basic element of the normative domain is a 
relation, being a reason for, can be seen as a claim about the metaphysics of the 
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normative.”309 It may be so that the world impinges on our sensory surfaces, but this does not 
set the ontological precedent for all forms of understanding. Taking domain centred realism 
seriously opens up conceptual space for reasons fundamentalism, whereby in order to “earn 
the right to think that some moral judgement is true…I have to provide moral arguments for 
that very strong opinion.”310 I highlighted that the ontologising assumption immediately 
limits the scope of the EDA to the debunker’s peril, since cases of moral realism where 
metaphysics is construed differently remain open.  
I then turned to Hypothesis A. On naturalistic grounds, I proposed that the debate over 
the mind-independence of truth is unsettled. This problematises the debunker’s position 
further. Although the possibility of domain-centred realism is more devasting for the 
debunkers, since it is inherently overlooked by the attempt to meet the demarcation 
challenge, it is worth considering the wider debate between the naturalists and the anti-
realists. Does there exist a reasonable account of naturalism that could be embedded within 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS 
I continue my analysis of the assumptions underlying the debunker’s attempt to meet the 
demarcation challenge by accepting the ‘Darwinian Hypothesis’ and demonstrating that 
realism can still follow. Since, as I will show, accepting the Darwinian Hypothesis can be 
both vindicating and debunking, I will argue that the actual fulcrum of the debate lies in how 
we characterise truth about normative reasons. This sets the playing field for Chapter Five 
where I expound the next underlying challenge. 
 
4.1 Whence Morality? 
What makes the EDA unique is that it is grounded in facts of evolutionary theory. In 
the previous chapter I argued that the debunking strategy relies on an assumption at the heart 
of the debate surrounding a classic metaethical problem of ontological classification. Here, I 
develop an account of moral naturalism which shows that a reductive case for moral facts can 
still vindicate, rather than debunk moral realism. This does not mean that moral naturalism is 
true. But that this debate remains open poses a problem for the aspiring debunker since they 
must rule out moral naturalism before the EDA can be formed. Recall the dilemma that the 
debunkers seem to implicitly pose to the realist:  
(1) that the moral realist must provide a naturalistic account as to how moral 
properties might have conferred truth upon the beliefs of our ancestors, and explain 
why this would have been beneficial, or  
(2) that the moral realist must accept that naturalism fails and that we are led to moral 
scepticism (because moral non-naturalism is not justified). 
I argued that (1) presupposes a causal relationship between evaluative facts and our 
inherited belief-forming processes and therefore only seriously considers moral naturalism. In 
the last chapter I concluded that the argumentation undergirding (2) relies heavily on this 
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charge of parsimony and obscurity; two arguments which, (a) only go through against non-
naturalist realists if we accept the moral field thesis and (b) render their debunking argument 
otiose from the very beginning if the underlying argument establishes the very conclusion the 
debunker aspires to establish (moral facts are superfluous to our explanations of moral 
judgements and are thus unjustified). I argued that a viable realist response remains available, 
domain centred realism (roughly, a kind of realist constructivism), whereby the moral field 
thesis need not be invoked. I speculated that holding realists accountable to the moral field 
thesis is an ontologising assumption, and this issue will resurface in the debates I am yet to 
explore. My focus now is on (1). If the realist can meet this horn of the argument, then the 
realist has a post-hoc justification. Recall that I am now exploring the underlying arguments 
of the debunker’s challenge. The residual challenge to come from my analysis of the 
debunking strategy is how an account of moral naturalism problematises the debunkers 
ambitions from the beginning. The demarcation challenge is primarily a call for a naturalist 
account of morality. In what follows, I develop one line of response.  
4.2 Ultimate and Proximate Causes 
Ultimate and proximate causes relate to developmental processes which occur during 
an organism’s lifetime (proximate) or prior to it (ultimate). Andreas Mogensen writes, 
"[n]atural selection is just one element in a broader explanatory picture in which proximate 
factors also play their part. Virtually every textbook on animal behaviour begins with the 
instruction that readers keep these points in mind and avoid confusing different levels of 
explanation. I believe that proponents of evolutionary debunking arguments have fallen prey 
to just this sort of confusion."311  
 
311 Andreas Mogensen, "Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and the Ultimate/Proximate Distinction," Analysis 
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Proximate causes refer to the events which are immediately responsible for an 
observed result, which refers to that which occurs during an organism’s own lifetime. These 
usually involve causal factors which are physiological or environmental. Ultimate causes 
relate to the more distal explanatory picture, in this conversation this involves understanding 
the evolutionary forces (in terms of natural selection or phylogeny) acting on a particular 
organism. Separating the two, allows for a clearer understanding of the events and systems 
involved in the change of an organism over time. Mogensen constructs the following 
example: 
Imagine that insects in one species, S1, have a certain pattern of colour action that 
serves as a camouflage: it resembles the surrounding foliage. Natural selection has 
favoured this pattern of colour action because it allows the insects to avoid predators. 
Suppose the colouration arises because juveniles eat a certain kind of moss during a 
critical developmental period. However, the fact that the juveniles have this diet is 
irrelevant in explaining why having this kind of colouration confers greater relative 
fitness: the colouration would be equally advantageous if it came about as a result of a 
different set of developmental factors…312 
In the example, we couldn’t fully understand the causal factors leading to the colouration of 
insects in S1 without appealing to facts about the juvenile insects and their eating habits. 
Though the broader ultimate cause would dictate that their colouration is explained by the 
rewards of camouflage, the mossy diet of the juvenile insects is not suddenly a superfluous 
explanatory factor. Mogensen continues: 
It would be similarly outlandish to insist that to explain why S1 insects are coloured 
as they are, we do not need to suppose that they have a special diet during the juvenile 
stage; all we need to suppose is that having this pattern of colouration has tended to 
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promote reproductive success in ancestral environments. Anyone advancing these 
claims would be obviously guilty of confusing proximate and ultimate causes. 
However, the proponents of evolutionary debunking arguments advance exactly 
analogous claims with respect to human moral beliefs.313   
Mogensen believes that debunking morality purely on the Ultimate level (natural selection) is 
incomplete, as it is generally believed to be also the product of causes on the proximate level 
through phylogenetic explanation.314 From an understanding of the proximate story, we learn 
that we have the beliefs we have because the developmental processes that we undertake and 
the socialisations that occur during that developmental process are afforded by genetic 
dispositions (occurring on the ultimate level) but are not fully caused by them. This means 
that morality might not be something that has been selected for, but something that what has 
been selected for affords.  
This gives us cause to review the causal premise of the EDA. On the one hand, we 
could argue that this collapses the causal premise, but Mogensen takes this as the foundation 
of a new debunking argument. He argues that a new debunking challenge can be built with a 
phylogenetic explanation. I will set out this argument, before turning to what this explanatory 
expansion in the causal premise means for the case for moral naturalism. 
By placing traits on the tree of life, Mogensen believes a more robust debunking claim 
can be formulated. Through a borrowed analogy, he considers the horizontal tail-flukes of 
whales: 
These are, in one respect, an obvious adaptation for swimming. But why have whales 
evolved flukes that are horizontal, and not vertical, like the caudal fins of fish? It is 
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implausible that whales inhabit special ocean environments in which horizontal flukes 
confer some advantage over the vertical alternative. The answer lies instead in 
cetacean phylogeny. Whales are descended from terrestrial mammals in the 
Artiodactyla order that ran on land by flexing their spinal columns in the vertical 
plane. When the ancestors of whales returned to the seas, their inherited body-plan 
necessitated the evolution of horizontal flukes that could be waved up and down to 
propel the animal forward. Thus, constraints imposed by phylogenetic inheritance 
explain the horizontal tails of whales.315  
Mogensen believes that the capacity to explain the horizontal tail-flukes mirrors the 
possibility of explaining a moral sense in humans. Since this sense would be founded on 
inherited social instincts, it wouldn’t be surprising if other animals sharing a similar 
intellectual faculty would come to acquire the moral beliefs we have. The basis of his 
variation of the causal premise is that morality is a group level, culture bound adaptation. 
This is contrasted with the individual-level selection models of Ruse, Joyce and Street. His 
conception of morality is centred around the evolutionary requirement for social order and 
regularity on a group level. Moral norms which are known and enforced by a group, “serve to 
organise social life by encouraging and suppressing certain behaviours, thereby delimiting 
conflict and fostering cooperation.”316 For Mogensen, moral norms bolster social coalitions 
and supply groups with the capacity to resolve moral conflicts through sanctions.317 These 
norms are both genetic and cultural traits developed through evolving traditions as well as 
genetic evolution, and thus he argues that we are the beneficiaries of a dual inheritance.318  
 
315 Andreas Mogensen, "Do Evolutionary Debunking Arguments Rest on a Mistake About Evolutionary 
Explanations?," Philosophical Studies 173, no. 1 (2016). 22 
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Mogensen argues that moral systems, of the kind found in the Code of Hammurabi 
and the Pentateuch, are constituted by moral norms which are variably constructed.319 He 
contends that these norms, which are acquired through a process of social learning, should be 
thought of as cultural traits capable of feeding into evolution, which is both genetic and 
cultural. Genes which predispose one to aggressive and antisocial behaviours for example, 
would be maladaptive in his model because of their general incompatibility with cooperative 
behaviours.  
Mogensen’s argument for the genealogy of these moral norms begins with the claim 
that our moral theorising is influenced to a considerable extent by emotional predispositions. 
He then argues that the evidence which demonstrates the prevalence of these emotional 
predispositions in other primates, gives credence to the view that they are evident in our own 
early development during childhood. If our moral verdicts are the product of emotional states 
arising from these dually inherited predispositions, then they are the product of a non-truth 
tracking genealogy and are rendered debunked. The strength of this argument as a debunking 
claim rests on the case for ‘functional truth irrelevance’ and phyletic contingency, whereby 
phylogenetically acquired moral beliefs were produced to secure functionality (social 
cohesion) irrespective of truth (what I’ve been calling, off-track), and that these functional 
beliefs are socially variable and inscrutable (cultural relativism).  
For his causal premise, Mogensen makes the case for sentimentalism, the view that 
emotional states influence moral responses, including judgements, to the extent that they are 
determinative of our concept of right and wrong. He writes, “[t]here’s no denying that 
morality is emotive. Moral arguments quickly raise tempers and voices. Our moral verdicts 
are often associated with intense feelings: injustice makes us seethe with anger; corruption 
 
319 By which he means, culturally relative. I would argue that the charge of relativism is doing metaethical work 
in Mogensen’s argument, but I won’t develop this argument here. 
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leaves us sick with disgust.”320 We might also feel a satisfaction when observing some acts of 
cooperation and generosity. However, to establish that morality is emotive, Mogensen must 
demonstrate that moral emotions form the basis of moral judgements and decision making 
and that our critical reflective capacity, like our emotive and conservative expressive 
tendency, are determined by these emotions. This means that emotions are not simply 
interwoven with certain decisions or judgements but are the foundation of morality itself. 
This level of influence is an echo of Hume who, in the case of promises, argued that it is the 
pain of social disrepute that safeguards the breach of the promise.321 This is also the 
underlying claim of Street, which I expand upon in the next chapter. If Mogensen cannot 
demonstrate that our beliefs are formed and supported only through these unreliable doxastic 
processes, he faces (1) an universal acid containment problem and (2) a problem pertaining 
to post-hoc justification. But a more general problem arises with Mogensen’s approach – and 
perhaps highlighting this problem gives new insight into the debunking strategy itself – 
unreliable doxastic processes becomes synonymous with attitude-dependence. The causal 
premise is not distinctly causal (let alone, evolutionary). The fundamental claim is an anti-
realist one: our emotional predispositions are overriding or epistemologically superior to our 
reasons in cases of judgement formation and decision making. This is a claim about 
normative reasons as opposed to an EDA.  
Mogensen’s argument for sentimentalism is that emotional states can impact the 
intensity of moral judgements, even in cases where the act would have otherwise been 
morally innocuous. He cites a study by Wheatley and Haidt (2005) which attempts to show 
that moral judgements are grounded in “affectively laden moral intuitions.”322 In this study, 
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participants were hypnotically induced to feel disgust upon reading neutral trigger words such 
as ‘take’ and ‘often’. Participants rated the severity of moral transgressions higher when 
under suggestion.323 Mogensen also cites cases of anger skewing moral judgements, in the 
studies of Lerner et al (1998) and Seidel and Prinz (2013).324 But the case for sentimentalism 
is not without opposition. The vast majority of studies like these, May argues, generalise 
findings from subgroups, scarcely contain significant effects, and that differences in moral 
judgement between induced subjects and controls are quite small.325 The most substantial 
issue however is that the polarity of moral judgements has not yet been shown to shift under 
suggestion. Judgements are yet to move from ‘Moral’ or ‘Okay’ to ‘Immoral’ in response to 
cases under emotional influence. There is an epistemic leap made then, when sentimentalists 
argue that, “[w]e can form the belief that something is morally wrong by simply having a 
negative emotion directed towards it.”326   
A broader issue is that none of these studies make clear the distinction between acting 
intuitively and grounding one’s moral justification in an intuition. The former is part of our 
conservative expressive tendency and the latter an ability made possible through our critical 
reflective capacity. For the realist, the question of whether a reasonable principle is capable 
of being proposed is left untouched by the suggestion that, under certain pressures, we tend to 
act in concert with emotional cues. Even for the intuitionists, there is still elbow room in the 
face of the sentimentalist challenge. Intuitionists can accept that moral transgressions occur 
but deny the claim that this necessitates affectively laden moral judgements and decisions. 
Our tendency to act can be clearly separated from what might constitute a sensible decision in 
 
323 Similar results were found when participants were in “disgusting rooms” or around “disgusting smells.” See: 
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a given set of circumstances. Furthermore, Audi’s (1997) intuitionist self-evidence model 
stresses the need to accommodate epistemological errors, such as in the case of accepting 
self-evident propositions simply on the basis of making sense of them. 327 On our critical 
reflective capacity, Ross writes that the “moral convictions of thoughtful and well-educated 
people are the data of ethics just as sense-perceptions are the data of a natural science.”328 
Over generations, moral convictions are refined and “an extremely delicate power of 
appreciation of moral distinctions” becomes possible, but only because those convictions are 
capable of being corrected.329 Huemer (2005) writes that “[o]nce we have a fund of prima 
facie justified moral beliefs to start from, there is great scope for moral reasoning to expand, 
refine, and even revise our moral beliefs, in exactly the manner that the contemporary 
literature in philosophical ethics displays.”330 If we accept that moral biases might be errors 
in perception in the same way that standard cognitive biases are, then we can accept that 
working through the fallibility of an empirical judgement is not unlike reflecting on our moral 
intuitions and refining them. It does not follow from the fallibility of intuitions that affective 
states are the foundation of those intuitions. Without recourse to the reasonableness of these 
moral judgements, a crucial function of our moral capacity risks being overlooked. For the 
sentimentalist to make the case that moral judgements are grounded in affectively laden 
moral intuitions, they need to look further than our tendency to act or judge in certain ways 
under certain conditions. The quality (reasonableness, validity) of the available justification 
for a particular judgement would need to be assessed – and this discourse is fundamentally 
incommensurable with affectations as it requires recourse to moral reasons. 
Secondly, Mogensen’s argument can be reduced to a metaethical argument identical 
to that which is at the heart of Street’s debunking strategy: we believe that X, Y and Z are 
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valuable, right or wrong, true or false, and so on, “ultimately because we take them to be.”331 
For Mogensen, our emotional predispositions play a foundational role in the selection and 
amplification of our moral judgements of rightness and wrongness. For Street, our starting 
fund of evaluative beliefs is off-track, and since we reason from this starting fund, moral 
deliberation is “a process of assessing evaluative judgements that are mostly off the mark in 
terms of others that are mostly off the mark.”332 Thus, the ‘evolutionary causes’ are prior, “in 
the sense that these causes (along with many others) gave us our starting fund of evaluative 
attitudes, and evaluative truth is understood to be a function of those attitudes.”333  
Emotions, desires or subjective and scientifically inscrutable intuitions, either 
contaminate our rational reflection, or they do not. These off-track starting funds are, in the 
context of the EDA literature, synonymous with the evolutionary claim that our beliefs that x 
were formed and supported through unreliable doxastic processes (which can be given 
evolutionary explanations) and are thus unjustified. This means, as I indicated earlier, that the 
evolutionary debunking argument is not a metaethically distinct challenge. It seems to 
provide a new bottle for old wine – that normative truth is constitutive or contingent upon our 
evaluative standpoint. Moving beyond the metaphysical challenge which I explored in the 
previous chapter, what remains is this debate about the mind-dependence (or independence) 
of value. Either we, as realists, accept that our evolutionary nature (and what we are causally 
predisposed to believe) is prior to our believing it, or we provide a reasonable story as to how 
we struck upon evaluative truth under such unlikely circumstances.  
What the case of Mogensen demonstrates is that the search for a ‘cause’ of our moral 
beliefs requires that we assume that our epistemological relation with moral facts is of a 
certain kind. Mogensen openly argues for sentimentalism, whereas Street’s challenge is more 
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explicit as she argues that it is our normative reasons that are fundamentally grounded in 
desires. But the problem facing either formulation of the challenge is the same. If our reasons 
are, in fact, grounded in subjective states, then we have no reason to believe that those beliefs 
are justified. If this were true, then to mount an EDA at this juncture is otiose, because it is 
clear that some kind of anti-realism is best suited to explain our relationship with moral facts. 
This question must be explored outside of debunking literature if we are to reach a consensus. 
I will now explore one realist response, and in doing so, I play out the otiosity of the 
debunking manoeuvre.  
4.2.1 Uni-Directional Causation and its Discontents 
As I wrote in the previous section, the core of the anti-realist’s discontent seems to be 
that we believe that X, Y and Z are valuable, right or wrong, true or false, and so on, 
ultimately because we take them to be. The crux of my wider argument is how we arrive at 
this claim. Joyce and Ruse appear to believe that it is a consideration of evolutionary facts 
which lead to this conclusion. I argued in Chapter Three that they rely heavily on the 
assumption that non-natural facts are unjustified (because they are ontologically queer or 
non-parsimonious) and that they must first, problematically, preestablish that a viable 
naturalist account does not exist. Street too seems to rely on an argument for attitude-
dependence, but I will leave my analysis of Street until Chapter Five.  
The first method in which we can respond to this claim is to accept it. We take X, Y 
and Z to be valuable because we were predisposed to, but we can add that (just as in sense-
perception), we are justified in our beliefs about X, Y and Z because the doxastic processes 
which led to their formation reliably tracked truth.  
The first step towards accepting this causal story is acknowledging that, even with 
Mogensen’s expansion, the evolutionary story is not complete. On the inadequacy of the 
proximate and ultimate distinction, Kim Sterelny writes that: 
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We need a framework that emphasises interactions between a population’s response 
to selection and the selective environment, and we need a framework that emphasises 
the interactions between organism’s proximate biology and the selectable variation 
available in the population built from those organisms.334 
Here, Sterelny outlines a need which developmental systems theory (DST) fills – an account 
of inheritance which acknowledges that a number of developmental resources work together 
in influencing the generation of traits.335 On this, Oyama writes that, “[h]uman biology 
is…not a matter of individuals with fixed internal natures, but of changing natures that are a 
function of reciprocal relations with environments that always have a social aspect.”336 What 
is missing in the ultimate/proximate distinction, is an acknowledgement of the complexity 
and non-fixed nature of organisms transitioning through life cycles and living in an 
interdependent relationship with their environments – a consideration of the fact that an 
organism and its environment are in a process of continual, mutual construction. This means 
that the unidirectional view of causation does not adequately account for the development of 
an organism’s traits. 
 Oyama writes that, in contrast to a view of a “master molecule”, a “central directing 
agency” capable of explaining some aspect of development, we should instead view “both 
development and evolution as processes of construction and reconstruction in which 
heterogenous resources are contingently but more of or less reliably reassembled for each life 
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cycle.”337 On such a view, the evolution of an organism and an environment is interdependent 
and the environment is not seen to be static any more than those organisms which inhabit it. 
Changes that take place in organisms and the environment lead to changes in the relationship 
between the organism and its environment which leads to new, subsequent changes as part of 
a wider developmental system. 
If evolution is change in developmental systems, then… it is no longer possible to 
think of evolution as the shaping of the organism to fit an environmental niche. 
Rather, the various elements of the developmental systems coevolve. Organisms 
construct their niches both straightforwardly by physically transforming their 
surroundings and, equally importantly, by changing which elements of the external 
environment are part of the developmental system and thus able to influence the 
evolutionary process in that lineage.338 
DST “expands the scope and power of adaptive/historical explanations” and thus, at the very 
least, should lead us to reconsider the haste in which we classify a particular etiological 
account, non-truth-tracking.339 This notion of reciprocal causation invites the critique that 
determining which cause leads to which outcome becomes exceedingly more complex. This 
is echoed by Oyama:340 
Oppositions between genes (or biology) and learning, or between genes (or biology) 
and culture, are endemic to many fields but are miserably inadequate for capturing the 
multitude of causal factors needed for any reasonable treatment of ontogeny or 
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phylogeny. DST emphasizes crucial but often overlooked similarities among 
resources that are usually contrasted.341  
Laland offers a clear example which might facilitate connecting DST to its metaethical 
implications: 
…earthworms change the structure and chemistry of the soils in which they live and 
thereby modify selection acting back on themselves, thereby influencing the fitness 
consequences of their water-balance organs… The ‘ultimate explanation’ of the 
earthworm soil-processing behaviour is selection stemming from a soil environment, 
but a substantial cause of the soil environment is the niche-constructing activity of 
ancestral earthworms.342 
The debate about whether this vindicates or debunks in the moral case, turns to what 
constitutes the niche-constructing activity of humans in the development of morality.  
Severini sees niche-construction as the platform for a new debunking challenge. Just 
as in Mogensen’s attempt with phylogenetic explanation, Severini suggests that one might be 
able to construct a new debunking argument on this expanded view of our inheritance, 
moving beyond just ultimate causes and including a consideration of our phylogenetic and 
ontogenetic inheritance.  
 The ontogenetic view is open to how the ecological niche – the changing 
environmental and social factors of an organism – can be impacted by and can impact upon 
organisms, an interaction which is capable of generating changes in selection pressures and 
thus the ‘direction’ of selection. Severini writes, “[i]n this sense, since the human ecological 
niche includes also the social relations in which human beings are involved, it is precisely in 
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this context that we can look for moral “facts”, insofar as there is an ecological niche made 
up by moral constraints among other things.”343  The human ecological niche opens the 
conceptual space for the development of a moral niche.  
The human ecological niche is made up of cultures and societies which are ever-
evolving, and thus some have concluded that “[n]ot only technologies and other artefacts are 
part of this ecology but also morality… That is to say, humans (like other creatures) do not 
simply live in their environment, but they actively shape and change it...”344 Severini takes 
this to mean that a biological consideration of the origins of morality pushes us towards 
constructivism, of the anti-realist kind. She writes that, “the environmental setting which 
influences our moral beliefs is the one that human beings have built up.”345 As understood in 
Street’s sense, this means constructed from our evaluative attitudes – and thus accepting the 
former option in the question of whether “things are valuable ultimately because we value 
them (antirealism), or whether we value things ultimately because they possess a value 
independent of us (realism).”346 As I have argued, for Street and other debunkers to secure 
this anti-realist conclusion, they must first demonstrate that the history of our moral belief 
formation, including the complex puzzle of cultural and social learning, shows that value (our 
evaluative attitudes, our emotional predispositions, and so on) is prior to belief – that we only 
believe what we do about right and wrong because of this etiological account. To secure this 
conclusion, they must first show that this etiological account of the realist relationship with 
truth is epistemically insensitive, is superfluous to our best explanations of why we believe 
what we do, or is otherwise the product of an unfathomable coincidence (which we should 
take as a poor method of belief formation). But all of these conclusions would require 
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independent argumentation. Only having established any of these conclusions, could the 
debunker then show how the etiological account explains this fact. Severini, like the 
proponents of evolutionary debunking before her, first owes an account of why this expanded 
analysis of our moral genealogy is debunking as opposed to vindicating. Severini must 
provide reasons as to why moral naturalism is unjustified, before suggesting that the 
expanded causal analysis has the metaethical implications of an anti-realist constructivism. 
Without this explanation, her argument is not metaethically distinct from anti-realist 
arguments which conclude that moral objectivity is ultimately grounded in subjective states. 
Further, once she has eliminated viable candidates for a naturalist account of moral realism, 
we would be in a situation where the etiological explanation itself explains why we have the 
moral beliefs that we do – to construct the EDA against moral realism at such a point would 
be otiose; the anti-realist conclusion is already established. 
If moral doxastic processes tracked truth at least partially, the debunker’s causal 
premise falls through as the debunking strategy requires that the beliefs within an argument’s 
scope are formed and supported only through an off-track doxastic process.347 Sterelny 
develops an account of moral naturalism which incorporates the expanded analysis. He 
locates moral truths outside of the traditional ultimate/proximate dichotomy, whereby 
“[i]ndividual psychology, social life, information flow, metapopulation structure, and the 
selective environment all interacted.”348 His version of naturalism offers an account of moral 
truth that supports the truth-tracking of cooperation, whereby certain maxims survive and 
become widely endorsed both because they were adaptive and because they were true. One 
example is cultural group selection which favoured moral norms that were “relatively 
efficient means to the ends of social peace, regulation of conflict, and the restraint of selfish 
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or destructive impulses.”349 Other processes might include the learning which is guided by 
prosocial emotions and trial-and-error learning in heterogenous environments. The ongoing 
process of gene-culture evolution leads us to form moral beliefs, some of which contain 
“lingering prejudices of various kinds” which might act as “levers for exploitation and 
injustice” but other beliefs will result from “tracking and responding to levers of 
cooperation.”350  
The explanatory task of the naturalist requires a differentiation between moral 
practices which include “fast, implicit, reflex-like online cognitive systems…” and what I am 
understanding as our critical reflective capacity, our “slow, explicit, offline systems”351 
capable of restructuring or rejecting certain moral beliefs over time. Sterelny’s naturalism 
seems better able to incorporate this view of our moral deliberation, as under gene-culture 
evolution and moral niche construction, the truth of certain maxims “is not causally idle: it is 
relevant to its presence, persistence, and learnability.”352 An example of such an evolving 
belief, sensitive to presence, persistence, and learnability, is cruelty. Long gone are the days 
whereby execution in the public eye is an acceptable form of punishment and entertainment, 
a change which Sterelny argues is propelled, at least in part, “by the acceptance of an anti-
cruelty maxim, and that maxim has been accepted because it is true.” He writes that the 
reflective vindication of certain maxims, and I would add our reflective rejection of certain 
maxims, is a mark of our evolved cognitive ‘maturity’. Recourse to our innate, emotional 
predispositions does not count against the possibility of such maturity, it merely reasserts that 
that moral thought is error prone. Sterelny concludes: 
 
349 Kim Sterelny and Ben Fraser, "Evolution and Moral Realism," The British Journal for the Philosophy of 
Science 68, no. 4 (2016). 999 
350 Ibid. 
351 Ibid. 983 
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Just as ancient astronomy was a response to the celestial world, moral views are a 
response to the opportunities and challenges of a world in which cooperation is 
profitable, but fraught with potentials for conflict, coordination failure, and 
misunderstanding. As in the case of pre-modern astronomy, these responses do not 
typically identify and solve those challenges ideally. But in a range of cases, the 
normative practices of individuals and groups are appropriately shaped by these 
challenges and the available solutions, and they enable individuals and groups to act 
adaptively in their social environments with some reliability. Moral thinking is neither 
a well-polished mirror of social nature, nor an adaptive fiction.353 
So, Severni and the debunkers must face tracking accounts such as Sterelny’s head-on and 
show how such accounts fail to fit into Hypothesis A if they are to suppose the Darwinian 
Hypothesis has debunking implications. Such an expanded account of moral naturalism has 
so far escaped the analysis of debunkers. If accounts such as Sterelny’s do not contain a 
satisfactory explanation for moral clout (Joyce) or seem to assume an all-too-convenient 
third-factor (Street), then the debate swings in favour of the anti-realists. But, as I have been 
arguing, these arguments are not utilising undermining facts from debunking literature. Since 
Joyce’s central contention is with the viability of realist accounts of moral motivation, it is 
worth exploring this argument before turning to Street. 
 
4.3 Practical Oomph and Keeping Promises 
In earlier metaethical discourse, there existed disagreement surrounding the content of 
moral utterances.354 Suppose I happen to come across Harman’s hooligans harming the cat. 
 
353 Ibid. 1003 
354 I use the past-tense here as, following van Roojen, I believe that most non-cognitivist challenges have been 
watered down to the point that it would be difficult to distinguish distinctly non-cognitivist positions from quasi-
realist and anti-realist views. See, Mark van Roojen, "Moral Cognitivism Vs. Non-Cognitivism," in The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (2016). 
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“That’s wrong!” I would say, safely to myself. The expressivists took such a moral utterance 
to be reducible to the expression of a mental state. They would argue that the cat torturing 
case arouses a great deal of disapproval in me, and that my utterance that it is wrong is 
reducible to the claim, “Boo to torturing cats!” But Joyce argues that I shouldn’t expect such 
an utterance to have any practical implication – it is highly unlikely that my utterance, 
understood as an expression of my conative attitudes, would have any sway over the 
hooligans.355 Instead, Joyce would contend that when I declare that an action is wrong, what I 
really mean is that my utterance deserves consideration as a reason which counts against the 
hooligan’s behaviour, and thus that, properly received, my reason would provide a cause for 
the hooligan’s to cease torturing the cat. My declaration, understood this way, is “purporting 
to put forward a consideration of practical importance.”356 Through such utterances we 
deploy moral concepts, and Joyce seems to understand this act as one which evokes a 
transcendent normativity which is not actually real.357 The inherited tendency to form moral 
judgements includes, for Joyce, the inherited tendency to be influenced by this illusory force 
driving us to carry out what we believe to be the right things to do – this is the motivational 
bulwark or normativity of moral reasons.   
Joyce argues that such a cognitive process would follow from the “transgressive acts 
and the negative responses that they provoke (and compliant acts and the rewards they 
provoke).”358 It would seem that this normativity bolstered our tendency to sustain social 
order by inheriting responses to certain acts which, themselves, led us to believe that certain 
responses are deserved. This is Joyce’s Just Deserts model, which he argues is one way of 
understanding moral judgement. The strong thesis he warily advances here is that, “morally 
 
355 At least, it is not likely to motivate them to cease torturing the cat.  
356 Joyce, The Evolution of Morality. 58 
357 This interpretation is also offered in, David Wong, "Constructing Normativity in Ethics," Social Philosophy 
and Ethics 25, no. 1 (2008). 239 
358 Joyce, The Evolution of Morality. 66 
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judging that somebody ought to do something involves the thought that she deserves some 
form of punishment if she doesn’t do that thing.”359 If it is true that moral beliefs contain the 
content they do because such beliefs promote helping and cooperation and assist in the 
regulation of interpersonal relationships, and we have evolved this corresponding ‘sense’ or 
‘conscience’ which produces guilt (in the instance that we fail to do our part in a particular 
social good) or a desire for just deserts (in the instance that we observe someone not acting in 
the interest of the community and getting away with it), then the practical oomph of morality 
can be explained in evolutionary terms. 
In defence of this view, Joyce invites readers to imagine that there was a community 
of social creatures with a set of imperatives which assist in the regulation and governance of 
interpersonal relations. Imperatives such as, “Don’t steal for self-gain” or “Keep your 
Promises” are examples cited, as a community without such imperatives would have 
difficulty securing the cooperation required to flourish as a social animal. These social 
creatures are much like us apart from one important feature, he writes, “[i]f someone fails to 
follow one of these prescriptions – say, one of them doesn’t keep a promise, out of 
selfishness – her fellows don’t subject her to criticism… Let’s say this community doesn’t 
have a concept of desert at all…”360 Joyce believes that if the members of the community 
don’t feel that a wrong doer, when punished, is actually getting what he or she deserves, then 
they lack a sense of justice, which he defines as “the element pertaining to getting what one 
deserves.”361 Similarly, without guilt, the offender can’t recognise that what he or she has 
done is something morally denounceable, “for what is guilt, if not an emotion that involves 
the judgement that one deserves some kind of penalty for one’s actions?”362 He thus suggests 
 
359 This is just one way of understanding the Joyce’s relationship between actions and reasons. Throughout his 
book, Joyce runs similar arguments with the concepts of guilt and fairness. Ibid. 69 
360 Ibid. 67 
361 Ibid. 67 
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that we have an innate conception of justice and guilt, and without the corresponding desire 
to see that moral beliefs are consistently carried out among our peers, he believes it is 
difficult to conceptualise how we would have managed to cooperate at all. Without these 
corresponding responses acting as evolutionary spurs for cooperative behaviour, Joyce 
speculates that citing moral imperatives would be like citing “Do not kill” to an animal. But 
this seems to reduce our reasons for acting to mere responses to emotional cues. Joyce briefly 
considers alternatives such as the case for internalist views whereby, for example, “one who 
morally trespasses in some manner harms himself, and thus a moral judgement might be like 
a piece of advice on how to avoid such self-harm.”363 But Joyce finds this view problematic, 
as “[o]ne can simply state “One who practices vice thereby damages his soul,” but without 
details and supporting evidence this amounts to nothing.”364 The question can be raised as to 
what kind of details and supporting evidence Joyce calls for, as the concern is that he has 
done away with a viable account of reasons and normativity on the basis of the seeming 
ontological queerness of such an account. Keeping with the example of a promise, I can 
explore a candidate account of normative reasons which seems to exist outside of the list of 
candidate accounts that Joyce supplies. 
Emerging from the constructivist tradition is the view that there exist accounts of 
normativity that rest in the expectations we set in our interpersonal relations – in what we 
reasonably believe we owe to each other. Pratt distinguishes between promises bound by the 
exercise of normative power and promises bound by the need to protect the value of 
assurance. The first is a volitional, broadly Humean notion.365 The second is a perlocutionary 
and contractualist notion, which signals a path so far unmarked on the debunker’s map. Pratt 
explores the work of Scanlon’s What We Owe To Each Other, where Scanlon grounds moral 
 
363 Joyce, The Evolution of Morality. 59 
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obligation in the expectations that we set for ourselves in others.366 Thus, for Scanlon, “the 
wrong of breaking a promise is an instance of a large family of moral wrongs concerned with 
‘what we owe other people when we have led them to form expectations about our future 
conduct.’”367 The moral expectation of the promisor that she would keep her promise rests on 
her regard for the wrongness of betraying another’s expectation of her. But the question on 
the debunker’s mind would be, from where does our assurance come that we are bound to 
care about the expectation we lead others to have of us? From the first-person perspective, we 
must have some reason for believing that our promisee will view it as wrong to break our 
promise to them. From a third-person perspective, the promisee requires a reason to believe 
in the integrity of the promisor that is independent of the wrongness of breaking the promise.  
One reason might be that antecedent non-moral expectations are set by the promisor. 
If both the promisor and the promisee are aware of the consequences of resiling from the 
promise, the confidence of the promisee is grounded in a judgement about the responsiveness 
of the promisor to this prospective consequence. The adoption of a social norm of promise-
keeping might carry out this function. Mogensen and Joyce would argue that it is the 
responsiveness to social disrepute that binds the promisor, and that our responsiveness can be 
given a genealogy embedded in promoting cooperation and supressing competition.368 But I 
argue that this view inadequately encapsulates the complexity of the promise. Scanlon writes: 
When I say ‘I promise to help you if you help me’, the reason that I suggest to you 
that I will have for helping is my awareness of that fact that not to return your help 
would, under the circumstances, be wrong: not just forbidden by some social practice 
but morally wrong.369 
 
366 Thomas Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000). 296 
367 Pratt, "Promises and Perlocutions." 93 
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In making a promise, we rarely and need not invoke non-moral commitments or agree upon 
consequences of failure to keep the promise. Such an act might even counter the force of the 
commitment. When one regards oneself as obligated to fulfil an expectation, the assurance of 
the promise is “moral all the way down.”370 
For Scanlon, being part of the reason fundamentalist tradition, moral judgements are 
claims about reasons. Thus, our moral deliberation as an exercise of our critical reflective 
capacity, considers whether our actions “could be justified to others on grounds that they, if 
appropriately motivated, could not reasonably reject.”371 The morality of what we owe to 
each other possesses the normative authority and ‘reason-giving force’ due to this ideal of 
justifiability.372 Valid principles are those which are not able to be reasonably rejected by 
other rational and appropriately motivated beings, and so Scanlon’s theory provides us with a 
framework with which we can construct a normative morality. One such valid principle, 
Scanlon argues, is his Principle of Fidelity. 
The promise consists of an act which seeks to summon in its perlocutors a feeling of 
mutual trust. Within the promise, the intention of carrying out the desired action and the 
mutual awareness of the ‘general moral fact’ of promising must be communicated. The 
Principle of Fidelity supplies the promisee with a reason to believe that the promisor does in 
fact intend to carry out the desired action, and that the rationality of the promisor confers on 
them an inherent moral awareness of the ‘general moral fact’ associated with the promise. To 
demonstrate, take the case of the promisor that makes promise P, with no intention of 
fulfilling it. Any principle that includes the act of making false promises, subjected to the 
rational scrutiny of others, cannot withstand Scanlon’s test of reasonable rejection. An 
attempt to construct a promise that P, with no intention of fulfilling it, is a moral wrong. It 
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follows that the act of promising creates an expectation in the promisee of sincerity. The fact 
of the promise introduces a new moral relation between promisor and promisee, and this 
relation tends to generate expectation and assurance. 
By attempting to induce assurance while admitting that she is in a situation in which if 
she succeeds in doing so she will attract a duty of fidelity, the promisor thereby 
induces assurance, thus attracting the duty. She acknowledges that an obligation is 
being created, and by doing so creates one.373 
It is not by recourse to the consequential social disrepute or psychological harm that 
commitment is communicated, but in that shared value of assurance. What matters here is 
that the promisee registers the promisor’s awareness that they have entered into a moral 
relationship with them. The nature of this assurance and the test of rational scrutiny briefly 
explored here, are just examples of how we are capable of moving beyond affective 
dispositions in justifying our moral beliefs. The biological basis of certain predispositions 
need not be denied for this discourse to occur. But to fully explore complex moral cases such 
as the act of promising, we use reasons to navigate and determine the viability of certain 
beliefs. We move beyond describing and understanding behaviours and attitudes of our 
conservative expressive tendency, which may be influenced to some degree by both ultimate 
and proximate factors, and we consider the proper functioning of our critical reflective 
capacity.374 Joyce’s account of normativity overlooks accounts such as these, and instead 
debunkers tend to assume that concepts like the value of assurance are volitional and 
Humean. On this view, debunkers are already advancing the anti-realist conclusion that they 
seek to secure through debunking. This shifts the debate from an evolutionary one, to one that 
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is between the constructivists who are realists about reasons, and the constructivists who deny 
this claim. I return to this question in Chapter Six. 
 Joyce’s contention with moral naturalism leads us back to the metaethical question of 
the primacy of value. As does Severini’s debunking argument and, as I will now turn 
towards, Street’s Darwinian dilemma. What remains of the debunker’s challenge to moral 
realism is the underlying argument which leads debunkers to argue that realists accept that 
naturalism fails and that we are led to moral scepticism. I have made several allusions 
throughout this chapter to an assumption undergirding this move which is not an appeal to 
ontological parsimony or a charge of ontological obscurity. One reading of the Darwinian 
Hypothesis seems to establish that our reasons which might count in favour of certain moral 
beliefs are drawn from the poisoned well of evaluative truth. This means that we do not stand 
entirely independent of our evaluative attitudes when we reason about right and wrong. I 
believe a residual challenge for the moral realist resides here. The question now is how, if the 
realist accepts the Darwinian hypothesis and that it might not have tracked truth, one is 
justified in believing the seeming coincidence that evaluative truth and our evaluative beliefs 
correspond. 
Conclusion 
Recall the dichotomy that I argued debunkers offer the realist: 
(1) that the moral realist must provide a naturalistic account as to how moral 
properties might have conferred truth upon the beliefs of our ancestors, and explain 
why this would have been beneficial, or  
(2) that the moral realist must accept that naturalism fails and that we are led to moral 
scepticism (because moral non-naturalism is not justified). 
If the Darwinian Hypothesis is true, the question still remains as to whether it is vindicating 
or debunking in regard to moral truths. This is what the first horn (1) is about. I explored an 
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account of naturalism grounded in developmental systems theory which acknowledges the 
complexity and non-fixed nature of organisms transitioning through life cycles and living in 
an interdependent relationship with their environments. The human ecological niche opens 
the conceptual space for the development of a moral niche, whereby cultures and societies 
which are ever evolving constitute the interdependent development of human morality. 
Though this explanation is a significant improvement on the ultimate/proximate distinction, it 
only carries the important question – the vindicating or debunking nature of this development 
– further down the river.  
Severini, who represents an important line of response for the debunkers, reads this 
expanded developmental picture as evidence for the constructed nature of human morality – 
an argument in favour of anti-realism. In order to make this argument, I argued that Severini 
must take a position on what moral truth is constructed from. Since this is a question of the 
mind-independence of truth, Severini must ultimately rely on metaethical argumentation 
external to the purely undermining facts of debunking literature. To sum up, the debunker 
must pre-establish or otherwise assume the mind-dependence of moral truth in order to claim 
that the developmental processes which led to the formative processes behind our moral 
beliefs were off-track. I argue that this move plays out the problem of otiosity for the EDA. 
I then considered the residual concern of moral motivation emerging from Joyce’s 
work. Joyce argues that moral naturalism – and by extension non-naturalism and 
supernaturalism – do not provide a feasible account of why we should be moral. I argued that 
his analysis assumes motivational externalism and that his reasons for dismissing internalism 
as a candidate theory are grounded in ontologising assumptions about the nature of moral 
facts. 
In the next chapter, I show how along this line of argument debunkers attempt to pre-
establish that value (our evaluative attitudes, our emotional predispositions, and so on) are 
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prior to belief – and that we ultimately believe what we do about right and wrong because of 
this etiological account of the origins of moral belief. This is where the second horn (2) 
comes in. Why is non-naturalism unjustified? Underlying the EDA are important challenges 
























CHAPTER FIVE – EXPOSING THE UNDERLYING CHALLENGES 
Over the past two chapters I have examined the dilemma which I proposed was at the 
heart of the debunking strategy. The first horn of the dilemma called for an account of 
naturalist realism which would demonstrate that evolutionary facts vindicate, rather than 
debunk, our belief in mind-independent truth. The second horn was to concede anti-realism, 
which was a conclusion reached via metaethical challenges outside of purely evolutionary 
debunking (the explanatory inadequacy of naturalism and non-naturalism). I now turn to the 
external challenges underlying this second horn. There seem to be two kinds of challenges. 
The first is an epistemological one. How can realists justify the claim that the causal 
influences behind our normative judgements just so happened to lead to us towards those 
normative judgements which realists suppose are true? The second is a metaphysical one. If 
moral truth could have been anything, since we could have evolved to be entirely different 
creatures, then it seems that truth is fixed to our nature. This means that there are no 
fundamental moral truths, just those truths which are true for creatures like us.  
 
5.1 Revisiting Street’s Darwinian Dilemma 
The first premise of Street’s debunking challenge is causal.  
Evolutionary forces shaped the content of our moral judgements.375 
Take the case of our moral judgements towards the act of cheating. We have the belief that 
cheating is wrong and we are capable of expressing this belief in a number of ways. First, 
regarding our conservative expressive tendency, we can observe our tendency to denounce 
cheaters by recourse to (1) our skill at identifying them and, (2) our commonsense beliefs 
towards the wrongness of the act. In defence of (1), evolutionary psychology has produced a 
 
375 As I discussed earlier, this claim is contentious and at best, an interesting hypothetical consideration for 
metaethicists until it is shown that this influence is debunking rather than vindicating. From here, I am exploring 
Street point of view, according to which such forces are debunking. 
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number of experiments which support the existence of a cheater detection module.376 Most 
prominently, the Wason selection task demonstrates that our application of propositional 
logic, specifically in conditional arguments, is mostly fallacious unless applied to social 
contexts.377 In regards to (2), our commonsense beliefs are calibrated towards viewing 
cheating negatively. It suffices to say that, in sport or in academia for example, the norm 
violation of cheating (at the expense of the integrity of the individual and the fairness of the 
system) is well monitored by the collective and mostly condemned. One way of formulating 
the causal claim then, is to argue that our beliefs regarding cheating are grounded in an 
affective disposition tracking the instrumental rewards of cooperation – rewards which are 
bolstered by the capacity to detect and punish cheaters. The belief is thus formed irrespective 
of whether or not it tracks the truth. 
 Our critical reflective capacity, outside of our conservative expressive tendency, 
allows us to express the thought that cheating is wrong in another way. We can claim to 
possess a reason, which is outside of some affective disposition, that explains why the act of 
cheating is wrong. Street argues that even this reason, whatever it might be, is drawn from the 
poisoned well. Street maintains that the distorting influence of evolution is part of our critical 
reflective capacity as much as it is part of our conservative expressive tendency. It “does not 
seem much of a stretch” she writes, to argue that these fitness enhancing dispositions were 
responding to some feature of the world “in some primitive, non-linguistic sort of fashion.”378 
So, we could view our evaluative judgements as “conscious, reflective endorsements” of 
certain evaluative tendencies that we share with other animals, and that were shaped by 
evolutionary forces.  
 
376 Jens Van Lier, Russell Revlin, and Wim De Neys, "Detecting Cheaters without Thinking: Testing the 
Automaticity of the Cheater Detection Module," PLoS One 8, no. 1 (2013). 
377 Peter Cathcart Wason, "Reasoning," in New Horizons in Psychology, ed. Brian Foss (Harmandsworth, United 
Kingdom: Penguin, 1966). 
378 Street, "A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value." 117 
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 From this, Street offers an “exhaustive” dilemma of possibilities in her Darwinian 
dilemma. She writes, “either the evolutionary influence tended to push our normative 
judgements toward the independent normative truth, or else it tended to push them away from 
or in ways that bear no relation to that truth.”379 Realists can embrace one horn of her 
Darwinian dilemma by providing what she calls a tracking account of the relation between 
our normative judgements and mind-independent truth.380 Otherwise realists may suppose 
that, since these judgements were formed in such a way that bore no relation to truth, they are 
the beneficiaries of a striking coincidence between the off-track genealogy of these 
judgements and the supposed correspondence of those judgements with evaluative truth. The 
coincidence challenge is captured in the following passage: 
As a purely conceptual matter, the independent normative truth could be anything. … 
But if there are innumerable things such that it’s conceptually possible they’re 
ultimately worth pursuing, and yet our [normative judgments] have been shaped from 
the outset by forces that are as good as random with respect to the normative truth, 
then what are the odds that our [normative judgments] will have hit, as a matter of 
sheer coincidence, on those things which are independently really worth pursuing?381 
The first sentence here indicates an underlying counterfactual challenge. I return to this in 
5.4. This formulation of the realist’s relationship with truth also presupposes the moral field 
thesis. Elsewhere, Street writes that “because [the realist] views these evaluative truths as 
ultimately independent of our evaluative attitudes, the only way for realism both to accept 
that those attitudes have been deeply influenced by evolutionary causes and to avoid seeing 
these causes as distorting is for it to claim that these causes actually in some way tracked the 
 
379 Original italics. "Mind-Independence without the Mystery: Why Quasi-Realists Can't Have It Both Ways," in 
Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 6, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 12 
380 Street’s main contention with this account is that it is scientifically indefensible. I would argue that 
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alleged independent truths.”382 Street forms this argument with the view that realists are 
committed to the existence of a “huge universe of logically possible evaluative judgements 
and truths.”383 Street’s analogy regarding sailing across Bermuda, discussed previously, 
further demonstrates this supposed commitment: 
On this view, allowing our evaluative judgements to be shaped by evolutionary 
influences is analogous to setting out for Bermuda and letting the course of your boat 
be determined by the wind and tides: just as the push of the wind and tides on your 
boat has nothing to do with where you want to go, so the historical push of natural 
selection on the content of our evaluative judgements has nothing to do with 
evaluative truth. Of course every now and then, the wind and tides might happen to 
deposit someone’s boat on the shores of Bermuda. Similarly, every now and then, 
Darwinian pressures might have happened to push us toward accepting an evaluative 
judgement that accords with one of the realist’s independent evaluative truths. But 
this would be purely a matter of chance, since by hypothesis there is no relation 
between the forces at work and the “destination” in question, namely evaluative 
truth.384 
The destination she seems to have in mind are the properties which instantiate the truth of the 
evaluative judgements.385 She adds that even our capacity for rational reflection cannot help; 
although it might seem that “just as a compass and a little steering can correct for the 
influence of the wind and tides on the course of one’s boat”, illegitimate influence existed 
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since the very beginning in our capacity for evaluation. Thus, rational reflection is just “a 
process of assessing evaluative judgements that are mostly off the mark in terms of others 
that are mostly off the mark.”386 She continues: 
In rational reflection, one does not stand completely apart from one’s starting fund of 
evaluative judgements: rather, one uses them, reasons in terms of them, holds some of 
them up for examination in light of others… Thus, if the fund of evaluative 
judgements with which human reflection began was thoroughly contaminated with 
illegitimate influence… then the tools of rational reflection were equally 
contaminated, for the latter are always just a subset of the former. … reflection of this 
kind isn’t going to get one any closer to evaluative truth, any more than sorting 
through contaminated materials with contaminated tools is going to get one closer to 
purity.387 
The only option remaining, Street suggests, is to adopt a theory which is mind-dependent 
because this construal allows for the possibility of evaluative error resulting from the 
influence of evaluative attitudes. The reflective equilibrium for Street operates within this 
realm where evaluative judgements are taken only from the poisoned well of evolutionary 
influence, where evaluative truth is a function of what emerges from this process – and thus, 
is not ultimately, mind-independently true. This is supposedly damning for the realist 
because: 
The realist understands the evaluative truths to be prior, in the sense that evolutionary 
causes are understood to have selected us to track those independent truths. The 
antirealist, on the other hand, understands the evolutionary causes to be prior, in the 
sense that these causes (along with many others) gave us our starting fund of 
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evaluative attitudes, and evaluative truth is understood to be a function of those 
attitudes.388  
Substituting back into my cheating example, one rendition of the core claim is that cheating 
related beliefs which are the product of forces of natural selection are unjustified because 
beliefs formed in this way (with this function of merely securing the outcome of social 
cohesion, for example) are often false. But, crucially, beliefs pertaining to cheating are not 
false because they are influenced by our attitudinal predispositions towards acts of cheating 
and cheaters themselves. They are false because the evolutionary consideration suggests that, 
at the core of our beliefs pertaining to cheating, are predispositions which are not at all 
connected to moral truth. The poison of the poisoned well – from which we supposedly draw 
our moral justifications – is truth-irrelevance. The challenge for the realist is thus posed as 
how they propose to remain committed to believing that a relationship holds between 
evaluative belief and evaluative truth under such unlikely circumstances. This is an 
epistemological challenge against the belief in the mind-independent truth of moral 
evaluations.  
 Such an epistemic reading of the dilemma could be stated as follows: 
(1) Realists must provide a tracking account without presupposing the mind-
independent truth of certain ends of selection as values for creatures like us. Or, 
(2) Realists can deny that truth was tracked, but must provide a story as to how 
evaluative belief and truth happen to coincide now, for creatures like us, when: 
a. Independent truth could have been anything. 
b. The forces which led to our belief formation produced indifferent to mind-
independent truth (in contrast to empirical beliefs), so if evaluative belief 
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and truth do coincide, how can realists be justified in the face of this 
strikingly convenient coincidence? 
A satisfactory account of moral naturalism would meet (1) and I suggested that this is a live 
option in Chapter Four. In what follows, I explore the nature of the challenge raised in (2). 
5.2 The Euthyphro Problem 
Each of us faces the inevitable loss of everyone and everything we love. More 
generally, we face an ineliminable gap between how things are and how we would 
like them to be. Is there a way to live in full awareness of this fact without falling into 
anxiety or depression, or resorting to one form or another of forgetfulness, denial or 
numbing out?389 
Whatever the answer to the above question, Street believes that a realistic metaethical basis 
for it requires a “strong form of ethical objectivity” but “without positing anything 
metaphysically or epistemologically mysterious.”390 Ultimately, Street argues that the answer 
“…somehow necessarily involves coming to occupy a compassionate point of view from 
which one sees the suffering of all beings as mattering.”391 It is here that value takes 
precedent in Street’s metaethical constructivism.392 Street’s version of Humean 
constructivism evades the EDA because, although its proponents are committed to the 
existence of moral facts, those facts can be compatibly rendered constitutive of – dependent 
upon – aspects of our moral psychology (which the Darwinian Hypothesis can supposedly 
explain). Moral realism cannot seem to accommodate this fact as it is at odds with its own 
central tenet: that moral facts obtain independently of any particular attitude or perspective, 
 
389 Sharon Street, "Constructivism in Ethics and the Problem of Attachment and Loss," Aristotelian Society 
Supplementary Volume 90, no. 1 (2016). 163 
390 Ibid. 
391 Ibid. 167 
392 This is Street’s Standpoint characterisation of constructivism. I return to this in the next chapter. 
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such as that fixed by our moral psychology (again, that which there supposedly exists an 
evolutionary explanation for). 
The Euthyphro Problem plays out this very contention – is a pious act loved by the 
gods because it is a pious act, or is it a pious act in virtue of its being loved by the gods? 
Later in this essay, which begins with the important question above, Street writes, 
“[o]bviously I can’t argue for the falsity of realism here, but in my view the most devastating 
objection to realism is epistemological.”393 The footnote which is attached to this quote leads 
to four papers. The first paper is the Darwinian Dilemma in which Street proposes her 
popular EDA. The second is a reply to David Copp’s preestablished harmony account. The 
third is a reply to the quasi-realists metaethical position which I will not explore here. The 
fourth and final paper is a response to Dworkin’s account of realism. I will show how these 
papers, which she insists contain the devastating epistemological objection on which her 
Humean constructivism rests, rely heavily on assumptions inherent in the debunking strategy. 
I will argue that this epistemological objection is otiose because it does no more, 
argumentatively, than restate her version of constructivism: standpoint constructivism. The 
epistemological objection can be reduced to the question of the primacy of value. I will 
discuss these papers chronologically.394 
 
5.2.1 Replying to Copp (2008) 
Copp, a central figure in the pre-established harmony line of response, wants to accept 
that certain moral beliefs were influenced by the forces of natural selection, but adds that it 
might be the case that certain moral beliefs are made true by moral facts which are the 
 
393 Street, "Constructivism in Ethics and the Problem of Attachment and Loss." 173 
394 The papers she cites are: "A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value."; "Reply to Copp: 
Naturalism, Normativity, and the Varieties of Realism Worth Worrying About."; "Mind-Independence without 
the Mystery: Why Quasi-Realists Can't Have It Both Ways."; and "Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Rethink 
It." I believe I have recounted the 2006 paper on the Darwinian Dilemma enough, I will thus proceed to her 
response to Copp. In the interest of clarity, I will not explore her paper on Quasi-realism. 
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product of quasi-tracking – whereby the doxastic process tracked moral facts to “an 
epistemically sufficient degree.”395 This means that those who accept the quasi-tracking 
thesis can, Copp argues, avoid the sceptical implications of the Darwinian consideration.  
Copp originally responds to Street by reformulating the Darwinian Dilemma with 
quasi-tracking in mind.396 On the first horn, Copp writes that: 
Realists accept the quasi-tracking thesis… that Darwinian forces caused our moral 
beliefs to quasi-track moral facts… because the capacity to detect moral truths 
promoted reproductive success among our ancestors.397 
This means that realists can safely grasp the first horn of Street’s dilemma, as the causal 
premise can be reformulated in such a way that would suggest that our ancestors would be 
generally ‘responding’ to moral facts. Copp seeks to provide such an account which he calls 
society-centred moral theory. He argues that his realist solution is a kind of ‘moral 
functionalism’ because if a society is to be successful, he argues, “it needs to be governed by 
shared norms or standards, which we can think of as constituting the moral code. In this 
sense, ‘morality’ has the function of enabling a society to meet its needs.”398 The central idea 
of society-centred theory is that “a basic moral proposition is true only if a corresponding 
moral standard or norm is relevantly justified or authoritative.”399 A moral standard is 
relevantly justified in that “its currency in the social code of the relevant society would best 
contribute to the society’s ability to meet its needs – including its needs for physical 
continuity, internal harmony and cooperative interaction, and peaceful and cooperative 
 
395 David Copp, "Darwinian Skepticism About Moral Realism," Philosophical Issues 18, no. 1 (2008). 192 
396 Note that Copp is assuming that the “Darwinian Hypothesis” is true. I have shown how it is far from clear 
what is meant by this, and how a sophisticated account of natural facts can be located in the genealogy of moral 
beliefs. This means that the aspiring debunker would have to first show why such an account is inadequate. In 
order to see where Street’s argument leads us, I must put these responses aside. 
397 Copp, "Darwinian Skepticism About Moral Realism." 193 
398 Ibid. 198 
399 Copp, "Four Epistemological Challenges to Ethical Naturalism: Naturalized Epistemology and the First-
Person Perspective." 68 
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relations with its neighbours.”400 To show how such a theory might function as an answer to 
Street’s first horn, take the property of wrongness. Copp writes, “the property of wrongness – 
in relation to society S – is the property of being forbidden by the social moral code of 
currency of which in society S actually would best enable S to meet its needs.”401 When 
reflecting on difficult cases such as euthanasia, the naturalist owes an account of the nature 
and epistemic status of the reasons employed in reflection and “of how it gives us access to 
the empirical truths that it identifies with moral truths.”  402 Copp’s grounding of truth is that, 
“a basic moral proposition is true only if a corresponding moral standard is included in or 
implied by the moral code the currency of which in the relevant society would enable society 
to better serve its basic needs than would the currency of other sets of norms and better than 
would be the case if no set of norms had currency in the society.”403 So, wrongness is fixed 
by societies and their contexts in their aim to secure their needs. But, Street argues, where do 
these needs come from? 
 Street’s response is that Copp’s view either makes no normative claim and is thus 
outside of the purview of her debunking considerations (Street supposes that she is only 
interested in debunking normative realism), or otherwise it simply assumes “a large swath of 
substantive views on how we have reason to live…and then note[s] that these are the very 
views evolutionary forces pushed us toward.”404 The primary concern for Street is that 
realists face the coincidence challenge, and she argues that Copp only succeeds in “trivially 
reassert[ing] the coincidence” rather than providing an explanation for it. Why is it that 
“physical continuity, internal harmony and cooperative interaction...” are among a society’s 
 
400 Ibid. 69 
401 Ibid. 70 
402 Ibid. 58 See also: Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other. 1; Peter Railton, "Moral Realism," Philosophical 
Review 95 (1986). 
403 Copp, "Darwinian Skepticism About Moral Realism." 
404 Street, "Reply to Copp: Naturalism, Normativity, and the Varieties of Realism Worth Worrying About." 214 
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needs?405 The coincidence the realist must explain is, if these values are valuable stance-
independently, then why are these are the very things that we would be predisposed to think 
are good? She writes that “the explanandum in question is the striking degree of overlap 
between the content of the normative truth and the evaluative directions in which 
evolutionary forces pushes us…”406 Without an explanation for this coincidence, Street 
argues that Copp (representing the realist camp) simply “takes a position on how we have 
reason to live.”407  
It may be so that Copp has cherry-picked these values and that his justification for 
selecting these values over others is left wanting. Street’s response would be that cherry-
picked values reflect Copp’s stance-dependence in his attempt to establish the mind-
independence of value.  
Street is offering the following argument. 
(1) Realists must provide a tracking account without presupposing the mind-
independent truth of certain ends of selection as values for creatures like us. Or, 
(2) Realists can deny that truth was tracked, but must provide a story as to how 
evaluative belief and truth happen to coincide now, for creatures like us, when: 
a. Independent truth could have been anything. 
b. The forces which led to our belief formation produced indifferent to mind-
independent truth (in contrast to empirical beliefs), so if evaluative belief 
and truth do coincide, how can realists be justified in the face of this 
strikingly convenient coincidence? 
 
405 Copp, "Four Epistemological Challenges to Ethical Naturalism: Naturalized Epistemology and the First-
Person Perspective." 69 
406 Street, "Reply to Copp: Naturalism, Normativity, and the Varieties of Realism Worth Worrying About." 212 
407 Ibid. 213 
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Street’s charge is that Copp does not succeed at (1) and therefore must face (2) and 
explain the all-too-convenient coincidence that it is these values that we evolved to track 
mind-independently. Street’s argument is a strong one, but it is worth noting that succeeding 
in her critique of Copp’s attempt to develop a truth-tracking account does not show that there 
is no possibility of such an account. Metaethical realism remains a viable option so long as 
alternatives to Copp’s account exist. If Street were to establish that all attempts to determine 
the value claims of morality are merely extensions of a stance towards those values, 
rendering realism unjustified, then the Darwinian Hypothesis need not be invoked. The 
evolutionary consideration does no argumentative work. 
Street extends this argument by adding that it would be a bizarre coincidence if the 
values which realists suppose are true are the very values which we evolved the capacity to 
track and are the very values which are true mind-independently. Street’s devastating 
epistemological objection then, surfaces here as a restatement of her stance-dependent 
constructivism and calls for a response to ‘the coincidence challenge.’ Neither of these 
arguments require the Darwinian premise – upon closer inspection, this is not an evolutionary 
debunking argument. 
 
5.2.2 Replying to Dworkin (2016) 
In Street’s reply to Dworkin, Street adopts new language for the Darwinian Dilemma: 
The practical/theoretical puzzle as I am raising...is a puzzle about our normative 
judgements in general: it notes that whatever our more specific normative views, we 
are forced to think that there is a general coincidence between the true normative 
judgements and the ones that causal forces led us to make, and it demands that this 
coincidence be explained.408 
 
408 Street, "Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Rethink It." 22 
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Dworkin believed that the coincidence need not be explained, “… why shouldn't you count it 
as a piece of luck[?]”409 But Street is unsatisfied with Dworkin’s position.  
Street distinguishes between three metaethical accounts through the case of the 
Ideally Coherent Caligula.410 Essentially, Caligula possesses consistent and coherent moral 
beliefs, yet he is different to us in that he values the act of torture. The Kantian view, which 
Street attributes to Korsgaard, explicitly rejects the possibility of Caligula because it follows 
from every consistent and coherent agent’s set of practical commitments that torture is 
morally wrong. Street believes that her own account of constructivism shares the common 
feature of stance-dependence with Korsgaard’s, because for Korsgaard, “if one makes any 
normative judgments at all, one is thereby committed to valuing the humanity of others in 
such a way that rules out torturing them for fun….”411 This means that, ultimately, the act of 
valuing is primary in Korsgaard’s account, meaning it falls under the purview of stance-
dependent anti-realism. Street’s own view differs from Korsgaard’s account in that there are 
no shared values that necessarily exist in every rational agent and thus a character such as 
Caligula is entirely possible. For the realist view, Street extracts from Dworkin’s claim that: 
We may be forced to concede, in some cases, that those who held different views 
lacked no information we have, and were subject to no different distorting influences. 
All that we can say, by way of explanation of the difference, is that they did not “see” 
or show sufficient “sensitivity” to what we “see” or “sense,” and these metaphors may 
have nothing behind them but the bare and unsubstantiated conviction that our 
capacity for moral judgment functions better than theirs did.412 
 
409 Dworkin, "Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It." 125 
410 A case of Gibbard’s (1999). 
411 Street, "Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Rethink It." 4 
412 Dworkin, "Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It." 121-122 
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But the crux of Street’s argument is how the realist supposes to possess this “sense” while 
also proposing that their evaluative judgements are aligned with evaluative truths. Street 
continues: 
...there is no reason to think that natural selection, or for that matter any causal 
process, would shape us in such a way that we would be able to track such 
truths....[the realist’s account] provides no reason to think that the causal forces 
described by our best scientific explanations shapes our normative judgements in 
ways that might have led those judgements to track the truth; it merely confidently 
reasserts that they did....One may explain each side of the coincidence in as much 
depth as one likes...[b]ut all this goes nowhere toward explaining the thing that really 
needs to be explained, namely the coincidence itself.”413 
Since the available explanation for the coincidence exists in her account of mind-dependent 
constructivism, Street believes the realist is in error. She concludes that, “[c]onstructivism is 
not self-defeating, then, for no matter what one’s starting set of normative judgments, 
constructivism follows from within the standpoint constituted by those judgments. It thus 
meets its own standard, and no problem arises when we apply it to itself.”414 But if Street’s 
constructivist account best explains the link between our evaluative judgements and 
evaluative truth, and this is the best scientific explanation of that link, then the debunking 
consideration carries no argumentative weight – the conclusion was already established on 
the grounds that value is stance-dependent.  
It may be that the challenge set by Street functions as an endorsement of her account 
of constructivism, rather than as a distinct metaethical challenge. Street’s devastating 
epistemological objection surfaces again as a restatement of her stance-dependent 
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414 Ibid. 42 
168 
 
constructivism and calls for a response to ‘the coincidence challenge.’ Neither of these 
arguments require the Darwinian premise. This supports the otiosity argument since it 
demonstrates that the metaethical argumentation necessary to establish that all realist 
justifications are in fact post-hoc rationalisations establishes the anti-realist conclusion that 
the EDA seeks to establish. I now turn to the merits of the coincidence challenge. 
 
5.3 The Coincidence Challenge 
Recall that I am dissecting the Darwinian Dilemma, which I argued has the following 
structure: 
(1) Realists must provide a tracking account without presupposing the mind-
independent truth of certain ends of selection as values for creatures like us. Or, 
(2) Realists can deny that truth was tracked, but must provide a story as to how 
evaluative belief and truth happen to coincide now, for creatures like us, when: 
a. Independent truth could have been anything. 
b. The forces which led to our belief formation produced indifferent to mind-
independent truth (in contrast to empirical beliefs), so if evaluative belief 
and truth do coincide, how can realism be justified in the face of this 
strikingly convenient coincidence? 
Copp provided a case for (1). Street’s response against Copp did not consist of stance-
independent reasons counting against (1). Instead, Street leans on the claim that in Copp’s 
answer to (1), he conveniently identifies (i) the very needs of a flourishing society that he 
supposes are true (ii) the very needs that a society of creatures like us would probably acquire 
under the Darwinian Hypothesis. I have been arguing that (ii) is otiose if (i) is true. Recall 
that the otiosity argument shows that it is underlying metaethical assumptions or otherwise 
what has already been established through rebutting facts that carries forward the realist and 
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anti-realist debate, as opposed to this progress coming from purely undermining facts 
emerging from evolutionary debunking literature. Reiterating my example from Chapter 
Two, suppose I make the claim that blue is the best colour. If you showed me that I only 
think blue is the best colour because it just happens to be my favourite colour, then my claim 
that it is the best colour is not justified – clearly I am biased and unable to form a stance-
independent reason about the best colour. But, if you went on to say that I was predisposed to 
favour such a colour purely because of my upbringing, you would not be developing any new 
argument against my original claim that blue is the best colour. You would, perhaps, only be 
cladding your claim that my favouritism skews my judgement of colours (you would be 
adding descriptive weight to the charge of bias). However, assuming that I was sensitive to 
reasons, I would, on recognising my bias, have already retracted my claim that blue is the 
best colour, and perhaps I am in the process of trying to separate my quest for the best colour 
from the distorting influence of my favouritism. Your causal claim about my upbringing, 
while perhaps true, is no longer to the point. Now, you and I should both return to the 
question of bias: I can still be biased and make a judgement which is true, so we must 
determine what colour is really the best, as objectively as we can, taking care to distance 
ourselves from causal influences which might be directing our choices. In this example, the 
undermining facts would be the discovery that my upbringing led me to favour blue. I am 
arguing that debunkers must first establish that this is the only reason that I believe blue is the 
best colour in order for the argument to have any force. If the debunker must establish this 
prior to constructing their debunking attempt, then they must rebut any reason I might have to 
believe that blue is the best colour. This would establish the post-hoc rationalisation premise. 
Since establishing this premise would achieve the very conclusion which the debunking 
attempt aims at, the debunking argument itself is otiose.  
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In the previous section, I showed that Street’s argument seeks to establish that moral realism 
is unjustified through an argument which rests on the implausibility of this coincidence in our 
moral beliefs. In this section, I want to show how she achieves this conclusion.   
The coincidence challenge need not appeal to the ‘Darwinian Hypothesis’, further, it 
need not appeal to any causal claim at all. For Street’s coincidence challenge to go through 
we must assume the moral field thesis. I will show that without the Darwinian premise and 
the causal premise in general, we can wear thin the foundation of Street’s Darwinian dilemma 
in order to expose the Humean constructivism underneath.  
The challenge goes like this. You think that you have just won the New York Lottery. 
The odds are unfathomably low, and yet you believe that your numbers coincide with the 
winning numbers. How would you be justified in supposing that you have in fact won, 
merely on the basis of having entered the lottery?415 Street’s point is simply that the 
evaluative beliefs that we have and think are true, and the evaluative beliefs that causal forces 
led us to believe “coincide” – and this is puzzling.416 How did we happen-upon the shores of 
Bermuda (evaluative truth), steered by only the wind and currents (Darwinian forces)? 
Appealing to the unlikelihood of an event does not provide grounds to dismiss that the event 
occurred. Yet, often when faced with highly improbable coincidences, we respond with 
incredulity and rush to make sense of them (the event must represent the intervention of some 
higher-order force). In and of themselves, coincidences often have simple scientific 
explanations – lightning striking St. Peter’s Basilica in Vatican City on the very evening that 
Pope Benedict XVI decided to abdicate can be explained in terms of meteorology, despite 
that most people tended to believe otherwise. Though I couldn’t fully explore the concept 
 
415 Street writes, “…imagine someone who insists that she has won the lottery, but when we ask her how she 
knows, she merely repeats to us, in so many words, “Because I know I won!”.… to state the obvious: if the odds 
of your having won the lottery are very low, and you have no non-trivially-question-begging reason to think that 
you did, then you should conclude that you probably didn’t.” Ibid. 20-21 




here, in the face of coincidences there seems to be some kind of epistemic challenge raised. I 
will follow Hopster in naming this disposition which calls for an explanation, our epistemic 
anxiety.417 So, we can now say, Street seems to have generated an argument which creates an 
epistemic anxiety for the realist account of truth.  
The call for a coincidence is in the fact that without a causal connection between two 
events, their supposed connection seems to be mysterious and is thus deserving of an 
explanation as to the nature of the causal connection, or at least as to why we should be 
content with viewing the coincidence as an instance of luck. Hopster highlights that in 
Owens, a coincidence is defined as “an event which can be divided into components 
separately produced by independent causal factors.”418 He also cites Mogensen’s rendition of 
the phenomena which holds that a coincidence is “a conjunction of facts whose conjuncts are 
explanatorily independent of one another: neither fact figures in the explanation of the other, 
and there is no relevant explanatory factor shared by the members of the conjunction.”419 
Coincidences call for causal explanations, as they are about observed events which have 
causal structures. Hopster acknowledges that in some cases, coincidences are just that, mere 
coincidences. But in these cases, he suggests that further context may be provided to support 
the chanciness of the observed event, or otherwise that some causal explanation will become 
available and render the coincidence explained.420 Dworkin’s response to this challenge is 
that the coincidence is a “piece of luck”, but – as I mentioned earlier – Street finds this 
unsatisfactory.421 This means we can understand Dworkin’s contentedness and Street’s 
dissatisfaction in a new way: Dworkin accepts that the coincidence was an instance of luck. 
 
417 Jeroen Hopster, "Striking Coincidences: How Realists Should Reason About Them," Ratio Special Issue 
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421 Dworkin, "Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It." 125; Street, "Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better 
Rethink It." 310 
172 
 
Street, on the other hand, is calling for a causal explanation for the apparent concurrence, or 
otherwise that we deny that the coincidence actually occurred (as the epistemic anxiety need 
not be faced under Humean constructivism). 
The realist’s problem is that our conception of truth could have been otherwise, 
according to Street. When we consider cases of amoralists, whose constitution is identical to 
our own and yet choose to behave opposite ways, we seem to be committed to the view that 
we are right and they are wrong, purely on the basis of responding properly to properties. As 
I discussed in the previous section, Street finds this conclusion weak and argues that the 
Humean constructivists need not face the problems raised in such explanations. Realists, 
Street argues, are committed to unreasonably insisting that they won the New York Lottery 
just as there is a “winning” system of normative thought for reporting the right facts, which 
just so happens to be the one that we have. Street doesn’t think such a view can be reconciled 
with the fact that realists also suppose that there are countless possible systems of normative 
thought which are wrong. Street continues: 
Given the odds we can reasonably suppose to be in play in this “normative lottery” 
case, we should conclude that in all probability we didn’t win—that, if there is indeed 
such a thing as the robustly independent normative truth we are positing as a 
substantive normative premise, then we are probably among the unlucky ones who 
(just like the ideally coherent Caligula, grass-counter, hand-clasper, and so on) are 
hopeless at recognizing it. This conclusion is so obviously implausible, however, I 
suggest, that we should reject the substantive normative premise that generates it—
namely the supposition of robustly attitude-independent normative truths.422 
This leads Street to argue that: 
 
422 "Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Rethink It." 24 
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Normative realism has become a strange form of religion—a religion stripped clean of 
everything except the bare conviction that there are independent normative truths that 
one is capable of recognizing.423 
This coincidence challenge is not a debunking argument. Additionally, it is not a new 
argument. A similar challenge was instituted against mathematical Platonists – arguably the 
mathematical equivalent of the moral field theorists. Exploring the mathematical challenge 
provides an interesting case study for how the coincidence challenge only brings us back to 
the question of the primacy of value. 
 
5.4 Morons and Mathematics 
Benacerraf proposes that we should view the following sentences as sharing the same 
truth conditions: 
(1) There are at least three large cities older than New York.  
(2) There are at least three perfect numbers greater than 17.  
(3) There are at least three FG's that bear R to a.424 
He argues that “…the concept of mathematical truth, as explicated, must fit into an overall 
account of knowledge in a way that makes it intelligible how we have the mathematical 
knowledge that we have.”425 He adds that mathematical truths which do not fit into ‘an 
overall account of knowledge’, “are introduced as a convenience to make simpler and more 
elegant the theory of the things you really care about.”426 The model Benacerraf proposes for 
the grounding of truth in mathematics rests on a causal theory of knowledge, he writes: 
 
423 Ibid. 26 
424 Paul Benacerraf, "Mathematical Truth," The Journal of Philosophy 70, no. 19 (1973). 663 
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…for X to know that S is true requires some causal relation to obtain between X and 
the referents of the names, predicates, and quantifiers of S… For Hermione to know 
that the black object she is holding is a truffle is for her (or at least requires her) to be 
in a certain (perhaps psychological) state.… Further…the black object she is holding 
is a truffle must figure in a suitable way in a causal explanation of her belief that the 
black object she is holding is a truffle.427  
He later connects this to mathematics when he writes that: 
If our account of empirical knowledge is acceptable, it must be in part because it tries 
to make the connection evident in the case of our theoretical knowledge, where it is 
not prima facie clear how the causal account is to be filled in. Thus, when we come to 
mathematics, the absence of a coherent account of how our mathematical intuition is 
connected with the truth of mathematical propositions renders the overall account 
unsatisfactory.428 
Benacerraf sets the precedent that there must be some causal manner in which to “link up 
what it is for p to be true with my belief that p.”429 Since there is no clear way to form this 
account in the case of mathematics, it would seem that we are not justified in positing 
mathematical truths. Since epistemologists came to reject the causal theory of knowledge, as 
I explored in chapter three, when Benacerraf’s problem was revisited it was improved upon 
by Field who wrote that:  
Bencerraf formulated the problem in such a way that it depended on a causal theory of 
knowledge. The [following] formulation does not depend on any theory of knowledge 
in the sense in which the causal theory is a theory of knowledge: that is, it does not 
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depend on any assumption about necessary and sufficient conditions for 
knowledge.430 
Field’s improvement of the challenge is framed by Baron as a problem which: 
…focuses on mathematician’s mathematical beliefs. The mathematical propositions 
that mathematicians believe tend to be true. If Platonism is correct, however, then 
these propositions are about mathematical objects. So, the mathematical beliefs held 
by mathematicians…are reliably correlated with facts about such objects. The 
challenge facing the Platonist, then, is to provide an account of this reliable 
correlation.431 
Following Hopster’s account of coincidences, we can understand this argument as calling for 
a causal explanation. If the challenge is for realists about mathematical truths to explain how 
their beliefs are reliably correlated with objects which instantiate their truth, then the 
explanation called for is still causal in nature – a kind of field thesis for mathematics is 
presupposed. Clark-Doane and Klenk agree with this reading.432 Clark-Doane identifies the 
core of Field’s challenge to be such that, “it appears in principle impossible for us to explain 
the reliability of our mathematical beliefs.”433 Severini and Sterpetti propose that debunking 
does not guarantee scepticism as one solution is to adopt epistemic instrumentalism, the view 
that we “should refrain from claiming that scientific theories tell us truth about inaccessible 
reality [morons], and we should be content in regarding those theories as useful and powerful 
tools to cope with the world.”434 However, realists can do better than this mere epistemic 
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instrumentalism. The realist need not respond in the confines of this argument. Street’s 
epistemic anxiety seems to squeeze realists into believing that only two responses exist: 
a. Provide a causally satisfactory account of our relationship with truth instantiating 
facts. Or, 
b. Resist the challenge by appealing to the instrumental epistemic value of the facts 
in question. 
But realists can reject the moral field thesis in mathematics under domain-centred 
realism. Realists need not confine themselves to explanations (a) or (b). Following Scanlon, 
the explanation we ought to call for about say, the property of moral wrongness, is not causal. 
Instead, it is, “a matter of identifying the relevant reasons”435 as “normative statements are 
statements involving claims about the reasons that people have.”436 The question that this 
response opens up is what it means for a reason to count in favour of a certain belief. If we 
understand this as an explanation which gives “authority to reasons”, then one line of 
response, and one Scanlon attributes to the Kantians, is that “the authority of reasons can be 
grounded in an idea of rationality.”437 This would be a question of the source of normativity, 
and I will argue that it is on this point, that Street and the realists ultimately disagree. I return 
to this momentarily. There is one more argument at play here. Field adds that: 
…we would have had exactly the same mathematical… beliefs even if the 
mathematical… truths were different; because of this, it can only be a coincidence if 
our mathematical or logical beliefs are right, and this undermines those beliefs.438 
I believe that here I can return to the metaethical equivalent of this argument. Recall that 
Street’s central contention is that: 
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…as a conceptual matter, the independent normative truths could be anything…. 
[W]hat are the odds that our values will have hit, as a matter of sheer coincidence, on 
those things which are independently really worth pursuing? That the odds seem low 
is an understatement.439 
I formulated this claim as underlying (2) in Street’s Darwinian dilemma. Recall that: 
(1) Realists must provide a tracking account without presupposing the mind-
independent truth of certain ends of selection as values for creatures like us. Or, 
(2) Realists can deny that truth was tracked, but must provide a story as to how 
evaluative belief and truth happen to coincide now, for creatures like us, when: 
a. Independent truth could have been anything. 
b. The forces which led to our belief formation produced indifferent to mind-
independent truth (in contrast to empirical beliefs), so if evaluative belief 
and truth do coincide, how can realism be justified in the face of this 
strikingly convenient coincidence? 
Since (b) appeals to coincidence, and we can understand the epistemic challenge of 
coincidences as calling for a causal explanation of the phenomena in question, (b) seems to 
be reducible to (1) – or at least (b) would be a non-starter if realists could face (1) – and 
(following my response here) I add that realists need not confine themselves to such an 
explanation. Street’s coincidence challenge interprets moral claims about reasons for action 
as incompatible with a scientific view of the world if these claims entail or presuppose facts 
about the natural world which do not figure into our best explanation of what there is. Under 
domain-centred realism, one can see that a broader understanding of realism renders the 
coincidence challenge insignificant as our reasons for action do not presuppose or involve 
 




such claims. Without this coincidence challenge to lean on, Street’s argument leads us back 
to the question of the primacy of value. Before I face Street’s constructivism however, (2a) 
remains to be discussed. 
 
5.4 Putting the ‘Darwin’ back into the Darwinian Dilemma 
I showed that Field suggests this counterfactual line of argument (stated as 2a above). 
On one reading, it makes sense to propose that this gives us cause to consider the correlations 
of certain beliefs and the properties which instantiate their truth as miraculous. But following 
my arguments in the previous section, I don’t think the coincidence challenge is the most 
charitable reading. Instead, what is offered is a general sensitivity counterfactual – one which 
can be traced back to Darwin’s own comments on morality; one which, importantly, evokes 
no causal premise at all. Street seems to partly acknowledge this, she writes, “I have focused 
on the case of Darwinian influences on our evaluative judgments because I think it raises the 
problem for realism in a particularly acute form. In principle, however, an analogous 
dilemma could be constructed using any kind of causal influence on the content of our 
evaluative judgments.… At the end of the day, then, the dilemma at hand is not distinctly 
Darwinian.” However, I want to argue that the dilemma is not distinctly genealogical either 
(in that it need not evoke a causal premise or presuppose any etiological account). If there is 
an argument to be salvaged, it is not an EDA – it is an argument mounted internal to the 
moral domain using rebutting facts (as opposed to undermining facts).440 The Darwinian 
Dilemma, I will conclude, only continues to lead us back to cases for Humean 
constructivism. What is Darwinian about the Darwinian dilemma then, I will show, is not that 
there exists a Darwinian Hypothesis which undermines moral realism, but that an argument 
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for moral scepticism – arising from the attempt to integrate evolutionary science and 
metaethics – can be traced back to Darwin. 
The challenge is stated as follows: 
It may be well first to premise that I do not wish to maintain that any strictly social 
animal, if its intellectual faculties were to become as active and as highly developed 
as in man, would acquire exactly the same moral sense as ours. In the same manner as 
various animals have some sense of beauty, though they admire widely different 
objects, so they might have a sense of right and wrong, though led by it to follow 
widely different lines of conduct. If, for instance, to take an extreme case, men were 
reared under precisely the same conditions as hive-bees, there can hardly be a doubt 
that our unmarried females would, like the worker-bees, think it a sacred duty to kill 
their brothers, and mothers would strive to kill their fertile daughters; and no one 
would think of interfering.441 
Darwin’s observation is primarily about relativity. The idea is that our moral beliefs are 
sensitive to our evolutionary genealogy and thus seem to be contingent upon that genealogy. 
If our moral beliefs are contingent upon our evolutionary past, then they are to some extent 
fixed by or grounded in natural facts. But there are two ways to read this. As we will see, the 
first is through an anti-realist lens. Street’s standpoint constructivism is perfectly suited to 
explaining how, from the standpoint of creatures like us, we have beliefs X, Y and Z, and that 
those beliefs are constitutive of our standpoint towards them. That is, those beliefs are true 
mind-dependently. However, Darwin’s observation is still consistent with realism. Unless 
one is willing to argue that relativism extends to our cultures, traditions or even our personal 
psychology, there is a strong realist tradition of grounding moral truth in natural facts about a 
species to which those moral truths refer. Phillipa Foot’s Species Being principle, for 
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example, is one such case from the neo-Aristotelian camp. Foot writes, “the evaluation of 
human action depends… on essential features of specifically human life.”442 Moral claims are 
just further facts about an organism, as much as our hands and feet and teeth, and the 
evaluation of a claim as right for an organism is dependent upon – but true independently of 
– the organism in question. The naturalist reading means a claim can be dependent on minds 
(as objects to refer to) but still true mind-independently (as it is true regardless of the 
organism’s perspective towards it).  
Extending from this relativist reading is also a potential sensitivity argument, however 
I believe it leads us to the same fulcrum. Recall the sensitivity epistemic condition which 
holds that “S’s belief that p is sensitive if and only if, if p were false, S would not believe 
that p.”443 The premises which give rise to the conclusion that p would, on a standard account 
of justification, necessitate that p from their content. But if those premises did not necessitate 
that p, and yet one held that p, it would seem that one is not justified in believing that p. 
Recall Schafer’s rendition of this argument, whereby this manoeuvre is given an evolutionary 
twist: 
1. We should believe that their development was unlikely to be sensitive to whether or 
not they were reliable. 
2. If we believe that the process by which some faculty developed was unlikely to be 
sensitive to whether or not this faculty was reliable, and we do not have any evidence 
independent of the faculty that it is reliable, then we should not trust the faculty. 
3. We do not have any evidence independent of our normative faculties that they are 
reliable. 
4. Therefore, we should not trust them.444 
 
442 Phillipa Foot, Natural Goodness (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). 14 
443 Ichikawa and Steup, "The Analysis of Knowledge." §5.1 
444 Schafer, "Evolution and Normative Scepticism." 480 
181 
 
In this argument, reliability (as a kind of epistemic externalism) takes the place of truth – and 
the claim is that the faculty responsible for producing moral beliefs was not reliable (non-
truth-tracking). Since moral beliefs emerge from faculties which arose from non-truth-
tracking developmental processes, the truth of those beliefs seems to be fixed by the manner 
in which they were derived. If the truth, could have been otherwise, had the developmental 
process been different, then our conception of truth is surely constitutive of our own stance 
towards them. Put this way, this is clearly a claim about stance-dependence. Cobbe also 
extracted this view, he writes: 
Mr. Darwin will leave us only the sad assurance that our idea of Justice is all our own, 
and may mean nothing to any other intelligent being in the universe…We have now 
neither Veil nor Revelation, but only an earth-born instinct, carrying with it no 
authority whatever beyond the limits of our race and special social state, nor within 
them further than we choose to permit it to weigh on our minds.445 
This is a claim that I believe Street arrives at, and this leads her to form the case against the 
realist: 
I am by no means requiring that we explain – from a standpoint that makes no 
assumptions whatsoever about our manifest surroundings – why we are not hopeless 
at recognizing objects in our manifest surroundings, and no more so am I requiring 
that we explain – from a standpoint that makes no normative assumptions whatsoever 
– why we are not hopeless at recognising our reasons. Again, the question is not 
whether we have normative reasons; it’s whether those normative reasons are robustly 
independent of our attitudes, as I’m claiming that they can’t be.446 
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The appeal to epistemic insensitivity in these arguments secures the conclusion that the 
Darwinian consideration only seems to secure – namely that our beliefs in stance-independent 
moral truths are not justified. The anti-realist argument is thus made without the need to 
suppose that the Darwinian Hypothesis is doing any argumentative work. This is made 
clearer by contrasting the conclusions of Schafer, who writes that: 
…if we want to apply a test to our normative faculties that corresponds to the test 
involved in an evolutionary vindication of our perceptual ones, we need to test 
whether the normative ones pass the corresponding sort of reflective endorsement 
test—that is, we need to test whether our best explanation of these faculties when 
combined with our best normative theory vindicates our reliance on them.447 
Yet, Street’s Humean constructivism is stated as: 
…the fact that X is a reason for agent A to Y is constituted by the fact that the 
judgement that X is a reason (for A) to Y withstands scrutiny from the standpoint of 
A’s other judgements about reasons.448 
For Street, the test of reflective endorsement is the source of normative reason, and it is what 
we choose to endorse that is constituted by our agency – by which Street would mean, “our 
own, contingently held values in combination with the non-normative facts.”449 Anti-realism 
permits that independent truth could have been anything, because under Humean 
constructivism, “no matter what one’s starting set of normative judgements, constructivism 
follows from within the standpoint constituted by those judgements.”450 So, Darwin’s 
consideration that, had we been reared under the same conditions as bees then, “…unmarried 
females would, like the worker-bees, think it a sacred duty to kill their brothers…” can be 
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read as a metaethical claim about stance-dependence. Darwin and Street are pressing a 
similar line of argument: what counts as a normative reason is entailed by the point of view 
of the moral agent. This is an argument internal to the moral domain about the embracing of 
the anti-realist horn of the Euthyphro dilemma, which Street states elsewhere as the question 
of whether the normative status of facts is “ultimately “conferred” upon these facts by our 
own evaluative attitudes, or do at least some facts possess normative reason giving-status in a 
way that is robustly independent of our attitudes?”451 Street and Darwin are acknowledging 
that normative commitments vary based on their constitutive relationship with the agent in 
question. Street is making the further claim that the truth of those commitments for an agent 
follow from the starting set of normative commitments – which again, could have been 
anything. So, since “the constructivist can see her way to constructivism no matter what the 
starting set of normative judgements she accepts or might have accepted, she needn’t view 
herself as merely “lucky” in having reached this conclusion.”452 Whereas the realist seems to 
remain committed to the view that they are in a “mysteriously privileged” epistemic position. 
The Humean constructivists, Street concludes, can find harmony in the face of the Darwinian 
consideration. 
 But, as I argued earlier, Street overlooks the naturalist line of response:  
Now if Mr. Darwin had simply said that under totally different conditions of life 
many of the existing human duties would have been altered, we could have no 
possible fault to find with his remarks. In a world where nobody needed food there 
could be no duty of feeding the hungry; in a world of immortals there could be no 
such crime as murder. Every alteration in circumstance produces a certain variation in 
moral obligation, for the plain reason (as above stated) that Morals only supply 
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abstract principles, and, according to the circumstances of each case, their application 
must necessarily vary. If the triangular field have a rood cut off it, or a rood added on, 
it will no longer be the half of the rectangle beside it.453 
This kind of naturalist constructivism is dependent on facts but not on our stance towards 
those facts – I return to this in chapter six. Further, a non-naturalist account of constructivism 
is also a live option, as I have been arguing throughout this dissertation. I return to this debate 
in the next chapter. 
Conclusion 
I began with the formulation of Street’s Darwinian dilemma, which was as follows: 
(1) Realists must provide a tracking account without presupposing the mind-
independent truth of certain ends of selection as values for creatures like us. Or, 
(2) Realists can deny that truth was tracked, but must provide a story as to how 
evaluative belief and truth happen to coincide now, for creatures like us, when: 
a. Independent truth could have been anything. 
b. The forces which led to our belief formation produced indifferent to mind-
independent truth (in contrast to empirical beliefs), so if evaluative belief 
and truth do coincide, how can realism be justified in the face of this 
strikingly convenient coincidence? 
I have shown in Chapter 4 that (1) is a consideration that debunkers must face head on, as the 
Darwinian hypothesis, if true, may still vindicate rather than debunk mind-independent truth. 
I began by exploring what Street refers to as her devastating epistemological objection, and I 
argued that she means to refer to her Darwinian Dilemma. Upon a closer analysis of the 
dilemma, I argued that Street proposes (1) in the case of realist’s cherry-picking evaluative 
facts to suit their varieties of realism. Instances of cherry-picking value claims support 
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Street’s constructivist claim that our evaluative beliefs are constituted by our evaluative 
stance towards those facts, however this observation does not guarantee anti-realism. It is still 
an open question as to whether a satisfactory naturalist account can be provided that can 
better account for our evolutionary relationship with stance-independent moral facts – and in 
chapter four I explored the literature which provides a promising line of response. There is 
also room for a non-naturalist line of response, however, Street’s second horn (2a and 2b) 
attempts to guard against such a response. This is because Street devastating epistemological 
objection rests on the coincidence challenge, which calls for a naturalist explanation of our 
relationship with moral facts. This kind of argument is not a new or distinctly evolutionary 
consideration in metaethics or in debates on mathematical realism. I argued that this 
argument ultimately equates realism with a causal understanding of our relationship with 
moral facts.  
 I argued that any residual challenge lies in how realists and anti-realists interpret this 
species-level relativism which is described in the quoted passage from Darwin about our 
moral nature. Had we evolved under different circumstances our evaluative beliefs would 
have been entirely different. Anti-realists seem to rely on reading this as the claim that our 
evaluative beliefs would be different because they are fixed by our evaluative stances. I 
argued that this reading ultimately adopts a position on the stance-dependence of value. It is 
here where Street imports her version of Humean constructivism. In the next chapter, I argue 









CHAPTER SIX – DECONSTRUCTING CONSTRUCTIVISM 
In the previous chapter, I traced the steps of the final constituent challenge in my 
analysis of the underlying metaethical assumptions in debunking literature. I argued that 
Street’s epistemological challenge was reducible to a claim about the stance-dependence of 
value, rather than a distinct evolutionary metaethical challenge. I now turn to how Street’s 
epistemological challenge gains its appearance of force. At least in debunking literature, no 
doubt due to the influence of her Darwinian Dilemma, Street’s construal is the dominant 
current characterisation of the constructivist viewpoint. The next step in the evolution of how 
we understand constructivism lies in expanding the scope of Street’s construal of it. A 
limitation of Street’s construal is that two strands of constructivism, which, following 
Southwood, I label the local normative and local constitutive varieties, are run together. I will 
argue that Street’s Darwinian Dilemma profits from this conflation. Without this assumption, 
the EDA cannot run. This reinforces the significance of the otiosity argument. 
 
6.1 The Evolution of Constructivism as Anti-realism 
 A precise scope and understanding of constructivism which is fair to its many 
subvarieties is so far unavailable.454 Some construe constructivism as a metaethical position 
somewhere between nihilism and realism;455 some, as a cognitivist and objectivist framework 
which could well be called realism;456 some have tried to remain neutral on the matter;457 but 
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most prominently, thanks to the work of Street, it is now more commonly understood as a 
variety of anti-realism.458 What complicates the task of defining constructivism further is that 
the varieties of constructivism are differentiated by background commitments to 
metaphysical, epistemological and psychological facts. Expressivism, naturalism, 
cognitivism, and situationism are examples of metaethical commitments which bear upon 
one’s conception of constructivism, yet ought to be external to any attempt to define it.459 The 
first challenge, then, is to avoid being led astray by supplementary metaethical questions, 
which only prima facie seems to be related to the task at hand. Significant improvements in 
how constructivism has been understood over time has involved casting off these other 
metaethical questions, allowing a more refined focus on reasons.460 Ultimately, construing 
constructivism as a kind of anti-realism seems to require that we import metaethical 
assumptions outside of constructivism. I will show this through an exploration of Korsgaard 
and Street’s work. Then I will argue that this problem haunts Street’s conception of 
constructivism, and it is by these means that Street’s EDA gains its apparent force.  
 
6.2 Korsgaard’s Proceduralism 
We can see evidence of this manner of refinement in the history of constructivism in 
metaethics. Korsgaard differentiated between procedural realism and substantive realism. The 
procedural realist holds that “there are answers to moral questions because there are correct 
procedures for arriving at them.”461 But the substantive realist, she argues, “thinks that there 
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are correct procedures for answering moral questions because there are moral truths or facts 
that exist independently of those procedures, and which those procedures track.”462 The 
distinction sought to offer a contrasting view to her neo-Kantian position, whereby 
substantive realism captured the non-reductive variety of realism which she was opposed to. 
But substantive realism, which is committed to procedure-, mind-, or stance-independent 
facts, as we have come to call them, seems completely compatible with Korsgaard’s claim 
that procedural realism holds that “there are answers to moral questions…that there are right 
and wrong ways to answer them.”463  
Hussain and Shah argue that Korsgaard intends to argue that procedural realism does 
not require a commitment to substantive realism.464 But if the answers to normative questions 
are simply “the results of some constructive procedure”465 then a host of realist accounts are 
constructivist under Korsgaard’s view. Korsgaard fails to provide a meaningful distinction 
between non-reductive realism and her Kantian objectivism. Perhaps, Hussain and Shah 
suppose, Korsgaard intends to argue that the output of those procedures are moral facts 
themselves. Constructivism is then, in a sense, synonymous with creation – whereby moral 
truth is the product of certain procedures. But an important question is only left to be carried 
further downstream, for she requires an explanation as to which procedures and conditions 
produce moral facts. Rawls’ characterisation of constructivism, for example, holds that 
“…truths about social justice are explained in terms of what is rationally required of anyone 
who accepts certain liberal democratic substantive norms.”466 The ‘original position’ is thus a 
procedure of reasoning from the premise that one accepts liberal democracy as a valid 
starting point. In Rawls’ account, reasonableness as a normative concept is left to be 
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explained.467 Even in non-normative terms, the constructivist is ultimately committed to the 
normative judgement that there are correct procedures for arriving at truth.468 But what 
standards denote correctness? Korsgaard’s later work emphasises responding to this 
challenge by grounding correctness in the result of one’s practical reasoning, namely, by 
means of the categorical imperative. 
Korsgaard’s Kantian account is that rational agents are constitutively bound by the 
moral law.469 Since we humans are capable of self-reflection – the act of considering one’s 
“thoughts and desires from a detached perspective”470 – we are capable of self-governance. 
By endorsing universal standards, standards to which any rational agent could subscribe, self-
legislation becomes a mode of fixing the moral law insofar as the moral law is self-legislated 
by the agent. For Korsgaard, normative reasons arise from the capacity for practical reason. 
Our senses of self, which she calls our practical identities, are many and varied. It is from 
these identities – our identities as students, mothers, utilitarians and so on – that we derive 
our normative reasons. She writes that these identities are, “a description under which you 
value yourself, a description under which you find your life to be worth living and your 
actions to be worth undertaking.”471 Without such identities, we have no sense of agency and 
thus are without “any reason to live and act at all.”472 Human beings are creatures who must 
assert themselves by adopting these practical identities and asserting themselves through the 
reasons obtained by reflecting upon these identities. Ultimately, and importantly as a stepping 
stone for Street’s case, there is one practical identity which we must fundamentally value in 
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order to value any other identity which we hope to adopt, and that is our practical identity as 
human beings. What justifies the claims that morality makes upon us, then, are our own 
commitments to our practical identities which we consciously adopt when we choose to act. 
Korsgaard argues that we possess self-consciousness in that we can have a conception 
of ourselves and are thus capable of reflecting upon ourselves from a deliberative 
standpoint.473 Reason, for Korsgaard, refers both to the active capacity of the mind to carry 
out this activity of deliberation, and those principles which are “constitutive of reflective 
mental activity itself.”474 When we are acting, we are conscious of being guided by principles 
of reason, so, when we make choices we are advancing reasons for action.475 Since we are “a 
reflective being who needs reasons to act and live”476, when we act and advance reasons we 
are also adopting particular practical identities which are constitutive of those reasons. So,  
1. Practical identities give rise to reasons for action. 
2. You only have practical identities if you fundamentally value yourself. 
3. So, you only possess reasons for action if you fundamentally value yourself. 
Just as “[t]rue lovers learn how to be made for each other…. agents transform contingent 
values into necessary ones by valuing the humanity that is their source.”477 Korsgaard seems 
to hint that we must embrace the contingency of our values when she writes that we “take 
things to be important because they are important to us.”478 If our values are contingent upon 
our biological, psychological and historical setting, then Korsgaard would seem to align with 
a kind of subjectivism. But Korsgaard’s Kantian story seems to offer an opposing objectivist 
account. Hussain and Shah argue that Korsgaard ultimately fails to provide a clear semantic 
and metaphysical response to the issue of how morality fits into practical reason, and that the 
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issue is blurred by her ‘normative question.’479 O’Neill argues that constructivist views such 
as Korsgaard’s become ‘avowedly circular’ upon examination, and this critique has since 
gained footing in metaethical debate, being presented by a number of authors since.480 
Essentially, the critique runs that constructivism grounds practical reasons in arbitrary 
standards of correctness or otherwise collapses into moral realism. The question is, which of 
Korsgaard’s commitments make her Kantian account anti-realist? If it were to come down to 
the fact that one must value oneself in order to have practical reasons, then her anti-realist 
constructivism seems reducible to a claim about the mind-dependence of the practical reasons 
that emerge from this self-valuing.  
 
6.3 Street’s Standpoint Characterisation 
 Street argues that such a critique can be avoided if one abandons the proceduralist 
characterisation of constructivism and instead adopts a thoroughgoing characterisation. 
According to this view, “the truth of a normative claim consists in that claim’s being entailed 
from within the practical point of view, where the practical point of view is given a formal 
characterisation.”481 Street seeks to avoid “tak[ing] the truth of any given substantive 
normative claim for granted…” and instead explain how standards of correctness arise from 
the attitude of the valuer.482 Street makes the further distinction between Humean and 
Kantian thoroughgoing accounts. Where the Kantian derives moral values from the 
formalised understanding of what is entailed by a particular agent’s standpoint – a view 
which Street attributes to Korsgaard – the Humean takes moral value to be that which “…one 
finds oneself alive as an agent – such that one come [sic] alive with an entirely different set of 
 
479 Hussain and Shah, "Misunderstanding Metaethics: Korsgaard's Rejection of Realism." 271 
480 Onora O'Neill, Constructions of Reasons (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 29. Shafer-
Landau, Moral Realism: A Defence. Caroline Arruda, "Constitutivism and the Self-Reflection Requirement," 
Philosophia 44, no. 4 (2016); Carla Bagnoli, "Constructivism and the Moral Problem," ibid.  




evaluative attitudes, or were mere causes to bring about a radical shift in those attitudes, 
one’s reasons would have been, or would become, entirely different.”483 Street’s own view as 
a constructivist is at once a challenge to realism and an attempt to capture what is 
metaethically distinct about metaethical constructivism. Reasons, for the thoroughgoing 
Humean constructivists (let us shorten this to the standpoint view), are dependent and 
contingent upon evaluative starting points. Street’s critique of realism is that the ‘rabbit of 
substantive reasons’ is being pulled from a hat, and that her version of constructivism avoids 
the epistemic anxiety with which realism is supposedly saddled.  
 We have seen how her Darwinian Dilemma leads us to an argument of this nature, 
and in Chapter Five I argued that this challenge is set independently of any evolutionary 
premises.484 To recall, Street’s coincidence challenge is that,  
Given the odds we can reasonably suppose to be in play in this “normative lottery” 
case, we should conclude that in all probability we didn’t win—that, if there is indeed 
such a thing as the robustly independent normative truth we are positing as a 
substantive normative premise, then we are probably among the unlucky ones who … 
are hopeless at recognizing it. This conclusion is so obviously implausible, however, I 
suggest, that we should reject the substantive normative premise that generates it—
namely the supposition of robustly attitude-independent normative truths.485 
Since “the constructivist can see her way to constructivism no matter what the starting set of 
normative judgements she accepts or might have accepted, she needn’t view herself as merely 
“lucky” in having reached this conclusion.”486 The realist, on the other hand, finds themselves 
in a “mysteriously privileged” epistemic position. However, it would seem that Street’s 
 
483 Ibid. 370 
484 This argument, I argued, is identical in nature to epistemological objections in her reply to Copp, her reply to 
the Quasi-Realists, and her reply to Dworkin. See §5.2-3. 
485 Street, "Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Rethink It." 24 
486 Ibid. 42 
193 
 
standpoint characterisation seems to both create a challenge for realism and solve it at once. 
Street’s objection to realism rests on a shared incredulity towards the mysteriously privileged 
position of the realist, but such an objection dissolves if realism is not be understood as 
having won the normative lottery. I will develop this possibility in what follows. But first, it 
is worth enquiring further into Street’s own constructivism. The putative improvement upon 
constructivism since Korsgaard rests in Street’s notion of entailment, the notion that rules 
follow from what is “constitutively involved in the attitude of valuing, or normative 
judgment, as such.”487 Take the following case.  
[S]uppose that someone says, ‘I have all-things-considered reason to get to Rome 
immediately, and to do so it is necessary that I buy a plane ticket, and I have no 
reason to buy a plane ticket.’ … Our diagnosis of such a case is not that the person is 
making a false judgment about his reasons, but rather that he doesn’t genuinely judge 
himself to have all-things-considered reason to get to Rome (or else doesn’t genuinely 
judge himself to have no reason to buy a plane ticket) at all.488 
We can interpret the case as containing all but the correspondent attitude which would entail 
action. This is also demonstrated in Street’s example of the ideally coherent Caligula. 
Caligula values, above all else, torturing innocents for pleasure. The Kantian, argues Street, 
believes that it follows from the formal characterisation of the agent’s standpoint that 
Caligula is in error. It is just incoherent that Caligula could value such a thing, and that 
continuing to value in this way would not generate a practical reason since it follows from 
Caligula’s evaluative standpoint that such a value is unacceptable. The Humean, representing 
Street’s own position, believes that Caligula is not in error and can coherently hold such a 
value, provided that Caligula “is aware of all the non-normative facts and has recognized 
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every normative conclusion that follows from his own values in combination with those 
facts…”489 The realist supposedly believes that in such a case, even if Caligula was fully 
aware of all non-normative facts and coherently recognizes those normative conclusions 
which follow, he is still in error because there exists “a fact of the matter about how there is 
reason to live … one that holds interpedently of what is entailed from within his practical 
point of view in combination with the non-normative facts.”490 Realism is thus construed as 
the view that posits that it is Caligula’s evaluative starting points which are false and that 
Caligula is failing to recognise these true starting points. This is not a fair characterisation, as 
Street has overlooked versions of realism that start not with a set of attitudes, but with 
commitments and relationships with others – features of our moral reality which are seen as 
more significant than value stances. What follows from these starting points can be correctly 
or incorrectly adduced, and the standards evoked in such an analysis are either dependent or 
independent of the standpoint of the valuer. Locating realism in the view that Caligula is 
unaware of or mistaken about some evaluative truth, despite being fully informed about all 
relevant facts, does not fairly demarcate realism about stance-independent standards of 
correctness and the constitutivism of Street’s standpoint characterisation. Instead, it runs 
them together as anti-realist.  
Constructivism in metaethics has been defined into opposition with realism, yet this 
characterisation hinges on the assumption that what functions as an evaluative starting point 
are our evaluative attitudes – attitudes which are contingent and dependent upon causal 
factors outside of any critical reflective process. It is here that the EDA becomes an ally to 
Street’s constructivism, but only because the assumption is set that what is constructed is 
what is entailed from an evaluative attitude. This means that anti-realism (as 
 




stance/attitude/mind-dependence) is established from the very beginning. This means that, 
firstly, evolutionary considerations guarantee anti-realist conclusions under Street’s construal. 
Street’s argument is supported by the Darwinian Hypothesis because it supports her view that 
starting points of critical moral reflection are all given to us as pure evaluative attitudes: prior 
to, and independent of, the operation of our critical, reflective capacities. Our capacities need 
something to work on which is immune from criticism; we cannot be critical all the way 
down. This makes her view a form of Humean foundationalism; and the Darwinian 
Hypothesis supplies one explanation for such foundationalism – but only one; the real work 
here is done by the foundationalist assumption. The Darwinian Hypothesis plays no 
undermining role. Instead, it plays a part in explaining the contingency of our evaluative 
attitudes which the realist can grant are partly constitutive of our moral deliberation. 
Secondly, and it is to this issue that I now turn, it signifies that the challenge of demarcating 
constructivism from other metaethical positions remains unfinished. 
 
6.4 Expanding the Scope of Constructivism 
 Southwood distinguishes between local normative and local constitutive varieties of 
constructivism. Scanlon’s account falls under the former and Street’s the latter. Standpoint 
constructivism is mistaken as it runs these varieties of constructivism together.  
Scanlon’s account grounds rightness and wrongness in the mutual recognition 
(between rational agents) of the justifiability of a certain act or judgement.491 Southwood 
characterises such a view as local normative, whereby “certain standards of correct reasoning 
normatively explain or ground certain truths about reasons…”492 The normative element of 
this follows from the manner in which standards of correctness are derived from other truths 
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about relevant reasons. Recall the ‘domain realism’ I introduced earlier. Scanlon writes that, 
"[n]ormative truths do not require strange metaphysical truth-makers. Such truths are 
determined by the standards of the normative domain itself."493 What is required to justify a 
certain claim, and what follows from that claim varies in virtue of what is under examination 
– mountains, numbers or reasons, Scanlon says – as each form parts of independent domains 
of inquiry. Southwood characterises this as an important element of the local normative 
characterisation, he writes, “…the explanation must appeal to truths about the same kinds of 
reasons as those that it purports to explain.”494 For example, earlier I argued that Harman’s 
Hooligan case calls for an unfair explanatory requirement on moral realists, as it – under the 
guise of an epistemic standard – ultimately calls for a scientific explanation of the realist 
relationship with moral facts. Scanlon responds that we are committed to the existence of 
natural kinds iff they play a role in explaining some feature of the natural world, of which 
moral properties need not be a part. He develops this account by recourse to the domain of 
mathematics.  
We have reason to quantify over numbers if quantifying over numbers is a good way 
to formulate this theory. We also have reason to introduce terms denoting new kinds 
of numbers (such as imaginary and complex numbers) just in case these are useful in 
providing a more coherent and satisfying account of the relevant parts of 
mathematics.495 
Crucially, what counts for relevant reasons in a justification depends on how a certain entity 
or concept fits into a domain. It is from within the domain that standards of correctness are 
derived from what can be reasonably accepted.496 Though there are further metaethical 
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questions to be explored in Scanlon’s account, this suffices to demonstrate that Scanlon’s 
account grounds truths about reasons in standards of correctness – the mutual recognition 
(between rational agents) of the justifiability of a certain act or judgement. 
Local constitutive constructivism, on the other hand, “holds that certain standards of 
correct reasoning constitutively explain certain truths about reasons…”497 Under such a view, 
truths about relevant reasons cannot form part of one’s justification of the entity or concept 
under examination. Recall that in Street’s epistemological objection to realism, she argues 
that rational reflection cannot correct the off-track influence of causal forces on our moral 
beliefs, because this would merely be “a process of assessing evaluative judgements that are 
mostly off the mark in terms of others that are mostly off the mark.”498 She continues: 
In rational reflection, one does not stand completely apart from one’s starting fund of 
evaluative judgements: rather, one uses them, reasons in terms of them, holds some of 
them up for examination in light of others… Thus, if the fund of evaluative 
judgements with which human reflection began was thoroughly contaminated with 
illegitimate influence… then the tools of rational reflection were equally 
contaminated, for the latter are always just a subset of the former. … reflection of this 
kind isn’t going to get one any closer to evaluative truth, any more than sorting 
through contaminated materials with contaminated tools is going to get one closer to 
purity.499 
Following my analysis of Street’s constructivism, we can see that Street is detailing 
her Humean thoroughgoing version of constructivism.500 It is this view which entices the 
solution that we adopt a theory of moral truth which is stance-dependent. However, with 
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Scanlon’s account of standards of correctness in mind, we can view this characterisation of 
realism by Street with new eyes: 
The realist understands the evaluative truths to be prior, in the sense that evolutionary 
causes are understood to have selected us to track those independent truths. The 
antirealist, on the other hand, understands the evolutionary causes to be prior, in the 
sense that these causes (along with many others) gave us our starting fund of 
evaluative attitudes, and evaluative truth is understood to be a function of those 
attitudes.501  
Street seems to be referring to a robust account of realism here, whereby moral truth 
functions like the truth-makers of moral claims, as opposed to Scanlon’s account of moral 
truth where truths are determined by standards internal to the moral domain. Street is 
mistaken in running local normative and local constitutive varieties of constructivism 
together as it means that first of all, some versions of realism are not properly contained 
within the scope of her EDA and thus that her EDA ultimately fails as a comprehensive 
critique of moral realism. Secondly, it reveals that what makes Street’s Darwinian Dilemma a 
forceful objection to traditional varieties of moral realism is the very characterisation of 
realism, as local normative varieties of constructivism remain unaddressed.  
Furthermore, Street’s characterisation reduces constructivism to constitutivism. 
Though such a characterisation includes the important work of Street and Korsgaard, it, by 
definition, rejects the view that the theories of Rawls and Scanlon, for example, are versions 
of constructivism. This is an unsatisfactory result. What is missing from the standpoint 
characterisation, Southwood shows, is a proper recognition of the primacy of reasoning that 
all constructivists share in explanations of truths about reasons.502 Southwood suggests that 
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expanding the scope of constructivism means understanding correct reasoning as the 
foremost question in constructivist enquiry. Truths about reasons, he writes, “are then 
explained in terms of correct reasoning, that is, reasoning that satisfies certain standards of 
correctness that are prior to and independent of reasons of the kind that are being 
explained.”503 Street actually hints at such an account when she writes that, “…one way to 
present … constructivism is as claiming that normative facts are constituted by facts about 
what is entailed by the ‘rules of … reason’ in combination with the non-normative facts. The 
trick, of course, is to give a plausible account of the ‘rules of … reason.”504 Such a suggestion 
does not commit one to constitutivism and instead emphasises the primacy of adducing 
standards of correct reasoning. 
Street’s work represents an innovation in the EDA which sought to recognise this 
feature of our moral deliberation, but I have shown here why we should be sceptical of this 
attempt. What we learn from this investigation of Street is that it is not just our critical 
reflective capacity that must be acknowledged and further discussed, but our standards for its 
correct exercise as well. This just is the task of the correct reasoning characterisation, and 
thus the debate between realists and anti-realists remains unsettled. 
 
6.5 A Positive Account of Our Relationship with Reasons 
A concern that I have pressed at various points throughout this thesis is that what is missing 
from debunking literature is a proper recognition of our critical reflective capacity. By 
proposing a positive account of our relationship with reasons I only mean to defend the prima 
facie plausibility of a constructivist realism – where moral truths are constructed through the 
enhancement of our reason-responsive natures in such a way that they are profoundly 
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independent of our evaluative stance. The correct reasoning characterisation offers a new 
schema for constructivism which can be filled in a variety of ways. Further, Southwood’s 
expanded analysis demonstrates that the constructivist territory to which Street stakes a claim 
still has space for realist accounts. Take the following principle from Scanlon. 
…an act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be disallowed by 
any set of principles for the general regulation of behaviour that no one could 
reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement.505  
Southwood’s account frames the task of constructivism as a matter of adducing the standards 
of correctness, which in Scanlon’s work mirrors the task of adducing the grounds one would 
have for the reasonable rejection of a certain principle. These are standards of correctness that 
are, “prior to and independent of reasons of the kind that are being explained.”506 Scanlon’s 
Reasons Fundamentalism is an attempt to adduce the standards of correctness, as he writes 
that for questions of right and wrong, “…it is enough to show that we have good grounds for 
taking certain conclusions that actions are right or wrong to be correct…”507 and that 
“…judgements of right and wrong [are] claims about reasons – more specifically about the 
adequacy of reasons for accepting or rejecting principles under certain conditions.”508 So, 
realism defined in opposition to constructivism is mistaken, if Southwood’s correct reasoning 
characterisation of constructivism is fair. Furthermore, understanding realism as purporting to 
advance a metaphysical stance is similarly unjustified if the standards of correctness can be 
understood in the way that Scanlon proposes.509 That there are answers to moral questions 
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and that these answers can be right or wrong based on reasons that we discover through moral 
inquiry, seems to be compatible with Street’s call for a “strong form of ethical objectivity… 
without positing anything metaphysically or epistemologically mysterious.”510  
 Scanlon writes that, “…we bring to moral argument a conception of generic points of 
view and the reasons associated with them which reflects our general experience of life, and 
that this conception is subject to modification under the pressures of moral thought and 
argument. Some of the most common forms of moral bias involve failing to think of various 
points of view which we have not occupied, underestimating the reasons associated with 
them, and overestimating the costs to us of accepting principles that recognise the force of 
those reasons.”511 He goes on to say that an important role of moral theory is to find a way to 
correct these biases. Moreover, we use our critical reflective capacity, not merely to answer 
problems inherent in evaluative stances we already find ourselves to have adopted, but to 
draw upon our expanding experiences and interactions with others so that we are capable of 
radically reshaping our moral considerations.  
What we learn from this debate is that biases and evolutionary affectations play a role 
in our moral deliberation. The metaethical question turns towards whether the correct 
standards for adducing truths about moral reasons are appropriately stance-independent in 
such a way that one can engage in moral deliberation independently of those biases and 
evolutionary affectations – that is, do we, or could we, escape the forces of our inherited 
predispositions? I think, tentatively, that we can. I am swayed by the arguments of Sterelny, 
who cites our capability of changing our actions based on periods of slow deliberation, such 
as in the case of our eating habits. We might become a vegetarian or come to place emphasis 
on the sourcing and conditions in which our food is grown following a consideration of the 
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longevity of the planet or the cruelty of certain farming methods.512 Such shifts in attitudes 
are not just seen in perspectives towards animals, there have been radical generational shifts 
in our attitudes towards raising children, the roles of women in the world and our moral 
obligations towards the environment. We can learn from the adoption of the standpoint of 
others, including other non-human creatures, that our currently extant evaluative tendencies 
are fundamentally amiss.  
Paul Taylor argues for one such principle which demonstrates this in environmental 
ethics. Consider, he writes, that “[t]he natural world is not there simply as an object to be 
exploited by us, nor are its living creatures to be regarded as nothing more than resources for 
our use and consumption. On the contrary… [t]he living things of the natural world have a 
worth that they possess simply in virtue of their being members of the Earth's Community of 
Life.”513 Were we to truly adopt Taylor’s principle of species impartiality and to respect, 
among other tenets, the fact that “…all organisms are teleological centres of life in the sense 
that each is a unique individual pursuing its own good in its own way”514 then we would have 
adopted a respect for nature which seems to radically contradict our evolved natures.515 
Expanding the Circle of our moral considerations to include the interests of non-human 
creatures and the ecosystems that support them, plays out our ability to exceed our biases and 
evolved tendencies through learning from the world and by critically reflecting upon our 
place within it.516 Although such principles are not always fully accepted and accommodated, 
they are moral reasons nonetheless, and like a trail of breadcrumbs from a forest, mark our 
path beyond our evolved natures. These reasons challenge us to constantly reconsider what 
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we owe to each other and the world. Whether or not we ever live up to these reasons is 
another question. 
Conclusion 
Southwood’s expanded analysis of the task of constructivism demonstrates that the final 
constituent challenge that I identified in debunking literature rests on an assumption about 
how constructivism is characterised. I argued that Street’s account of constructivism carried 
forward metaethical literature in important respects, but that following Southwood’s 
distinction between local normative and local constitutive varieties of constructivism, Street’s 
innovation is mistaken as it runs these varieties of constructivism together. It is only with this 
assumption, and her coincidence challenge which I discussed in the previous chapter, that 
Street’s epistemological objection gains its illusion of force. I argued that Scanlon’s account 
meets the task of adducing standards of correctness and is thus a viable candidate for a realist 
constructivism. That such a candidate account remains indicates that the aspiring debunker 
faces the problem of available evidence. This means the debunker cannot argue that purely 
evolutionary considerations guarantee anti-realist conclusions. Instead, the metaethical debate 
between realists and anti-realists is settled externally to any debunking attempt, utilising 











In Chapter One I introduced the evolutionary debunking argument. The EDA is 
unique in metaethical argumentation in attempting to offer an undercutting defeater, as 
opposed to a rebutting defeater, for the moral realist’s claim that moral truth is justified. The 
EDA draws from the discovery that only some beliefs are likely to have emerged from 
cognitive processes which were formed via on-track belief forming processes. For reasons I 
explored in a later chapter, moral beliefs are classified by debunkers as a set of beliefs which 
emerged from cognitive processes formed via off-track belief forming processes. The general 
argument is that the benefits of moral beliefs being grounded in truth were unlike those 
benefits which presented more immediate threats to our survival and evolution, such as those 
beliefs which are formed via our senses, senses which allow us to navigate the challenges of 
our manifest surroundings. The EDA begins with the premise that moral beliefs have been, at 
best, instrumental for our evolution, and as a result our moral beliefs are not necessarily made 
true by any feature of the world. I argued that there seems to be at least four different ways of 
forming the argument, each importing different epistemic claims.  
The Non-Foundational Formulation seeks to debunk the claim of an objective 
foundation to morality by arguing that morality is the result of the non-truth tracking 
genealogy of the natural selection of our moral sense. The Superfluity Formulation appeals to 
ontological parsimony and the empirical claim of a completed non-moral genealogy of 
morality. The Sensitivity Formulation argues through a truth conditional theory of knowledge 
that moral beliefs do not count as knowledge given their status conferred from their 
evolutionary origins. The Implausibility Formulation is a two-pronged attack on the 
justifications offered by realists in the face of the debunking argument.  
I argued that each formulation of the EDA required a shared set of attributes in order 
to succeed as an EDA. I stipulated these conditions in my analysis of the deep structure of the 
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argument. I followed Joyce in his example of Napoleon and the Battle of Waterloo, whereby 
we are to imagine that at some point we were slipped a belief pill which has led us to believe 
that Napoleon lost Waterloo. The discovery that our belief comes from the belief pill is 
supposedly analogous to our discovery that our moral belief has come from the off-track 
formative processes of our moral faculties. Just as a pill alone provides no reasonable 
grounds for believing that Napoleon lost in the battle of Waterloo, so too the etiology of our 
moral beliefs provide no reasonable grounds for believing that moral facts are true mind-
independently. I argued that this thought experiment assists in the elucidation of three 
important considerations for aspiring debunkers. 
Firstly, I asked what it means to debunk the target belief, Napoleon Lost Waterloo. To 
fully appreciate that our belief that Napoleon Lost Waterloo is unjustified because of this 
belief pill, we probably require a number of other beliefs which give this focal belief any 
meaning in the first place. For example, we believe that Napoleon was a French Emperor, 
that a battle took place in a region called Waterloo in 1815, and that the armies which 
Napoleon commanded lost that battle. I named these other beliefs the necessary beliefs (N-
beliefs), since they must appear in the set of beliefs which are targeted by this pill for the 
debunking of them to make any sense. If the belief pill didn’t target the Battle of Waterloo 
which occurred in 1815 (as opposed to another battle of Waterloo in a different year) or the 
actual Napoleon Bonaparte, then the attempt to debunk my belief that Napoelon Lost 
Waterloo fails. I called this first condition the scope of the EDA. The scope in the case of the 
metaethical implementation of this argument must involve all our reasons for believing that 
moral truth is mind-independent.  
Next, I argued that the aspiring debunker must be weary of how widely they set the 
scope of the EDA. Beliefs which are built upon the target belief are toppled by its 
undermining. I proposed the example that we came to believe that Napoleon lost Waterloo by 
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a very small margin. A belief about the degree of the loss at Waterloo makes no sense 
without a loss at Waterloo to refer to. So, the discovery that our belief that Napoleon lost 
Waterloo was the product of a belief pill, means that our auxiliary belief that Napoleon lost 
Waterloo by a very small margin is built upon an insecure epistemic foundation and is thus, 
by extension, unjustified. I called this consideration the debunking argument’s corrosiveness. 
The corrosiveness in the case of the metaethical implementation of this argument pertains to 
the concern that certain beliefs which are like moral beliefs in their development, such as 
some epistemic and prudential beliefs, might be susceptible to debunking were the scope of 
the EDA set too broadly.  
 Finally, I posed the question of how we are to understand those beliefs which are 
outside of a debunking argument’s scope yet might provide a means for understanding and 
synthesising those beliefs which are within the scope. I gave the example of our knowledge 
that the belief that Prussian forces won the battle of Waterloo against Napoleons’ armies. A 
pill which targeted the N-beliefs I mentioned earlier would be ineffective, as even upon 
discovery that our N-beliefs were tainted, we could deduce from our untainted beliefs 
regarding the Prussian forces that Napoleon must have lost Waterloo. If I were widen my 
scope so as to include this belief regarding the success of the Prussian forces, to safeguard 
against the failure I have just demonstrated, I must further account for those beliefs regarding 
the German forces, the allies of the German forces, then the War of the Seventh Coalition, 
then the French revolution, and so on. We might even look to the arrangements of states 
today and deduce something further about the outcome of the war. Either the debunker 
continually expands the scope of their EDA until all this information is similarly contained 
within the scope (making the problem of corrosiveness a more considerable one), or their 
EDA is rendered ineffective. I called this the problem of available evidence. I showed that 
Joyce was seemingly aware of this condition when he wrote that, “unless you can find some 
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concrete evidence either in favour or against the belief you should cease to believe this 
thing…”517 It is precisely this search for alternative evidence which makes up the ongoing 
debate between realists and anti-realists. The problem of available evidence reveals my 
central contention with the evolutionary debunking argument, which I called the otiosity 
argument. 
The otiosity argument shows that it is underlying metaethical assumptions or 
otherwise what has already been established through rebutting facts that carries forward the 
realist and anti-realist debate, as opposed to this progress coming from purely undermining 
facts emerging from evolutionary debunking literature. This is because in order to cope with 
the problem of available evidence, the aspiring debunker must first show that no reason 
outside of the scope of the EDA exists for a realist to believe in the mind-independent truth of 
moral facts. In this exercise, the aspiring debunker would be effectively demonstrating the 
conclusion that they seek to establish via the EDA, namely that belief in the mind-
independent truth of moral facts is unjustified. Chapters Three, Four and Five, play out this 
issue as I show that through their attempt to safeguard against the problem of available 
evidence, debunkers merely assume or otherwise attempt to preestablish various anti-realist 
conclusions. These arguments demonstrate the otiosity of the EDA, since the debunkers are 
either successful or unsuccessful in their attempts to establish that realists have no reasons 
independent of the EDA to believe in the mind-independent truth of moral facts. 
I then turned to prominent arguments in existing debunking literature. The first 
argument I explored challenged the most central claim to the evolutionary debunking of 
morality – the claim that there is any evolutionary story to be told of our moral beliefs in the 
first place. I called the view that moral beliefs are the product of an evolutionary and 
epistemically off-track formative process, the Darwinian Hypothesis. Recall the stipulation of 
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the Darwinian Hypothesis, which was that “moral beliefs are formed and supported only 
through unreliable doxastic processes.” If moral beliefs are not formed only through 
unreliable doxastic processes, then the debunker must concede the more modest conclusion 
that only some of our moral beliefs are not justified. Such an argument does not threaten the 
broader position of metaethical realism. The literature on denying the Darwinian Hypothesis 
attempts to establish this. I first began by emphasising what it would mean to debunk 
‘morality.’ I argued that a significant portion of debunking literature draws on the empirical 
evidence underlying our conservative expressive tendency (CET) as opposed to our critical 
reflective capacity (CRC). 
I proposed this distinction in order to gain clarity in what we mean when we discuss 
‘morality’. I argued that we have the tendency to act in certain ways, form moral judgements 
or make decisions about how we should act or certain characteristics we should express, in 
accordance with our evolved natures and that, on the other hand, we have a capacity to reflect 
on the ways in which we choose to act and the sort of people we thus become or aspire to be. 
The existence of this latter capacity problematises the attempt to empirically investigate 
morality since it exceeds the kind of disposition to believe targeted by EDAs. Next, I argued 
that there does not yet exist a satisfactory and completed non-moral genealogy for our moral 
beliefs. So, the conclusions drawn through EDAs are hypothetical considerations until more 
work is done to demonstrate that the Darwinian Hypothesis is true.  
I then explored the problem of cherry-picking in nativist literature. Often theorists 
draw upon ‘evidence’ from our evolutionary past in order to defend a certain image of our 
evolved natures. I argued that this evidence is often contradictory and that this reinforces the 
incompleteness of this research. Because of this gap in the literature, debunkers must 
currently propose that some moral beliefs are formed and supported only through unreliable 
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doxastic processes. This is a perfectly accommodatable claim for the realists, and thus the 
debunking argument carries no force on this front. 
 The second argument I explored drew from the literature which accepts, at least for 
the sake of argument, that the Darwinian Hypothesis is true. The realists in this debate call 
themselves the pre-established harmony theorists, since they claim that there is a pre-
established harmony between certain moral facts and the evolved cognitive processes which 
evolved to track them. These theorists seek to ‘lower the epistemic bar’ of scepticism towards 
the belief that we might have evolved to have certain moral beliefs because those beliefs are 
true. Later in the thesis I agree with Street that this avenue of response might require that 
certain values be deemed valuable prior to our belief in them.  
The third and final argument I explored was the self-undermining argument. The self-
undermining argument builds upon the problem of defining a debunking argument’s scope 
and the problem of an EDA’s corrosiveness. Debunkers must have a clear target for their 
EDA in order to contain the universal acid and avoid a debunking argument which 
generalises to its own epistemic foundation. It is in this move, in meeting the demarcation 
challenge, that the debunkers must assume or preestablish metaethical arguments which are 
not distinctly evolutionary, undermining facts. Instead, rebutting facts settled external to the 
attempt to meet the demarcation challenge are relied upon. In Chapter Four I set out those 
assumptions. 
The demarcation challenge set the task of distinguishing which beliefs were formed 
via reliable doxastic processes and which beleifs were not. Debunkers must provide reasons 
for the claim that moral beliefs are formed and supported only through unreliable doxastic 
processes whilst beliefs which underly the scientific and epistemic claims inherent in their 
own argumentation were formed and supported reliably – lest their debunking arguments 
collapse upon themselves.  
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The debunker's attempt to meet the demarcation challenge reveals that truths about 
our manifest surroundings must first be posited 'in one's best explanation' in order to explain 
how our ancestors adapted to overcome the challenges of fires, cliffs, and predators. This 
assumption is not without philosophical disagreement, and furthermore the debunkers do not 
offer this option to the moral realists. Instead, debunkers argue that realists are committed to 
the mysterious position of proposing that moral truth also features in our manifest 
surroundings. I argued that there is a strong history for this kind of ontologising assumption is 
metaethics. As Dworkin argues through his moral field thesis, realists are not committed to 
such a view. I argued that the dichotomy offered by the debunkers seems to be that: 
(1) the moral realist must provide a naturalistic account as to how moral properties 
might have conferred truth upon the beliefs of our ancestors, and explain why this 
would have been beneficial, or  
(2) the moral realist must accept that naturalism fails and that they are led to moral 
scepticism. 
I demonstrated this assumption through an analysis of how Joyce sets up his EDA. 
Joyce argues that Hypothesis A can supposedly explain the history of our moral judgements. 
If Hypothesis A is true, he argues, then Hypothesis B and C (representing non-natural and 
supernatural facts) are rendered superfluous to explaining our moral judgements. Debunkers 
such as Joyce must first show that a naturalist account is not embedded within Hypothesis A. 
This requires argumentation which is independent of undermining facts emerging from 
debunking literature. Joyce runs an independent argument when he attempts to dismiss the 
claim that naturalism is embedded within Hypothesis A on the grounds of his moral clout 
requirement. This means, he argues, that Hypothesis B and C must also be sunk. Firstly, his 
argument against Hypothesis A relies on the outcome of the debate between motivational 
externalists and internalists as opposed to any distinctly evolutionary consideration utilising 
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undermining facts – and I consider the merits of that argument in a later chapter. Secondly, 
his dismissal of Hypothesis B and C seems to rely heavily on this ontologising assumption. 
Meeting the demarcation challenge ultimately requires that debunkers construe the 
debate between realists and anti-realists as a naturalistic one, whereby moral facts can be 
situated within our manifest surroundings. I introduced Scanlon and Dworkins domain-
centred realism, which offers a different perspective whereby “the basic element of the 
normative domain is a relation, being a reason for, can be seen as a claim about the 
metaphysics of the normative.”518 It may be so that the world impinges on our sensory 
surfaces, but this does not set the ontological precedent for all forms of understanding. 
Taking domain centred realism seriously opens up conceptual space for reasons 
fundamentalism, whereby in order to “earn the right to think that some moral judgement is 
true…I have to provide moral arguments for that very strong opinion.”519  I highlighted that 
the ontologising assumption immediately limits the scope of the EDA to the debunkers peril, 
since cases of moral realism where metaphysics is construed differently remain open.  
I then turned to another problem with Hypothesis A. If the Darwinian Hypothesis is 
true, the question still remains as to whether it is vindicating or debunking in regard to moral 
truths. Joyce acknowledges this problem as well. I introduced the background of an updated 
account of moral naturalism which takes our evolved natures seriously yet is not necessarily 
anti-realist in nature. I explored the recent debate seeking to enrich the weight of the 
Darwinian Hypothesis and argued that the most promising candidate for an account of moral 
naturalism is in developmental systems theory. DST acknowledges the complexity and non-
fixed nature of organisms transitioning through life cycles and living in an interdependent 
relationship with their environments. DST opens the conceptual space for the possibility of a 
 
518 Scanlon, Being Realisitic About Reasons. 25-26 
519 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs. 26 
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moral niche, whereby cultures and societies which are ever evolving constitute the 
interdependent development of human morality. Though this explanation is a significant 
improvement on the ultimate/proximate distinction, it only carries the important question – 
the vindicating or debunking nature of this development – further down the river. In order to 
settle this question, I turned to metaethical literature attempting to synthesise DST.  
Severini, a prominent author at this intersection, reads this updated developmental 
picture as evidence for the constructed nature of human morality – an argument in favour of 
anti-realism. In order to make this argument, I argued that Severini must take a position on 
what moral truth is constructed from. Since this is a question of the mind-independence of 
truth, this means that Severini must ultimately rely on metaethical argumentation external to 
the purely undermining facts of debunking literature. 
I then considered the residual concern of moral motivation emerging from Joyce’s 
work. Joyce argues that moral naturalism – and by extension non-naturalism and 
supernaturalism – do not provide a feasible account of why we should be moral. I argued that 
his analysis assumes motivational externalism and that his reasons for dismissing internalism 
as a candidate theory are grounded in ontologising assumptions about the nature of moral 
facts. 
In chapter five, I turned to the final of the underlying arguments that I believe play out the 
otiosity argument. I began with a formulation of Street’s Darwinian dilemma, which was as 
follows: 
(1) Realists must provide a tracking account without presupposing the mind-
independent truth of certain ends of selection as values for creatures like us. Or, 
(2) Realists can deny that truth was tracked, but must provide a story as to how 
evaluative belief and truth happen to coincide now, for creatures like us, when: 
a. Independent truth could have been anything. 
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b. The forces which led to our belief formation produced indifferent to mind-
independent truth (in contrast to empirical beliefs), so if evaluative belief 
and truth do coincide, how can realism be justified in the face of this 
strikingly convenient coincidence? 
I have shown in Chapter 4 that (1) is a consideration that debunkers must face head on, as the 
Darwinian hypothesis, if true, may still vindicate rather than debunk mind-independent truth. 
I began by exploring what Street refers to as her devastating epistemological objection, and I 
argued that she means to refer to her Darwinian Dilemma. Upon a closer analysis of the 
dilemma, I argued that Street proposes (1) in the case of realist’s cherry-picking evaluative 
facts to suit their varieties of realism. Instances of cherry-picking value claims support 
Street’s constructivist claim that our evaluative beliefs are constituted by our evaluative 
stance towards those facts, however this observation does not guarantee anti-realism. It is still 
an open question as to whether a satisfactory naturalist account can be provided that can 
better account for our evolutionary relationship with stance-independent moral facts – and in 
chapter four I explored the literature which provides a promising line of response. There is 
also room for a non-naturalist line of response, however Street’s second horn (2a and 2b) 
attempts to guard against such a response. This is because Street devastating epistemological 
objection rests on the coincidence challenge, which calls for a naturalist explanation of our 
relationship with moral facts. This kind of argument is not a new or distinctly evolutionary 
consideration in metaethics or in debates on mathematical realism. I argued that this 
argument ultimately equates realism with a causal understanding of our relationship with 
moral facts.  
I argued that any residual challenge lies in how realists and anti-realists interpret this 
species-level relativism which is described in Darwin’s quote about our moral nature. Had we 
evolved under different circumstances our evaluative beliefs would have been entirely 
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different. The anti-realists seem to rely on the reading of this claim that our evaluative beliefs 
would be different because they are fixed by our evaluative stances. I argued that this reading 
ultimately adopts a position on the stance-dependence of value. It is here where Street 
imports her version of Humean constructivism. A limitation of Street’s construal is that two 
strands of constructivism are run together. Since one of these versions of constructivism, a 
version I attribute to Scanlon, permits a positive account of reasons, I argue that Street must 
first preestablish that Scanlon’s account is unviable. However, if Street can establish the 
stance-dependence of value, then she need not construct the EDA against moral realists. So, 
even though this debate remains unsettled, the otiosity of the EDA in metaethical 
argumentation is reinforced.  
The evolutionary debunking argument has become a popular metaethical challenge 
against the ultimate foundations of moral belief that grew from the consideration of the role 
that evolution played in the development of human morality. Though an important number of 
innovations have come from this consideration both in philosophy and science, the attempt to 
integrate evolutionary facts into the metaethical debate between realists and anti-realists is 
deeply problematic and inconclusive. In the end, in so far as moral reasons constitute an 
independent domain of inquiry, it is doubtful that evolutionary considerations alone can lead 
to the rather serious conclusions – that morality is a myth, a useful fiction, and so on – that 
have arisen in recent literature. Instead, the debates about the ultimate foundations of 
morality, our justifications for moral belief and our reasons for acting, are debates which 
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